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Abstract 
This thesis examines the response of the Labour Government to events in Portugal following 
the coup d’état in April 1974. Britain, as Portugal’s traditional ally and largest trading 
partner, with close partisan ties between the Labour movement and Portuguese Socialist 
Party, was a leading player in the international response to developments in Lisbon. The 
Portuguese Revolution also had wider implications for British foreign policy: the presence of 
communist ministers in government threatened both the cohesion of NATO and detente with 
the Soviet Union; West European leaders sought to influence events in Lisbon through the 
new political structures of the EEC; the outcome of events in Portugal appeared to 
foreshadow a political transition in Spain; and decolonisation in Angola and Mozambique 
made Rhodesia’s continued independence unlikely. This study therefore contributes to 
historical debate concerning the Labour Government and its foreign policy during the 1970s.  
It considers the extent to which the domestic, political and economic difficulties of the 
Labour Government during this period undermined the effectiveness of its foreign policy. 
This thesis also considers the relative importance of, and interplay between, the factors which 
shaped post-war British foreign policy: the Cold War, membership of NATO and the EEC; 
relations with newly independent states in the developing world and the Commonwealth; and 
the relationship with the United States. It also examines how those within the government 
who play a role in foreign policy- principally the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Cabinet, 
Treasury and the Foreign Office- interpreted the national interest and sought to influence 
policy-making accordingly; the role of outside groups, such as the political parties, Trade 
Unions and the media, are also considered. 
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Chapter I – Introduction 
 
Britain’s role and status as a world power, following its rapid decolonisation and gradual 
economic decline, had effectively ceased by the late 1960s. The 1956 Suez crisis had 
signalled that Britain was no longer an independent power, and the 1960s Rhodesia crisis 
ended initial optimism that global influence might be retained through the Commonwealth. 
The decision in January 1968 to withdraw British military forces from ‘East-of -Suez’ 
confirmed its decline as a world power, leading to the conclusion of the 1969 Duncan Report 
that Britain had become “a power of the second order.’1 During the 1970s, the country sought 
to reinvent its global role as a regional power through membership of the European Economic 
Community. This was also a period of significant change in the nature of power within 
international politics following the rise of global energy prices, superpower détente and the 
emergence of a multi-polar world order. However, Britain’s worsening economic difficulties 
during the 1970s world recession, alongside domestic political instability resulting from 
minority governments, led many to question its continued relevance in international affairs. 
 The Labour Government elected in February 1974 faced very different circumstances 
from those of its 1960s predecessors. These had begun with great optimism, but there was 
now widespread cynicism towards a government which had not been expected to win the 
election and appeared to lack a clear strategy for addressing Britain’s problems. Harold 
Wilson sought to learn from his previous experience of Cabinet divisions by adopting a new 
style of government where ministers had greater independence. He appointed James 
Callaghan as Foreign Secretary, a previous rival but an able politician with experience of 
every other major ministerial role (including being his predecessor’s shadow since 1972). His 
brief was to renegotiate Britain’s membership of the EEC and restore a close Anglo-
American relationship. Despite initial successes, including the referendum on EEC 
membership and a settlement of the industrial disputes which undermined the previous 
government, global recession led to worsening economic conditions in Britain which 
alongside the failure to achieve a Parliamentary majority in the October 1974 election, led to 
a steady erosion in the effectiveness of the Labour Government. Throughout its remaining 
period in office, the Labour Government struggled to pass legislation and was in almost 
permanent crisis. Harold Wilson’s surprising and unexpected resignation in February 1976 
                                                             
1 Report of the Review Committee on Overseas Representation, 1968-9 (Duncan Report) (HMSO, 1969). 
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led to his replacement by James Callaghan, but Britain’s domestic and economic difficulties 
continued, culminating in its humiliation during the IMF crisis in 1976.  
The revolution in Portugal was one of the most important foreign policy crises faced 
by the 1970s Labour Government. The removal of the Caetano regime on the 25
th
 April 1974 
led to a two-year power struggle which brought “six provisional governments, two presidents, 
a failed right-wing coup attempt, a failed left-wing coup attempt, three elections, countless 
seizures of land and housing, bombings, strikes, demonstrations and still more turmoil.”2 By 
1976 parliamentary democracy was established in Portugal, but in the immediate aftermath of 
the April coup d’état this had seemed the least likely outcome; the presence of Marxist 
military officers and members of the Portuguese Communist Party within government led 
many contemporary observers to believe that they were “witnessing one of the most 
revolutionary socialist developments to have occurred in Western Europe since World War 
Two.”3 Portugal was also the last European state to retain its overseas territories and its 
commitment to grant them immediate independence threatened civil war and proxy Cold War 
conflict. Thus developments in Portugal had wider implications for international politics, 
particularly the potential to undermine east-west détente. This led to a division between the 
United States, which sought a robust western response, and its West European allies who 
took a more restrained view of events and provided assistance to the political moderates in 
Lisbon.  
 The removal of the Caetano regime presented an unexpected opportunity for the 
Labour Government. Its replacement by a provisional government dedicated to establishing 
democracy in Portugal and granting independence to its overseas territories meant two recent 
Labour election manifesto commitments (to remove authoritarian regimes in Western Europe 
and white racialist states in southern Africa) might be achieved. In particular, Harold Wilson 
immediately realised that an independent Mozambique would enable the effective 
enforcement of international sanctions against Rhodesia, and so might lead to a resolution of 
one of the most intractable issues which had faced successive British governments. It also 
meant that Anglo-Portuguese relations, which had been damaged during the Caetano period, 
might be restored. Furthermore, as Portugal’s ‘oldest ally’, with historic diplomatic and trade 
                                                             
2 Paul Christopher Manuel, The Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), p. xii. 
3 Bill Lomax ‘Ideology and Illusion in the Portuguese Revolution: The Role of the Left’, in L.Graham and 
D.Wheeler, ed., In Search of Modern Portugal: The Revolution and its Consequences (Madison: The University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1983), p. 105. 
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links, alongside the existence of close partisan ties between the Labour Party and the 
Portuguese Socialist Party, the Labour Government was in a favourable position to have 
influence in Lisbon.
4
 However, the wider international implications of the Portuguese 
Revolution endangered the Labour Government’s foreign policy elsewhere. The presence of 
communist ministers within the provisional government raised concern at Portugal’s 
continued membership of the NATO alliance and threatened to undermine Anglo-Soviet 
relations. Differences within the response of the western alliance, including between Britain 
and the United States, complicated its multilateral approach to foreign policy. The leftward 
direction of the revolution also endangered British business interests in Portugal. 
This study will consider Britain’s response to the Portuguese Revolution and will 
contribute to historical debate concerning the Labour Government and its foreign policy 
during the 1970s. It will do so in three central ways. Firstly it will consider the extent to 
which the domestic, political and economic difficulties of the Labour Government during this 
period undermined the effectiveness of its foreign policy. Immediately after the April coup 
d’état Britain had some success in achieving its objectives, particularly in encouraging 
independence for Portugal’s overseas territories by supporting political moderates in Lisbon. 
However, as the political crisis in Lisbon worsened, threatening Britain’s national interests 
elsewhere, the Labour Government was unable to conduct a coherent foreign policy. In 
particular, it was unable to provide substantial bilateral economic assistance and official visits 
were cancelled because ministers needed to attend Parliament to ensure the survival of a 
minority government. This thesis will contribute to historical debate concerning the 
effectiveness of the Labour Government’s foreign policy during the mid-1970s. 
This thesis will secondly contribute to our understanding of the nature of British 
foreign policy during this period. The recent transformation of its world role, alongside 
important developments in international politics, meant this was an era of significant change 
in Britain’s approach to foreign relations. Because the Portuguese Revolution had wider 
implications for international politics, several of the most important influences on Britain’s 
post-war foreign policy shaped its response to events in Lisbon. In particular, this study will 
allow a consideration of (a) the importance of Cold War imperatives, with the presence of 
                                                             
4 Anglo-Portuguese relations went back to 1373, with the forming of the world’s oldest alliance; treaties in 1703 
and 1810, and Portuguese commitments during World War One, cemented this diplomatic and economic 
relationship. However, Portuguese neutrality in World War Two, the loss of Goa in 1961 and British protests at 
the anti-colonial wars in Africa had strained relations between the two countries. 
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communist ministers in government threatening the cohesion of the NATO alliance and 
superpower relations; (b) the impact of its recent membership of the EEC including whether 
there was a distinctively ‘European’ approach to events in Portugal; (c) the nature of the 
Anglo-American relationship, particularly the existence of institutional cooperation and 
shared values; (d) the importance of Britain’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa in its 
approach to the Portuguese overseas territories, particularly those Commonwealth states 
directly affected; (e) the Labour Government’s socialist values, including its membership of 
the Socialist International; and (f) the importance of protecting British business interests, 
after the expropriation of British farmers’ property during the revolution. Because these are 
many of the factors that shaped Britain’s post-war foreign policy, this study allows an 
analysis of their interplay and relative importance, thereby providing a valuable insight into 
the nature of its foreign policy during the 1970s. 
Thirdly, this thesis will contribute to historical debate on British foreign policy 
making during this period. There was a range of influences both inside and outside 
government on this process, and Britain’s changing world role led to innovations in 
diplomatic practice. It will consider (a) the role of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime 
Minister (and Labour Cabinet), particularly during periods of domestic crises, and their 
leadership styles and working relationship; (b) the influence of individual Labour ministers 
and MPs who demonstrated a particular interest in events in Lisbon, alongside the Labour 
Party and how it was able to influence policy through the National Executive Committee; (c)  
the influence of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, particular those departments 
concerned with Portugal and the British Embassy in Lisbon; and (d) whether the opposition 
political parties were able to shape the policy of the Labour Government. Being a pluralistic 
democracy, there were also several influences on policy-making in Britain outside 
government; these included business interest groups, the British media, and trade unions. The 
importance of their role will enable a consideration of whether the Labour Government 
grasped the potential of ‘Soft Power’ in response to the Portuguese Revolution.5 
 
 
                                                             
5 Soft Power is the idea that state power can be measured not only by military and economic strength but also 
through cultural influence. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: the means to success in world politics (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 5-8. 
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Historiography 
The record of the Labour Governments of the 1960s and 1970s has been the subject of 
continuous historical research. There was initially greater interest in the 1960s governments 
as memoirs and archival records for the period became available first. The 1970s Labour 
Government has been frequently portrayed as the moment when British decline reached its 
nadir. Its record was important to contemporary debate amongst British political 
commentators considering the necessity of Thatcherism. During the 1990s the archives for 
this period were opened and the memoirs of Labour ministers were published. The memoirs 
of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan include Portugal prominently in their accounts of 
foreign policy during the 1970s.
6
 This meant that subsequent biographies and historical 
studies of the Labour Government did likewise. The opening of papers in the National 
Archives under the thirty-year rule has often brought new insights into previous British 
governments. The publication of an FCO document series on NATO’s southern flank crisis 
included a section on Britain’s response to the Portuguese Revolution which has been used in 
several historical studies. More recently, diplomatic historians have begun to research closely 
the archival records and consider the effectiveness of difference aspects of the 1970s Labour 
Government foreign policy. 
The international dimension of the Portuguese Revolution has been the subject of 
ongoing historical study. The first writings, published immediately after the revolution, relied 
on first-hand interviews, memoir accounts and released government documents, and stressed 
the importance of outside actors. During the 1980s the memoirs of western leaders were 
published, within which they sought to explain their role in events during the Portuguese 
Revolution.
7
 This decade also saw the emergence of an influential school of Political Science 
which viewed the Portuguese Revolution as an archetypal democratic transition, in which 
international support was critical to the outcome. In the 1990s, the opening of government 
archives in western and former communist states led to a renewed interest in the international 
dimension of the Portuguese Revolution. The opening of British archives led to interest 
                                                             
6 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987). Harold Wilson, Final Term: The Labour 
Government 1974-76 (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1979). 
7 Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (New York: Viking, 1992). Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: the 
Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (London: W.H. Allen, 1979). Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999). Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York, Simon & 
Schuster, 1990). Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: a Political retrospective (New York: Random House, 
1989). 
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amongst Portuguese historians in Britain’s role in developments in Lisbon. The Carnation 
Revolution remains a subject of great significance in Portugal. The process of national 
reconciliation following authoritarian rule, familiar to its Iberian neighbour, means historical 
revelations often shape contemporary political debate.  
 A number of historiographical debates are relevant to this thesis, and although not all 
directly address Britain’s response to the Portuguese Revolution, they consider areas 
necessary for understanding its foreign policy during the period. The following 
historiographical survey is organised into a section of historical debates on the Labour 
Government and British foreign policy during the 1970s, and a section on those concerned 
with Britain’s response to the Portuguese Revolution.  
 
a) The Labour Government and its foreign policy  
 
The first studies of the Labour Government were dominated by the view that Britain 
had entered a period of irreversible decline.
8
 Initially written by political commentators 
during the 1980s, these accounts were often influenced by an image which “owes more to the 
back-projection of Conservative hagiography.”9 Robert Skidelsky is typical when he 
contends that “Not much can be salvaged from the Wilson-Callaghan years of 1974-9 except 
lessons. They were among the low points of British Government in the twentieth century, 
perhaps the lowest point.”10 These accounts are principally concerned with domestic 
economic failings, especially rampant inflation, rising unemployment and industrial unrest. 
The impact of Britain’s economic recession on the effectiveness of her foreign policy is 
widely recognised, especially the damage to its global reputation caused by continuing 
defence spending cuts.
11
 The Labour Government’s role in encouraging Portugal’s 
decolonisation and transition to democracy are either overlooked or not seen as being 
significant within these studies. But the argument that Britain was unable to conduct an 
effective foreign policy during this period is directly relevant to this thesis.   
                                                             
8
 See, Robert Skidelsky, ‘The Worst of Governments’, Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson, eds., New Labour, 
Old Labour: the Wilson and Callaghan Governments, 1974-79 (London : Routledge, 2004), pp.316-320. 
9 Ann Lane, ‘Foreign and Defence Policy’, Ibid., p. 154. 
10 Robert Skidelsky, ‘The Worst of Governments’, Ibid., p. 316. 
11 Ritchie Ovendale, ed.,British defence policy since 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 
131-157. John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1980: The Special Relationship (London: 
Macmillan, 1981). Robb Thomas, ‘The ‘Limit of What is Tolerable’: British defence cuts and the Anglo-
American ‘special relationship’, 1974-1976, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 321-337. 
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A revisionist interpretation of the Labour Government began with the publication of 
Ross McKibben’s article, “Homage to Wilson and Callaghan.”12 A number of historical 
studies using the newly published memoirs of former ministers followed to give a more 
favourable interpretation of the Labour Government’s record.13 This was particularly the case 
with biographies of Wilson and Callaghan, written during the 1990s, which are broadly 
sympathetic to the Labour Government. These accounts tend to be concerned with, or to 
emphasise, its achievements during the 1960s, with its final term viewed as a less successful 
postscript.
14
 More recently, there has been greater academic attention on the government of 
the 1970s.
15
 The period is seen as interesting to historians because of the “unfortunate 
conjunction of a new government lacking a secure base in the House of Commons, with a 
major international economic turning-point signalled by the breakdown of Bretton Woods 
and the 1973 oil price hike.”16 In particular, there have been several studies of the 1976 IMF 
crisis, the background of which is relevant to this thesis.
17
  
The impact of Britain’s economic recession on the effectiveness of its foreign policy 
is widely recognised in these accounts. Historians sympathetic to the Labour Government 
argue that, considering the scale of its domestic problems, its achievements during the 1970s 
are impressive, thus demonstrating the outstanding ability of its Cabinet ministers. The 
foreign policy successes of the Labour Government are central to this revisionist argument.
18
 
Kenneth Morgan, for example, argues that “Above all, it was a constructive period in foreign 
policy, quieter than the later Blair years, but with more obvious achievement and certainly no 
risky adventure like an invasion of Iraq.”19 The recent opening of the archives for this period 
                                                             
12 Ross McKibbin, ‘Homage to Wilson and Callaghan’, London Review of Books 20:3 (October 1991), pp. 3-5. 
13 Michael Artis and David Cobham, ed., Labour’s Economic Policies: 1974-1979 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1991). Kenneth Morgan, Ages of Reform: Dawns and Downfalls of the British Left (London: 
Tauris, 2011). 
14 Clive Ponting, Breach of promise: Labour in Power, 1964-1970 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989). John 
Young, The Labour Governments, 1964-70,vol.II: International Policy (Manchester University Press, 2003). 
Richard Coopey, Steven Fielding and Nick Tiratsoo, ed., The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1993).Glen O'Hara and Helen Parr, ed., The Wilson Governments 1964-70 Reconsidered (London: 
Routledge, 2006). 
15 A number of recent accounts on Britain during the 1970s combining research using government archives and 
cultural analysis have been popular amongst the wider reading public. Andy Beckett, When the lights went out: 
Britain in the seventies (London: Faber, 2009). Dominic Sandbrook, Seasons in the Sun: the Battle for Britain, 
1974-1979 (London: Allen Lane, 2012). Alwyn Turner, Crisis? What Crisis?: Britain in the 1970s (London: 
Aurum, 2013). 
16 Edmund Dell, A Hard Pounding: politics and economic crisis 1974-76 (Oxford, 1991), p.3. 
17Kathleen Burk and Alec Cairncross, Goodbye Great Britain (Yale University Press: New Haven & London, 
1992). Richard Cooper and Nicholas Woodward, Britain in the 1970s: the troubled economy (London: UCL 
Press, 1996). Kevin Hickson, The IMF crisis of 1976 and British politics (London: Tauris, 2005) 
18 Ann Lane, ‘Foreign and Defence Policy’, New Labour, Old Labour, p. 154. 
19 Kenneth O.Morgan,‘Was Britain dying?’, New Labour, Old Labour., P. 306. 
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has led a number of historians to consider the Labour Government’s response to foreign 
policy crises during the 1970s, to which this study will be an addition.
20
  
The eventual democratic outcome in Portugal has been essential to the argument that 
the Labour Government conducted an effective foreign policy during this period, but this 
reflects the prominence of the Portuguese Revolution within the memoir accounts of Wilson 
and Callaghan rather than British archival research. Britain’s response to events in Portugal is 
also given a prominent place in their biographies. Austen Morgan gives a detailed 
chronological account of Britain’s role in international diplomacy over Portugal using the 
memoirs of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. He concludes that British intervention “was 
nothing less than interference in the internal affairs of another country”, even suggesting the 
probability that this involved the use of MI6.
21
 Morgan also sees Britain as playing a key role 
in reversing Soviet intervention in Portugal by threatening to end trade negotiations. Ben 
Pimlott, a freelance journalist in Lisbon in 1975, argues that Britain played a role in 
diplomacy between the superpowers over Portugal (with a degree of independence from the 
United States), and refers to divisions within the Labour party over Portugal.
22
 The chapters 
on Callaghan’s period as Foreign Secretary by Kenneth Morgan are extensively researched 
using his memoirs, press reports, biographies and personal papers (at that time unreleased).
23
 
His argument closely follows Callaghan’s memoir, with Portugal and Cyprus seen as the 
most important foreign policy crises of the period. He contends that Callaghan was prominent 
in Britain’s response throughout the crisis, and concludes that his action in supporting 
democracy in Portugal was one of his greatest achievements. 
There are two studies of the 1970s Labour Government which are particularly 
relevant to this thesis. David Allen gives an overwhelmingly positive account of James 
Callaghan’s period as Foreign Secretary, although his view is based almost entirely on the 
memoirs and biographies of Wilson and Callaghan.
24
 He sees Callaghan’s approach to 
Portugal as a “great success”, particularly by changing the US approach to relations with the 
PSP. Callaghan’s effectiveness as Foreign Secretary is given detailed consideration. He 
                                                             
20 Aoife Collins, ‘The Cabinet Office, Tony Benn and the Renegotiation of Britain's Terms of Entry into the 
European Community, 1974–1975’, Contemporary British History 24:4 (2010), pp. 471-49. Geraint Hughes, 
‘Soldiers of Misfortune: the Angolan Civil War, The British Mercenary Intervention, and UK Policy towards 
Southern Africa, 1975–6’, The International History Review 36:3 (2014), pp.493-512.  
21 Austen Morgan, Harold Wilson: A Life (London: Pluto Press, 1992), pp.483-484. 
22 Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: Harper Collins, 1992), p.670. 
23 Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan- A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.408-466. 
24 David Allen ´James Callaghan: Foreign Secretary 1974-76’, Kevin Theakston, ed., British Foreign Secretaries 
since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2004), p.47-66. 
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argues that his close personal ties with fellow leaders at the Commonwealth and Socialist 
International were a critical aspect of his approach to foreign policy. Allen contends that 
Callaghan had a strong working relationship with Wilson, which was a significant feature of 
this government, leading him to conclude that “Callaghan probably enjoyed better relations 
with the Prime Minister than any other Foreign Secretary in recent times.”25 He analyses 
Callaghan’s personal leadership style, recognising his willingness to defer to his strong 
ministerial team and expert advice from the FCO, alongside regular consultation with the 
Trade Union Congress and the International Committee of the NEC. Allen argues that 
Callaghan took an innovative approach to diplomacy, for example appointing private officials 
(such as Tom McNally) as political advisers, and allowing them a prominent role. This leads 
to his overall conclusion that “Callaghan brought a distinct style to his time at the FCO.”26 He 
gives little consideration though to the difficulty of conducting an effective foreign policy 
during a period of domestic crises; his contention that Callaghan was adapt at uniting factions 
within the Labour Party will also not be supported by the findings of this thesis.  
The second relevant study is Anne Lane’s chapter on foreign and defence policy 
within a collection on the 1970s Labour Government. Britain’s involvement in the 
Portuguese Revolution is seen within the context of its wider approach to the Cold War 
(especially its intervention during the Helsinki Summit), although her analysis is limited to 
memoir accounts. She argues that Callaghan’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy, rather 
than being a reflection of his personal leadership style, was a means to maintain Britain’s 
global influence in response to changing international circumstances. Her overall conclusion 
is that because “Labour was necessarily preoccupied with domestic issues during this 
period,” this gave Callaghan the opportunity to “impose a fresh vision of British interaction 
with the outside world which was rooted in the principles of socialist internationalism” which 
recognised the realities of Britain’s global decline.27 His commitment to the Anglo-American 
relationship, Lane concludes, was “embedded in a broader strategy” of British foreign policy 
informed by these principles.
28
 
There are a number of historical debates on Britain’s post-war foreign policy which, 
although rarely making specific reference to the Portuguese Revolution, are relevant for an 
                                                             
25 Ibid.¸ p.51. 
26 Ibid., p.52.  
27 Ann Lane, ‘Foreign and Defence Policy’, New Labour, Old Labour, p 154. 
28 Ibid., p. 155. 
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understanding of the Labour Government’s approach to foreign policy during the 1970s. This 
thesis will consider issues relating to the historical debate on the extent to which Britain had 
declined as a world power during the 1970s. To some historians, economic decline and 
withdrawal from global commitments signalled that Britain was no longer a global power, 
whilst to others (although a significant gap now existed between its capabilities and the 
superpowers) its influence was successfully maintained through the perception, domestically 
and internationally, that it was still capable of shaping developments elsewhere.
29
 Britain’s 
ability to effectively and realistically manage its existing resources to maintain a global role 
is central to this argument. A number of historians, however, argue that because Britain’s 
diplomacy was increasingly conducted through multilateral organisations, its exact role and 
influence are difficult to assess.
30
 
The importance of the Anglo-American relationship to Britain means its post-war 
foreign policy has always been made with reference to that of the United States. The 
historiographical debate on the nature of the relationship is therefore relevant to this thesis. 
The dominant interpretation is the functionalist school, influenced by ‘realism’, which argues 
that the Anglo-America relationship is a result of shared interests; others argue that the 
relationship is not merely between leaders but that there exists “an institutionalised ‘special 
relationship’ with Britain centring on patterns of consultation, nuclear sharing, and defence 
and intelligence cooperation.”31 There is wide agreement amongst historians that the Anglo-
American relationship had been damaged during the Heath Government because of its 
reorientation of British foreign policy towards Europe, but after its electoral defeat both 
parties sought its restoration, leading to the mid-1970s being a period of particularly close 
                                                             
29 Historians stressing Britain’s post-war decline include Paul Kennedy, The realities behind diplomacy: 
background influences on British external policy, 1865-1980 (London : Allen & Unwin, 1981); C. J. Bartlett, 
British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1989); and K. Robbins, 
The Eclipse of a Great Power: Modern Britain, 1870-1992 (London, 1997). By contrast, historians who see the 
period as one of transformation in Britain’s role include John Young, Britain and the World in the Twentieth 
Century (London, 1997); David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled (Harlow: Longman, 2000) and Mark Curtis, The 
Ambiguities of Power: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (London, 1995).  
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relations, especially between Callaghan and Kissinger.
32
 There is no specific reference to the 
Portuguese Revolution in the historiography of the Anglo-American relationship, aside from 
John Dumbrell’s argument, based on British memoirs, that Britain took the diplomatic lead 
on this issue. There have also been a number of studies on the relationship between the 
Labour Party and the United States.
33
 These explore the paradox that Anglo-American 
relations have often been closest between US administrations and nominally socialist British 
governments, leading Kenneth Morgan to argue that, despite “residual anti-Americanism” 
within the Labour movement, “Labour was the main custodian of the idea of the Special 
Relationship.” 34 
There are a number of studies on the Labour Government’s post-war approach to 
foreign policy, with particular interest in the extent to which they have followed democratic 
socialist principles. The record of the 1960s Wilson Governments on contentious foreign 
policy issues, such as the retention of the nuclear deterrent, Rhodesia and the Vietnam War, 
has been the subject of several studies.
35
 These give a useful context to understanding its 
approach to foreign affairs during the 1970s. In his account of the Anglo-American 
relationship, Peter Jones considers the tension between the largely pro-American Labour 
leadership and its more left-wing party members, arguing that its approach to foreign policy 
tended to be more radical in opposition because of the role of its members within the National 
Executive Committee which shaped its policies.  
There have been a number of studies which consider British foreign policy making 
during this period. The changes in Britain’s world role and in wider international politics 
meant that the 1960s and 1970s “were something of a golden age for such studies in 
Britain”36 In particular, there was great interest in the functioning of the recently merged 
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Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
37
 These accounts were influential in shaping historians’ 
subsequent understanding of British foreign policy. More recent historical studies address 
issues which are directly relevant to this thesis. They use published memoirs, interviews with 
participants and newly opened archives to analyse policy making (often through selected 
case-studies from post-war British foreign policy).
38
A number of historical debates are 
relevant to this thesis, particularly the changing role of the FCO, and the record of the 
protagonists who have shaped British policy making during this period.  
There are two studies of particular relevance to this thesis. In his study of British 
diplomacy during the twentieth century the British historian, John Young, uses several case-
studies from the 1960s and 1970s to argue that this was a critical era of innovation in 
diplomatic practice.
39
 He focuses on a number of areas, such as the recognition of new 
regimes, the role of ambassadors, the conduct of multilateral diplomacy and official state 
visits, all of which are relevant to understanding Britain’s policy making towards Portugal. 
The background to these changes he argues “was one of retreat from the world role, a 
corresponding attempt to escape from colonial conflicts, divisions within the Commonwealth, 
persistent economic weakness, a declining ability to wield military force, an intensification of 
the relationship between domestic and international problems, a focus on relationships with 
other western powers and growing multilateralism, especially thanks to membership of the 
EC.”40 The dilemma facing British policy makers at this time, he contends, was that “at any 
point this picture could be confusing and it was not clear how far or how fast Britain would 
decline in power relative to its main competitors.”41 Although recognising the increasing 
importance of multilateral organisations, he argues that the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Secretary remained central to foreign policy making throughout this period. He views 
                                                             
37 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (New York: The Free Press, 1989). Gaynor Johnson, ed., The Foreign Office and 
British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Routledge, 2005). 
38 Ronald Barston, Modern Diplomacy (third edition, Longman, 2006). Tessa Blackstone and William Plowden, 
Inside the Think Tank: Advising the Cabinet, 1971-1983 (William Heinemann, 1988), John Dickie Inside the 
Foreign Office (Chapmans, 1992). John Dickie, The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works? 
(London, 2004). Ruth Dudley Edwards, True Brits: Inside the Foreign Office (London, 1994). Steve Smith, 
Michael Smith and Brian White, ed., British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation (London, 
1988). Gill Bennett, Six Moments of Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
39 John Young, Twentieth-Century Diplomacy: a case study of British practice, 1963-1976 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
40 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
41 Ibid. p. 18. 
20 
 
Callaghan as “a key figure at the top of the Labour leadership, shrewder and more cunning 
than his rivals,” and was a successful foreign secretary.42  
The introductory chapter to a volume on post-war Foreign Secretaries by Kevin 
Theakston analyses changes to their role.
43
 He argues that Britain’s increasingly multilateral 
approach to foreign policy during the post-war period makes it difficult for historians to 
assess their exact role and this means that studies of British foreign policy making tend to 
focus on the small number of case studies, such as the Falklands War, where Britain acted 
bilaterally.
44
 In his concluding chapter to the volume David Hannay argues that 
multilateralism also meant, “Prime Ministers have increasingly moved into foreign affairs, 
limiting the Foreign Secretary’s independence by taking charge of key policy areas, attending 
international summits and conducting one-to-one diplomacy with other heads of 
government.”45 He identifies this transformation as having occurred during the mid-1970s, 
noting that “In 1974 there were no regular European summits, only an occasional not very 
well prepared and organised meeting; the G8 did not exist; NATO did not have regular 
summits; meetings between the leaders of the main powers were sporadic.”46 Theakston also 
claims that a number of significant changes to policy making were introduced by the 1970s 
Labour Government. He notes the important role given to Callaghan’s political adviser, Tom 
McNally, maintaining that he “was particularly influential and he had access to all FCO 
telegrams except those marked ‘Top Secret: Intelligence.”47 The Labour Cabinet is seen to 
have had very little involvement in foreign policy during this period; he observes that “The 
Prime Minister - Foreign Secretary axis normally dominates on foreign affairs: other 
ministers and the Cabinet have only limited involvement.”48  
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b) Britain and the Portuguese Revolution 
The first accounts of the Portuguese Revolution appeared immediately afterwards.
49
 
These relied solely on memoirs, newspaper records and interviews with participants, although 
the climate of free expression in Lisbon, including the release of government documents, 
meant valuable work was published. Their analysis is often speculative, with outside 
intervention habitually mentioned, but invariably without substantiation. The role of the 
United States, and to a lesser extent Britain, is often viewed as conspiratorial, with the 
existence of a covert programme widely assumed. There was renewed interest in the 
Portuguese Revolution during the twentieth anniversary of events. It remains, however, the 
source of great difficulty in the study of modern Portuguese history; many participants in the 
revolution, although ailing, remain alive, such as Mario Soares, whose historical foundation 
is influential.
50
 The Carnation Revolution remains the subject of great debate in Portugal, 
with the release of new government documents and interviews with participants often leading 
to new interpretations. There has been increased interest in the international dimension of the 
revolution, especially since the study of diplomatic history became more established at 
Portuguese universities. However, Portugal enforces a thirty-year rule on access to 
documents relating to its foreign policy and the most important often remain closed for 
longer.  
In Britain and the United States, Portuguese history had been a largely neglected area 
before the revolution. There was an (albeit incomplete) bibliography in Britain, with its 
historic links to Portugal, but in the United States Iberian studies only emerged as a distinct 
discipline during the 1970s. Histories of the revolution started to be written in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, when events continued to have contemporary resonance.
51
 Literature written in 
the late-1980s and 1990s made use of post-revolutionary Portuguese historiography, written 
after the key actors, through memoirs or public broadcasts, had attempted to secure their 
places in history.
52
 The role of outside powers was prominent in these accounts, influenced 
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by international relations articles written during the Portuguese Revolution.
53
 The Carnation 
Revolution had huge significance for US ‘transition studies’ literature written in the 1980s 
and 1990s. This field began with the seminal work by Samuel P.Huntington which saw the 
Portuguese Revolution as the beginning of a new stage in the history of liberal democracy.
54
 
Portugal is seen as the first case of what is known as the “third wave of democratisation”, 
which led to the collapse of authoritarian regimes, from Latin America to Eastern Europe, in 
the following decades. Political scientists specialising in ‘transitional theory’ stress the 
importance of international factors in democratic transitions, especially the role of the 
European Community in encouraging reform in southern and Eastern Europe.
55 The 
democratic transitions in Portugal and Spain have also been the subject of a number of 
comparative studies.
56
  
 The historiographical debate most relevant to this thesis concerns international 
intervention during the Portuguese Revolution. The first studies considered the response of 
the United States. This was partly because there was easy access to official documents, 
alongside interviews with participants (and Kissinger’s copious memoirs), which allowed an 
analysis of its role.
 
But there was also greater interest amongst Portuguese historians in the 
response of the United States because of its significance to post-war Lisbon.
57
 Pedro Oliviera 
notes that “the relationship between Lisbon and Washington, or Portuguese involvement in 
institutions led by the Americans, became one of the favourite themes of Portuguese 
diplomatic history focusing on the period after 1945, relegating the London/Lisbon 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Manuel, The Uncertain Outcome: The Politics of the Portuguese Transition to Democracy (New Hampshire: 
University Press of America, 1995). Kenneth Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
53
 John C. Campbell, ‘The Mediterranean Crisis’, Foreign Affairs (July 1975). Kenneth Maxwell, ‘The Thorns 
of the Portuguese Revolution’, Foreign Affairs (January 1976). Tad Slzulc, ‘Lisbon and Washington: Behind the 
Portuguese Revolution’ Foreign Policy 21 (Winter 1975). Jonathan Story, ‘Portugal’s Revolution of Carnations: 
Patterns of Change and Continuity’ International Affairs 52:3 (July 1976). 
54 Samuel P.Huntington, The Third Wave (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). 
55 The most significant study is a collection of essays edited by Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Securing Democracy- 
Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe (London: Routledge, 1990). See also, Juliet 
Antunes Sablosky, ‘Transnational Party Activity and Portugal’s Relations with the European Community’, 
Paper Prepared for Delivery at the Fourth Biennial International Conference of The European Community 
Studies Association, May 11-14, 1995. http://aei.pitt.edu/7009/1/ sablosky_ juliet_antunes.pdf 
56 Benny Pollack and Jim Taylor, ‘The Transition to Democracy in Portugal and Spain’ British Journal of 
Political Science vol. 13 (1983). E.Ramon Arango, Spain: Democracy Regained (Oxford: Westview Press, 
1995). Howard Wiarda and Margaret Macleish, Catholic Roots and Democratic Flowers – Political Systems in 
Spain and Portugal (London: Praeger, 2001). 
57 Friere Antunes, Nixon e Caetano: Promessas e Abandono (Lisbon: Difusão Cultural, 1992). Tiago Moreira de 
S , Os Americanos na Revolu  o Portuguesa (1974-1976) (Lisboa: Not cias, 2004). Bernardino Gomes and 
Tiago Moreira de Sá, Carlucci vs Kissinger : os EUA e a Revolução Portuguesa (Lisboa: Dom Quixote, 2008). 
23 
 
connection to secondary importance.”58 There is now greater interest in the role of other 
states in the Portuguese Revolution, particularly since their archival records became 
available. A study of the German Democratic Republic’s involvement in Portugal, based on 
archives declassified after reunification, reveals that its participation (which was known) was 
made independently of the Soviet Union.
59
 More recently, a study of the Federal Republic of 
Germany demonstrates the importance of its intervention which included substantial financial 
assistance to the Portuguese Socialist Party.
60
 This research has allowed the first studies of 
the international response to the Portuguese Revolution (including the role of the Labour 
Government) based on multiple archival sources.
61
  
The response of the Labour Government to events in Portugal has not received the same 
level of interest amongst diplomatic historians as that of other leading states. A number of 
studies exist on the historic relationship between Portugal and Britain, but little has been 
published on the post-war period.
62
 The Labour Government’s involvement in the Portuguese 
Revolution was widely recognised amongst historians, although it was seen as part of a 
collective western response, rather than as an independent policy. Pedro Oliviera argues that 
this was the result of the perception amongst historians that Britain’s economic weakness 
during the period prevented it playing a significant role in events in Lisbon.
63
 The publication 
of the FCO document series on NATO’s Southern Flank Crisis led to greater interest in 
Britain’s response to the revolution, although the subject of the volume meant that the 
selection of documents and the introduction by Keith Hamilton are concerned exclusively 
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with the Cold War implications of events in Portugal.
64
 Because these sources are easily 
accessible to historians in Portugal and elsewhere (being in a widely spoken language), they 
have been used to assess the role of other states, such as the Soviet Union, whose archives 
remain closed.
65
 More recently, diplomatic historians have begun a detailed exploration of the 
national archival records for this period, which has led to a wide-ranging understanding of 
Britain’s policy towards Portugal.66  
The Labour Government’s response to the Portuguese Revolution has often been 
included within studies of the United States and Portugal. Because analysis was based on 
British documents accessible through US archives, its policy is considered to be an adjunct to 
Washington’s (motivated by Cold War concerns).67 The broader approaches of the Labour 
Government, such as encouraging Lusophone decolonisation and protecting British business 
interests, are not considered. There is also an assumption that there was a close Anglo-
American relationship during this period because of regular contact on Portugal, but the 
Labour Government’s motives for this, given its wider policy of pursuing closer relations 
with Washington and its differences on Portugal, are not explored. However, a comparison of 
studies on the response of Britain and the US to the Portuguese Revolution enables a 
consideration of the nature and importance of Anglo-American relations during this period. 
There has been a widespread assumption amongst Portuguese diplomatic historians 
that the United States planned covert operations in Portugal during the revolution. Because 
US archival records reveal that the Labour Government was aware that the Ford 
administration considered such a programme (through close institutional ties), there is an 
assumption that Britain was also involved in this planning. There has even been the 
suggestion that the Labour Government led these discussions. Tiago Moriera refers to a 
British covert operation called the ‘Plano Callaghan’, a supposed British initiative in late 
1975 to supply political moderates with military assistance
68
, this based on an interview with 
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a Portuguese participant in the revolution.
69
 In a more recent study, his claims are supported 
by material from the US archival record, although no evidence of such an operation is given 
from British sources.
 70
 This study will investigate the possibility that such a plan existed, or 
any other programme. It will argue that Portuguese historians conflate limited British support 
for the PSP with US proposals for covert operations in Lisbon.  
A number of recent historical studies have stressed the significance of Western 
European involvement in the Portuguese Revolution.
71
 These emphasise its collective 
response, with little consideration given to differences between states; the importance of the 
close cooperation between Western Europe and the United States during the final stages of 
the revolution is also downplayed. The Portuguese diplomatic historian, Antonio Jose Telo, 
contributes a chapter on Western European involvement to a volume of revisionist 
interpretations of the Carnation Revolution. He argues that although the US played an 
important role immediately after the April Revolution, it was the contribution of Western 
Europe, particularly through financial aid, which was critical to the democratic outcome in 
Portugal.
72
 The Labour Government is seen as both a leading participant in the Western 
European response and the main proponent of a role for the EEC in Portugal. However, its 
regular contact with the United States on Portugal is not seen as being significant.
73
 Britain’s 
support for Lusophone decolonisation is briefly mentioned, but because this is based on 
Portuguese sources, the Labour Government’s motives are not explored.74   
The Portuguese diplomatic historian, António Simões Do Paço, explores the support 
given to the PSP by the Western European socialist movement.
75
 He uses the memoirs of 
Portuguese and European leaders to consider its origins during the early 1970s. But his 
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research on the Carnation Revolution is based almost exclusively on British archival sources, 
leading to the assumption that the rest of Western Europe shared the Labour Government’s 
approach. He also does not consider that its encouragement of the PSP was motivated by 
other factors besides partisanship, particularly its support for Lusophone decolonisation. His 
main argument is that the PSP’s ties with Western Europe were critical to its electoral 
strategy in 1976, especially the meeting of socialist leaders held in Porto, the ‘Europa 
Connosco’.76 However, despite listing each attendee, he does not analyse the rather surprising 
absence (given its involvement on every other occasion) of a single representative of the 
Labour Government.  
 The Italian diplomatic historian Mario Del Pero has written an article on the response 
of Western European governments to the Portuguese Revolution.
77
 His premise is that the 
Western European approach was fundamentally different from that of the United States, 
being principally concerned with a “Chilean Shadow” (a return to right wing authoritarian 
government), whereas Washington feared that the leftward direction of events might 
undermine the integrity of the NATO Alliance.
78
 Del Pero makes extensive use of 
historiography on the Portuguese revolution but primary research only from US and British 
archives. His article assumes that there was a common response by Western European 
socialist parties to events, arguing that “The early/mid 1970s were in many ways the heyday 
of Western European democratic socialism.”79 Del Pero does not consider the impact of the 
Anglo-American relationship on the Labour Government’s response to events in Portugal, 
especially whether close institutional ties brought cooperation on covert activity. He also 
downplays the significance of the divisions on Portugal within the Ford Administration 
(meaning that the State Department shared similar views to Western Europe) and the eventual 
decision of the US to support the PSP through the Socialist International.  
There have been a number of recent studies on Lusophone decolonisation which consider, 
using British archives, the role of the Labour Government.
80
 As one of the leading diplomatic 
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actors in Africa concerned with ending white minority rule, Britain is mentioned in much of 
the literature on Portuguese decolonisation.
81
 There is particular interest in the Labour 
Government’s role in sponsoring talks on Guinea Bissau’s independence after the April 
Revolution.
82
 There is also an extensive historiography of the Rhodesian crisis, including the 
effect of the Portuguese Revolution on Mozambique, which altered the military balance away 
from the white racialist regime towards the black national movements.
83
 The prospect of 
sanctions against Rhodesia being effectively enforced were Mozambique granted 
independence is explored within existing literature, but this thesis will consider how this 
shaped the Labour Government’s response to the Portuguese Revolution.84   
The British historian, Norrie MacQueen, has written an extensive account of 
Lusophone decolonisation, using a range of source material, interviews with participants and 
Portuguese historiography.
85
 Influenced by neo-dependency theory, he traces the role of 
Britain in supporting Portuguese acquisition of its colonies and the capital investment that 
enabled their development. He argues that Britain then played a crucial role, as a trusted ally, 
in assisting the new Lisbon government in the diplomatic process that led to rapid 
decolonisation. More recently, MacQueen has written an article on Britain and the issue of 
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recognising Guinea-Bissau’s independence.86 He uses the British archives to outline a 
number of influences on its approach, including its reputation in the UN amongst newly 
independent states and wider Cold War implications. MacQueen maintains that the Labour 
Government was fortunate in the timing of Spinola’s decision to grant independence to the 
overseas territories because it would otherwise have faced the dilemma of whether to support 
Portugal or Commonwealth Africa during a forthcoming United Nations debate on the issue. 
The Portuguese historian, Pedro Oliveira, has written an account of the post-1945 Anglo-
Portuguese relationship in the Lusophone overseas territories.
87 It is an extensive study using 
recently opened British archives and interviews with FCO officials; the final chapters 
consider the role of the Labour Government in Portuguese decolonisation. Oliviera considers 
Anglo-Portuguese relations in Lisbon, but only as context for their relationship elsewhere. He 
argues that the election of a Labour Government in February 1975 is important, given that 
radical ministers within the Cabinet had close ties to the national liberation movements in 
southern Africa. This meant that the Labour Government was able to facilitate negotiations 
on the overseas territories with the new government in Portugal. Oliviera also suggests that 
“the Watergate affair could doubtless also have prevented the British and the Americans 
from working to produce a joint approach to Portugal’s overseas problems”, to explain why 
the Anglo-American relationship was a less significant factor in Britain’s approach to 
Portugal during 1974.
88
 
Sources 
A range of primary sources relevant to understanding the Labour Government’s 
policy towards the Portuguese Revolution are accessible in the United Kingdom. The most 
important are the official government records held at The National Archives at Kew, London. 
Under the thirty-year rule the documents for 1974-75 were available after cataloguing in 
2006. Although documents on Portugal were opened almost in their entirety, some are 
restricted and remained closed. During research an unsuccessful Freedom of Information 
request was made in August 2012 concerning a number of closed documents for this period; 
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the small number of restricted documents and their distribution within files suggests that this 
decision was made to protect participants in the revolution who remain alive, such as Mario 
Soares, rather than to disguise a particular policy response. The main archives consulted were 
those of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM), 
the Ministry of Defence (DEFE), the Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM) and the 
Cabinet Office (CAB). Relevant material on the Portuguese Revolution has been published in 
the FCO documents series.
89
 British officials who participated in events were either 
unavailable for interview or deceased when this study began. 
The private papers of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan are deposited in the 
Bodleian Library (Oxford), although the latter remain uncatalogued, thus reducing their 
usefulness. The memoirs of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan both recall their 
involvement in the British response to the Carnation Revolution. Harold Wilson gives a 
meticulous chronological account of the diplomacy between London, Washington and 
Moscow concerning Portugal in his memoirs, but there is little analysis of the Portuguese 
Revolution, suggesting that his concern as Prime Minister was with the international 
ramifications of events rather than the revolution itself.
90
 By contrast, the Portuguese 
Revolution has, alongside the Cyprus crisis, a prominent place within James Callaghan’s 
memoirs in the chapters concerning his period as Foreign Secretary. He viewed events in 
Portugal as extremely important and the British response as equally significant. Callaghan 
stresses the differences in interpretation of events by Washington and London, but within a 
context of close personal relations between Kissinger and himself.
91
 The memoirs and diaries 
(and there are many) of other Labour cabinet ministers also mention events in Portugal. They 
feature prominently in some accounts but only fleetingly, or not at all, in others, suggesting 
that whether cabinet ministers viewed events in Portugal as noteworthy depended on their 
personal interest in the politics of the revolution. There is a clear division of sympathy 
between those enthusiastic about the leftward direction of events in Portugal and those 
supportive of Callaghan’s approach.92  
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There are also a number of other archives relevant to a study of the British response to 
the Portuguese Revolution. Hansard records of Parliamentary debates on Portugal are 
accessible on-line. The TUC Library Collection (Modern Record Centre, Warwick 
University) holds records of the Trades Union Congress and of its General Secretary Jack 
Jones who helped to organise non-communist trade unions in Portugal. The Labour History 
Archive and Study Centre (Manchester) holds Labour Party records. There is a range of 
relevant material, including National Executive Committee minutes, party conference 
resolutions, correspondence with the Socialist International and the private papers of several 
Labour Ministers who took an interest in Portugal, although these are not clearly catalogued, 
meaning the material available is not always conducive to reaching adequate conclusions. 
There was an extensive coverage of the Portuguese Revolution in British newspapers, 
journals and periodicals. The British Library (London) holds a wide range of materials, from 
broadsheet newspapers to the left-wing press. In particular The Economist and The Financial 
Times featured regular editorials on events in Lisbon and their impact on British business 
interests. The Marx Memorial Library (Clerkenwell, London) and Modern Record Centre 
(Warwick University) hold material from fringe left-wing parties which influenced the far-
left of the Labour party.
93
 The Anglo-American relationship during the Portuguese 
Revolution can be explored through a recently released volume of the Foreign Relations of 
the United States Series (F.R.U.S) on Western Europe during the 1970s.
94
 The collection 
includes papers from the Nixon and Ford Archives, and the State Department and CIA. There 
is an extensive section of documents relating to the Portuguese Revolution, including 
communications with the Labour Government during the crisis.  
 
Methodology  
A study of the British Government’s response to the Portuguese Revolution requires a 
state-centred approach, limited to the perspective of the government sphere as revealed by the 
exchange of communication between political and diplomatic actors. Hence this thesis largely 
uses official government records and memoir accounts of leading politicians. The limitations 
                                                             
93 Both the Labour History Archive and the Marx Memorial Library are currently closed due to financial 
constraints. 
94 Kathleen B. Rasmussen, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–15, Part 2, 
Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, (United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 2014). 
All US sources referred to in this thesis are taken from this volume unless otherwise stated. Documents accessed 
on-line (http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2.) 
31 
 
of official records will be addressed through close textual analysis and contextual awareness. 
The approach taken during research was to understand how events in Lisbon were perceived 
by the Labour Government, the policy debate within government and the influences on each 
policy outcome. This will include a consideration of the foreign policy of other states as 
revealed by historical research. As a pluralistic democracy, it is also necessary to consider 
non-governmental influences on the Labour Government, such as the role of the Labour 
Party, British media, trade unions, businesses and public opinion.   
A critical question will be how the British national interest in Portugal was defined by 
the Labour Government. The methodological approach taken will be the international 
relations concept of Bureaucratic Politics.
95
 This considers whether different government 
departments cooperate together to define the national interest, or whether policy outcomes are 
the result of compromise between competing interest groups within government. The concept 
has been widely applied to the study of post-war US foreign policy; this thesis will consider 
its relevance to a case study of British policy making.
96
   
This is not intended as a transnational study of the Anglo-Portuguese relationship. 
The significance of trade relations, media coverage, tourism and cultural exchange, although 
important, are considered only where relevant to an understanding of bilateral state relations. 
Nor is it intended to assess Britain’s importance in the outcome of the Portuguese Revolution 
and so contribute to historical debate in Portugal on the Carnation Revolution, but rather to 
demonstrate how the Labour government perceived developments in Lisbon and to assess the 
effectiveness of its foreign policy response. 
One problem will be that descriptive terms such as ‘political moderate’ and ‘radical 
left’ are limited in their value given the fluidity of political allegiances in Lisbon and 
controversy over their role, but these were the terms of analysis used by British politicians, 
diplomats and public commentators to understand the Portuguese Revolution. Therefore such 
terminology will be used with reference to relevant debates, such as whether the April coup 
d’état was a dramatic revolution or in reality a gradual political transition which began during 
the Caetano regime. 
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Structure 
The Labour Government’s foreign policy towards Portugal will be considered within 
the periodisation of the Carnation Revolution most widely used by historians. The 
organisation of the thesis will therefore be largely chronological, with a chapter on the 
response of the Labour Government during each stage of the Portuguese Revolution, plus a 
thematic chapter which will consider Britain’s role in Lusophone decolonisation. There is 
naturally some inter-connection between these chapters and so cross-referencing will be 
made. The argument of this thesis is organised within the succeeding chapters.  
 
Chapter II is concerned with the immediate response of the Labour Government to the 
April Revolution. It will consider the difficulty in relations between Britain and the Caetano 
regime prior to the coup d’état. A thematic section will examine Britain’s relationship with 
Portugal and how this changed after the coup d’état. It will then consider the Labour 
Government’s relations with the first provisional government. This chapter will argue that the 
primary motivation of British policy during this period was to encourage Portuguese 
decolonisation. This meant that the close relationship between the Labour Government and 
the PSP was not only partisan but arose because they were the leading proponents of 
immediate independence for the overseas territories. The consequence for the Labour 
Government, however, was that its relations with President Spinola were formal rather than 
close, in contrast to that of the Nixon administration, and this weakened its influence in 
Lisbon. 
 
Chapter III looks at the Labour Government’s role in encouraging Portuguese 
decolonisation. It examines the importance of the Rhodesia Question to the Labour 
Government, and the implications of political change in Lisbon for this situation. It considers 
the important role played by the British Government in facilitating talks between the new 
government in Lisbon and the national liberation movements, particularly the conference held 
in London at the end of May 1975 between Portugal and representatives of Guinea Bissau. It 
will argue that Britain was in a unique position to do so, particularly because of its historic 
relationship with post-independence leaders in southern Africa. It will also argue that the 
political idealism of the Labour movement explains its commitment to Portuguese 
decolonisation. The chapter will conclude by showing that once the principle of 
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independence was conceded by Lisbon, the Labour Government became concerned with the 
implications of such a rapid decolonisation. 
 
Chapter I  considers the Labour Government’s reaction to the events in Lisbon after 
President António de Spínola’s resignation. The leftward direction of events meant that 
Britain became concerned with Communist Party activity in Lisbon. It sought to support both 
independent trade unions and moderate political parties, while encouraging the embryonic 
democratic institutions. The Labour Government encouraged this support through the Labour 
Party and the TUC to avoid being seen to intervene in Portugal’s sovereign affairs. This 
chapter will also argue that British interests were now directly threatened by events. It will 
explore the visit of Wilson and Callaghan to Moscow in February 1975 when concern about 
communist influence in Lisbon was raised with the Soviet leadership. It will finally consider 
the Labour Government’s response to the provisional assembly elections in April 1975. 
Chapter   will consider the Labour Government’s response to the events in Lisbon 
during the ‘Hot Summer’ (the attempt of the radical left to consolidate power). It will argue 
that Britain now considered events in Portugal to be a Cold War crisis leading to close 
cooperation between the US and its European allies. At the Helsinki Summit in July and 
August 1975, the Labour Government raised events in Lisbon with the Soviet Union. The 
Labour Government’s response was also shaped by the need to defend British business 
interests in Portugal. However, British influence in Lisbon was now limited by its inability to 
provide substantial economic assistance. Its response was also complicated by opposition 
from democratic socialist Labour Party members who expressed sympathy with the radical 
left in Lisbon.  
 
Chapter VI considers the transition to democracy in Portugal following the 
appointment of a moderate government in September 1975, which led to parliamentary and 
presidential elections in early 1976. It will consider the dramatic events of the 25
th
 
November, when the radical left made one final attempt to seize power. This chapter will 
argue that although the opportunity now existed to increase British influence in Lisbon, 
Britain’s own domestic crises meant that it was unable to provide the same level of assistance 
as its western allies and therefore, paradoxically, British influence declined during Portugal’s 
final transition to democracy. 
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This study contributes to our understanding of Labour Government foreign policy 
during a period when Britain’s global influence declined. Political scientists have seen the 
transition to democracy in Portugal as an archetypal political event of the late-twentieth 
century. The international response is seen as crucial to that outcome and became a template 
for future interventions from neighbouring Spain at the time to Eastern Europe in the 1990s. 
The challenge of encouraging parliamentary democracy after a period of authoritarian rule, 
despite Britain’s military and economic decline, remains a contemporary concern of her 
foreign policy. 
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Chapter II –The April Revolution and Spinola 
Government (25
th
 April – 30th September, 1974) 
 
The first response of the Labour Government to the coup d’état of the 25th April was to 
promote immediate independence for Portugal’s overseas territories. The principal motivation 
behind this policy was that if Mozambique were to achieve independence, sanctions against 
Rhodesia might be fully enforced, thus giving the prospect of a resolution to a foreign policy 
issue which had bedevilled successive British governments.
97
 However, decolonisation 
required the success of politicians in Lisbon committed to achieving this aim. The Labour 
Government’s support for Mario Soares and the Portuguese Socialist Party was, therefore, not 
only partisan: their success best served the British national interest. Paradoxically, its support 
for a political rival meant relations with the newly inaugurated President Spinola remained 
formal rather than close; consequently, the Labour Government’s approach weakened rather 
than bolstered the political position of the Portuguese leader as he struggled to meet the 
challenge from the radical left. The British commitment to the success of moderate politicians 
also meant they did not develop contacts across the political spectrum and, therefore, failed to 
predict accurately the leftward direction of politics in Lisbon.  
The main argument of this chapter will be that Britain’s policy towards Portugal was in 
many respects an inadequate response to a propitious set of circumstances. President Spinola 
needed to end Portugal’s diplomatic isolation and Britain could have been his closest partner. 
The United States was tainted by close ties to the Caetano regime; other European states had 
neither the shared interests nor sentiment which characterised Portugal’s relationship with 
Britain. The eventual resignation and replacement of Spinola by a radical left-wing 
government led to a Cold War crisis which threatened to undermine superpower détente. 
Furthermore, because the approach of the Labour Government differed markedly from that of 
the Ford Administration (which was fully committed to supporting Spinola) relations 
between the two became strained. However, British policy was shaped primarily by the belief 
that its national interest in relation to Portugal was a solution to the Rhodesia problem. While 
                                                             
97 Flower, Serving Secretly, pp.142-144. Verrier The Road To Zimbabwe, pp.166-185. Hancock White Liberals, 
pp. 193-194. Widrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, pp.221-257. 
36 
 
Britain both supported and encouraged a transition to parliamentary democracy in Portugal, 
during the Spinola presidency this was only a secondary concern. 
The departure of the Caetano regime was met with relief by the Labour Government; 
Britain’s relations with Portugal, albeit within the framework of close historic ties, had 
become increasingly difficult as a result of the Lusophone African wars. Britain came under 
pressure to vote for UN resolutions condemning Portuguese activities, while the Caetano 
regime embarrassed Portugal’s NATO allies, undermining the alliance’s legitimacy as an 
organisation defending democratic values. The anniversary of the ‘oldest alliance' in 1973 
became less of a celebration of Anglo-Portuguese relations than a diplomatic test to be 
skilfully negotiated.
98
 A Foreign Office official later concluded that “The overthrow of the 
authoritarian Caetano regime and the present Portuguese Government’s commitment to self-
determination and independence for Portugal’s overseas territories has removed the major 
cause of friction in Anglo-Portuguese relations.”99 With a new government committed to 
ending the colonial wars, the opportunity existed for the restoration of Britain’s traditional 
influence in Lisbon, particularly now that Nixon’s strategy of close relations with Caetano 
had backfired.
100
  
However, the April 25
th
 coup d'état was greeted without great enthusiasm in London. 
Although an unpleasant regime, it was not brutal, and Britain had been able, by and large, to 
maintain constructive relations with Salazar and Caetano. Its removal by a military coup did 
not appear to herald a transition to democracy. Portugal seemed to have exchanged an 
ossified authoritarian system for an uncertain period of military rule, which promised change 
but might bring chaos. As welcome as developments may have appeared to the Portuguese 
people, it could become more difficult to defend Britain’s interests. A British official at the 
Lisbon Embassy observed: “It is clear that this consequence of the April Coup is disturbing 
the British community as much as the collapse of the cosy political order which they have 
been familiar with for so long.”101 That Portugal could become a parliamentary democracy, 
integrated economically and eventually politically with its neighbours, was not considered the 
most likely outcome of events.  
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The United States, disappointed in its strategy of close relations with the Caetano 
regime, was more sceptical of the direction of events in Lisbon.
102
 There was unease at the 
presence of Communist ministers in the new coalition government and at the strength of the 
party in the country as a whole. Therefore, the foremost concern in Washington was the 
strategic implications for NATO: the negotiations for the renewal of the lease of air-bases on 
the Azores (which had begun before the coup d’état103) and the security of sensitive 
information at meetings attended by the Portuguese representatives.
104
 The United States 
pursued close relations with President Spinola. Kissinger noted approvingly that “Spinola 
appears to be off to an auspicious start. His prestige is such that, despite the divisions within 
the armed forces, he may be able to keep them fully under control.”105 During a meeting in 
the Azores on the 18
th
 and 19
th
 June, President Nixon assured the Portuguese leader, “he 
would explore any way the US can assist Portugal, both overtly and covertly.”106 The Labour 
Government sought to promote Soares in Washington, but Kissinger disliked the Socialist 
leader, commenting that “Soares is typical of the type who has brought disaster to Europe – 
well meaning, nice, and ineffectual.”107 However Callaghan, with his strong commitment to 
the Anglo-American relationship and a warm friendship with Kissinger, was able to robustly 
advocate support for the PSP leader during their discussions.
108
   
Harold Wilson’s victory in March 1974 brought significant changes to British foreign 
policy. The newly appointed Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, was instructed to 
renegotiate membership of the EEC, deal with the implications of the economic crisis caused 
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by the oil cartel and re-affirm Britain’s commitment to the Anglo-American relationship, 
which had been allowed to fall into a state of atrophy by Edward Heath. The Labour Party’s 
National Executive Committee had written an election manifesto which committed a Labour 
administration to a left-wing agenda on a number of foreign policy issues, including 
promoting democracy in the Iberian Peninsula and support for the national-liberation 
movements in Portuguese colonies.
109
 These causes were actively supported by the radical 
FCO minister, Joan Lestor, and Jack Jones, the Trade Union Congress leader, Spanish Civil 
War veteran and forceful Labour affiliate. Therefore, coincidentally, there was a convergence 
between the foreign policy goals of the new Labour Government and the changes in Lisbon.  
Between the coup on April 25
th
 and the resignation of President Spinola on September 
30
th, Britain’s foremost concern in its relations with Portugal was to encourage Lusophone 
decolonisation. In so doing, although strongly supporting a transition to democracy in 
Portugal, it did not closely engage with the internecine factional politics which came to 
dominate political life in Lisbon. The Labour Government’s understanding of what was 
happening in Portugal was shaped more by the views of Soares than those of the British 
Embassy (which only had limited contacts with the new political actors in Lisbon). 
Consequently it was often bewildered by the course of events, failing to predict accurately the 
resignation of Prime Minister Palma Carlos on 9
th
 July and of President Spinola on 30
th
 
September. The foremost aim of British policy was achieved with Spinola’s announcement 
on 21
st
 September that Portugal’s overseas territories would be granted their independence. 
However, with increasing concern at the leftward direction of events in Lisbon, the Labour 
Government now acted more assertively to support democracy in Portugal.  
 
The April Revolution  
 The sudden and dramatic 25
th
 April coup d’état brought to an end fifty years of 
dictatorship in Portugal. However, while the foreign press corps descended on Lisbon to 
herald a revolution, experienced international observers of Portuguese politics, like the 
British Embassy, although confused by the identity of the coup plotters, were not surprised at 
the disappearance of the regime - the culmination of a reformist liberalising political process 
begun after the death of Salazar five years before and unrest in the military caused by the 
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wars in Africa. Both contemporary observers and historians have used de Tocqueville’s 
aphorism that authoritarian regimes are at their most vulnerable when they reform,
110
 to 
explain the course of events in Portugal (an FCO official noted that a colleague, “has pointed 
to De Toqueville’s perception of the danger in which a Government stands when it begins to 
reform itself”).111 The British Embassy in Lisbon had sent more regular despatches after 
January, reporting differences within the regime on the need to liberalise the Portuguese 
economy and society. The unrest amongst the Portuguese armed forces was monitored by the 
Embassy’s military attaché in Lisbon. The British press also reported rumours of an 
impending coup d’état in articles by The Guardian on the 31st December and the Financial 
Times on the 3
rd
 January.
112
  
 The publication on 22
nd
 February of a book by Spinola, the legendary former military-
governor of Guinea-Bissau, calling for the establishment of a commonwealth between 
Portugal and its African colonies, further divided the political class in Lisbon between 
reformists and conservatives and triggered unrest in the military. The exact nature of relations 
between President Caetano and General Spinola has been the subject of debate amongst 
historians.
113
 The Spinola affair was judged by the Embassy to have the tacit support of 
Caetano, as part of his efforts to liberalise the regime.
114
 A Cabinet Office minute, written by 
Lord Bridges, concluded: “A key point is that there was not a great deal of difference 
between Spinola and Caetano on African policy. The differences were within factions within 
the Portuguese army, and Caetano was a victim of their struggle.”115 The British Ambassador 
reported ominously that “I feel that the ripples caused by events 13-26 March have not yet 
died down and their full effect is not yet known.”116 A flow of correspondence concerning the 
likelihood of a coup passed between Lisbon and Whitehall during March and April. 
 The British considered a coup probable but judged it unlikely to be successful, and that, 
even if it were, it would not have popular support. Although the Labour Government was 
encouraged by the internal debate in Lisbon and supported the idea of liberalising Portugal, it 
neither sought nor encouraged regime change. While the British perceived that the 
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Portuguese regime was on a precipice, they failed to note that the Portuguese people were 
also desperate for change. Illustrative of this is the judgement of a Foreign Office official that 
“If in point of fact the mass of the country is indifferent, and the debate in consequence takes 
place within a smaller circle, there is a better chance of a tidy solution and by no means 
necessarily the wrong one.”117 The British did not want to see Caetano replaced, the 
Ambassador noting that “I, for one, certainly hope that Caetano has continued to retain most 
of his authority if only because at the moment there are no reasonable candidates to succeed 
him.”118 The British Embassy in Lisbon appears to have had a cosy, comfortable relationship 
with the Caetano regime which it did not wish to have disturbed. Signs of unrest led the 
Ministry of Defence to consider cancelling British participation in a NATO naval exercise in 
Portuguese waters.
119
 That this failed to happen demonstrates that the Labour Government 
did not want to jeopardise its relations with a regime which it did not expect to disappear.
120
  
 The coup d’état of the 25th of April caught the British Government by surprise. Those 
who made up the Armed Forces Movement, the military junta which plotted the coup, were 
unknown. Indeed, the nature and importance of the AFM as self-appointed guardians of the 
revolution would remain a mystery to the British throughout the Spinola presidency. Initially, 
the coup d’état was perceived to be a reordering of political factions within the Portuguese 
regime rather than a revolution. The appointment of Spinola as President by the military junta 
on the 15
th
 of May appeared to confirm this.
121
 The prejudice that Portugal was a country 
incapable of establishing democracy is present in Foreign Office documents. The British 
Ambassador in Lisbon noted with disdain: “The Portuguese are, by and large, a docile 
people, not unduly addicted to intellectual activity, and a paternalistic regime, such as that of 
Salazar in his early years, is not by its nature unwelcome to many of them.”122 It is clear from 
the tone of reporting that events in Portugal were widely seen within the paradigm of 
perceived Iberian and Latin American politics: an endless cycle of coups and counter-coups. 
However, this was not a sentiment shared by many in the Labour Party, who immediately 
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established contact with politicians in Lisbon committed to establishing democracy. The 
British Embassy’s failure to understand developments in Portugal was also because it had no 
contacts amongst the military officers who had seized power. The longevity of the previous 
regime had meant that its analysis of opposition politics consisted of understanding factional 
differences from information provided by participants. 
It was the May Day celebration in Lisbon which shifted perceptions of the coup 
d’état. Predicted by the British Embassy and other observers to be a day of violent protest and 
disorder, it became, to the amazement of many, an outburst of popular civic sentiment, 
symbolised by the placing of carnations in the rifle barrels of watching soldiers. The British 
Ambassador observed: “The Portuguese people gave vent to their pent up feelings, in a 
demonstration that was astonishing in its spontaneity and civic sense. There was virtually no 
disorder, just an overwhelming expression of joy that their self-respect had been restored to 
them.”123 The British Embassy now came to see the potential for genuine democratic change 
in Portugal. Indeed for a brief moment its reports became infected with the spirit of the 
moment. Ambassador Trench was reminded of Wordsworth’s lines on the French Revolution: 
“Bliss was it to be alive, but to be young was very heaven.” 124 
The Labour Government immediately grasped the wider significance of the April 
Revolution, realising that, whatever the outcome of events in Lisbon, it had important 
implications for southern Africa. By contrast, the analysis of the FCO was principally 
concerned with the consequences of the coup d’état on Portugal, only speculating that “some 
kind of initiative on the overseas territories will be likely.”125 Harold Wilson was influenced 
by British media coverage of events, particularly The Guardian.
126
A Cabinet minute, written 
two days after the coup, recorded that “Mr Wilson has noted the comments in the press and 
the other media about the way in which the situation might develop, and has asked officials to 
prepare an early assessment of the general position. The particular aspect of closest concern 
to the Prime Minister is the effect of the coup d’état on the situation in Rhodesia.”127 The 
Cabinet Office, instigated by the Prime Minister, sent missives to the Foreign Office in the 
days immediately after the coup, which reveal an obsession with the technical details of 
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sanctions enforcement.
128
 Callaghan also raised the issue at a Cabinet meeting on the 2
nd
 
May.
129
 The moment appeared propitious because the AFM’s manifesto promised rapid 
independence for Portugal’s African territories.130  
 However, while an opportunity now existed for a diplomatic breakthrough in southern 
Africa, there remained an obstacle. President Spinola continued to favour a transition to a 
Lusophone community, based on the principle of self-determination, rather than immediate 
decolonisation. A Cabinet Office official wrote, “I do not think Spinola has yet said anything 
which could lead us to expect that Portugal will shortly change her basic policies regarding 
sanctions and the power line-up in Southern Africa.”131 The Labour Government realised that 
only a “more liberal regime at home may push him in that direction”, and concluded that 
“much would depend on the position of the Socialist Party in his administration.”132 As the 
leading advocate of rapid decolonisation, it therefore served Britain’s interest to support 
Soares and the Socialist Party.  
 The Labour Government expected Soares to be offered an important position in any 
provisional government. At the meeting between Soares and the British held in London on 
the 2
nd
 May, he had intimated that he would only accept the role of Prime Minister.
133
 They 
had discussed how General Spinola could be persuaded to appoint Soares to an important role 
in any government: it was agreed that Britain could play a role in doing so.
134
 Callaghan sent 
instructions to the British Ambassador to raise the issue in his first meeting with General 
Spinola on the 6
th
 May, leaving it to his discretion to decide “how far to go in your references 
to the inclusion of the Socialist Party in the government.”135 The Ambassador brusquely 
communicated to Spinola that “its composition would affect the warmth of future Anglo-
Portuguese relations.”136 With Soares having only recently been the guest of the British 
Labour Party in London, meeting Wilson and Callaghan on the 2
nd
 May, the implication of 
the Ambassador’s statement should have been clear to General Spinola.  
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 The decision the Labour Government faced immediately after the coup d’état was 
whether to recognise the new regime in Lisbon. This was a surprisingly difficult issue.
137
 The 
British realised that doing so would “encourage the new regime to continue in the seemingly 
hopeful direction in which they have set out; liberalisation at home and saner policies in 
Africa.”138 They were also concerned that recognising the regime after other states might 
send a negative signal to Lisbon which would harm British interests.”139 Hence the Labour 
Government liaised closely with other western allies.
 
The Assistant Secretary of State, 
Stabler, telephoned the British Ambassador in Washington, Ramsbotham, to compare notes 
on recognition.
140
 West Germany sought a coordinated EEC response and called a meeting of 
Lisbon representatives.
141
 However, France and Britain were uncomfortable with Bonn’s 
desire for a positive endorsement of a regime which had come to power by unconstitutional 
means.
142
 
 The problem was that the convention of British recognition differed from that of other 
states, the majority of which did not require an act of formal recognition.
143
 The dilemma 
outlined in an FCO document was that “Unlike many other states, it is the long-established 
practice... to treat the recognition of a regime which has come to power unconstitutionally in 
a foreign country as subject to a conscious act of recognition.”144 British recognition was not 
dependent on accepting the legitimacy of a regime. However, legal precedents, particularly 
the principles formalised by Ernest Bevin when Foreign Secretary, had to be met. On 26
th
 
April, Callaghan sent a telegram to Lisbon seeking urgent information on whether the new 
government met his criteria.
145
 In contrast, countries like West Germany and the United 
States recognised states rather than governments, and the simple act of continuing relations 
with a country, by replying to the first correspondence sent by a new government, constituted 
recognition. 
 A telegram was sent to embassies in America, Europe and the Commonwealth states, 
asking whether each planned to recognise the new regime in Lisbon and, if so, when. Britain 
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also received telegrams from a number of states on the same issue, particularly the 
Commonwealth. States such as Indonesia, which did not have an embassy in Lisbon, 
requested guidance from Britain, demonstrating that it was considered by many states to be 
the leading diplomatic actor in relations with Portugal.
146
 In the meantime, the British 
Embassy was sent firm instructions that “you should avoid any action which could imply 
recognition of a new government or head of state.”147 Diplomacy became urgent once a note 
was received on the 27
th
 April from the Portuguese Ambassador in London, requesting 
recognition: any response or any other contact with Portugal would now amount to 
recognition.
148
  
 The Labour Government eventually recognised the new regime on the 2
nd
 May. By the 
30
th
 April the new government had been recognised by the United States, Spain, France, 
Germany, and Brazil.
149
 The British government delayed recognition until after the 
discussions were held with Soares in London. This meant that the Foreign Office had to 
prepare a rather guarded and disingenuous answer to a parliamentary question on the issue of 
recognition.
150
  The delay enabled a linkage to be made between British recognition of the 
new regime and the advice of Soares. This is explicit in the record of the meeting between 
Wilson and the PSP leader at 10 Downing Street on 2
nd
 May which noted that “He intended 
to try to strengthen Dr Soares’ position by announcing that the Government had decided to 
accord recognition to General Spinola following the discussion with Dr Soares in London.”151 
The British Embassy was informed that “This will be done later today and the news made 
public by news department, who will set their statement in the context of Dr Soares’ visit.”152 
It was hoped that this would bolster his political position in Lisbon by creating the impression 
that Soares was a politician whose advice was respected by leading states and who was able 
to influence their policy making.  
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         The decision of the Labour Party to invite Soares to London immediately after the coup 
d’état was made independently of the Labour Government. A hand-written note written by 
the Secretary of State (after the decision to coordinate British recognition with Soares’ visit) 
makes this clear.
153
 The Labour Party’s links with the Portuguese Socialist Party supported 
government policy, but their activities were organised separately from the formal structures 
of policy making. This allowed them to act in a partisan way, supporting a fellow socialist 
party, something which would be difficult for a Labour Government to do considering the 
convention that British foreign policy is non-partisan and made in the national interest. 
Callaghan outlined this two-pronged approach to Portugal: “First, there was the question of 
Party support; Dr Soares should let the Labour Party know what he wanted. Secondly, as 
between Governments, he hoped General Spinola would tell the British Government what 
Portugal needed.”154 This enabled the ambiguity of formal relations between the governments 
to exist alongside partisan support for the Socialist Party, since they considered it the party 
whose success best served the British national interest.  
The Labour Government also tried to encourage the United States to support Soares. At 
the meeting in London on the 2
nd
 May, Soares had expressed an interest in visiting the United 
States.
155
 The Foreign Secretary immediately contacted Kissinger in Washington; he 
promoted the PSP leader in a way likely to appeal to US concern at the course of events in 
Portugal.
156
 The threat of a Soviet-backed Communist Party had not been discussed at the 
London meeting, but Callaghan stressed that “Soares sees the socialist party as the only force 
in the country capable of resisting the Communists who he believes have the full backing of 
the Soviet Union.”157 Callaghan also played down the possibility of a right-wing coup, 
arguing that “the right-wing are in no state to stage a counter coup or even to constitute a 
viable political force at the moment.”158 Soares visited Washington, and had a short meeting 
with Kissinger, but the United States, unlike Britain, was to pursue close relations with 
President Spinola.
159
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 The British Embassy and Southern European Department had been aware of the 
manoeuvrings between factions within the Caetano regime and understood the depth of the 
crisis it faced. However, the British had no knowledge that middle ranking officers were 
organising a coup d'état and, until the displays of enthusiasm for political change by the 
public on May Day, failed to grasp that Portugal had entered a revolutionary period. That the 
British were aware of developments within the regime, but not of the changes in public 
mood, was a result of the limitations of the Lisbon Embassy’s operating procedures. The 
nature and longevity of the authoritarian government meant Britain assumed that political 
change would occur within the regime rather than by its removal. Consequently, the 
responsibility of the Embassy to measure attitudes across Portuguese society had been 
neglected.
160
  
 The Labour Government realised that the coup d'état made independence for Portugal’s 
overseas territories probable and that this would make the Rhodesian state unsustainable.  
However, although encouraged by the potential benefits to British interests, the diplomatic 
conventions concerning recognition, as well as the means by which the Spinola Government 
assumed power, made it difficult for Britain to seek immediate advantage from the coup 
d'état. The establishment of close ties between the Labour government and Soares also meant 
relations with President Spinola were formal rather than close. The immediate response of the 
British to developments in Portugal demonstrated that FCO officials were more comfortable 
understanding changes in the political arrangements by which Portugal was governed rather 
than the importance of the outpouring of democratic sentiment amongst the Portuguese 
people, unlike leading figures in the Labour Party who immediately grasped the significance 
of events in Lisbon. 
 
British foreign policy making towards Portugal “After the Carnival” 161 
 Because the coup d'état affected a wide range of British interests, its policy response 
was shaped by a number of protagonists both inside and outside government. In particular, 
the British Embassy in Lisbon, the Southern European Department of the FCO, the Labour 
Party, the TUC and Fleet Street journalists, sought to influence the Labour government’s 
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policy making. There was also consultation with Britain’s leading partners, above all the 
United States. Britain was a member of a number of multilateral institutions affected by 
events in Lisbon, particularly NATO and the EEC. There was a consensus amongst all parties 
for the need to encourage democracy in Portugal and independence for its overseas colonies. 
However, there was a distinct difference in reasoning between each participant, and they 
attempted to shape policy accordingly.   
 For the British Embassy in Lisbon and the Southern European Department within the 
FCO, which had dealt with the same regime for fifty years, the coup brought a dramatic 
change in operating milieu.
162
 The British Ambassador observed that “In short, the 
impression one gets is of an ant-heap which has been broken open. Frenzied activity is in 
progress and ants are scurrying in all directions.”163 He commented that in the past, “anyone 
who held views to the left of the British Conservative Party was liable to be denounced as a 
Communist.”164 The Embassy struggled to understand developments, a situation exacerbated 
by the fact that a new ambassador had been appointed a few weeks before the coup.
165
  There 
was a failure to make connections across the political spectrum, particularly within the 
Armed Forces Movement. The Embassy was over-reliant on information from past 
acquaintances in the Salazar and Caetano regimes; rather than being impartial these contacts 
naturally sought to advance their own interests. The British Ambassador worked closely with 
his US colleague in Lisbon, Ambassador Stuart Nash Scott, whose analysis was increasingly 
at variance with that of Kissinger in Washington but was shared with London and with the 
position of the other ambassadors of the Nine European Community states.
166
  
  The Labour Government followed events in Portugal, which soon became one of the 
most significant foreign policy issues it addressed. Harold Wilson took a close interest in 
Rhodesia, and participated in meetings with Prime Minister Palma Carlos and Soares on a 
number of occasions.
167
 Callaghan regarded “sustaining the frail shoots of Portuguese 
democracy as a vital priority.”168 He held regular meetings with Soares, contributing to 
diplomatic initiatives to bring decolonisation to Africa; he also encouraged support for the 
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Portuguese Socialist Party from the Labour Party and TUC. However, during July-September 
1974, Callaghan was distracted by the crisis in Cyprus, particularly after the Turkish invasion 
on 20
th
 July. This meant that there was little consideration of unfolding events in Portugal, 
which culminated in the resignation of President Spinola on 30
th
 September. The British 
Cabinet Office monitored developments in Lisbon, receiving regular reports from the 
Southern European Department. During the Spinola presidency, the British Cabinet discussed 
Portugal only on two occasions, on the 2
nd
 May and 11 July.
169
 Therefore, the British foreign 
policy response to events in Portugal was almost exclusively the preserve of the Prime 
Minister and Foreign Secretary, working with their advisers, rather than that of the Cabinet as 
a whole. 
A number of parliamentary members took an active interest in developments in 
Portugal. The Labour MPs Tom McNally and Ron Hayward maintained regular contact with 
Soares, independent of the Labour Government and FCO.
170
 The Labour Party began to plan 
how it could aid the Portuguese Socialist Party; a representative of the party, Ron Hayward, 
visited Portugal.
171
 The FCO minister, Joan Lestor, toured several of Portugal’s overseas 
territories.
172
 The Conservative Party MP, Michael Young, also visited Portugal to assess the 
prospects for centre-right parties.
173
 He received the support of the Lisbon Embassy during 
his visit, and the contacts and information he acquired were shared with the Foreign Office.
174
 
However, there was no coordination between Conservative and Labour Party activities. The 
interest shown by these MPs demonstrated their idiosyncratic concern with Portugal rather 
than a systematic approach by the leading parties to assisting the advancement of 
parliamentary democracy in Western Europe. The British Labour Party was a member of the 
Socialist International, which actively supported the Socialist Party in Portugal. Created 
before the First World War, it had been largely defunct since.
175
 However, the Socialist 
International had a renaissance in the late-1960s, as resurgent west European Social 
Democratic movements, led by charismatic individuals such as Willy Brandt in West 
Germany and Olof Palme in Sweden, began to coordinate their internationalist approach to 
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foreign relations.
176
 There was a consensus across European states that the political situation 
in Portugal was most similar to their own immediately after World War Two, when 
democracy also appeared precarious but the presence of Communist ministers had not led to 
dictatorship.
177
 The coup d’état was raised at a Socialist International meeting that took place 
at Chequers in June and support for the PSP was discussed.
178
  
There were also a number of British groups outside government who took an interest 
in Portugal. The Trade Union Congress had tried to maintain links with the labour 
movements in both Portugal and Spain despite their authoritarian governments.
179
 The TUC’s 
chairman, Jack Jones, as a veteran of the International Brigade in Spain, took a particular 
interest in the Iberian Peninsula.
180
 Immediately after the coup d’état, the TUC planned how 
they could assist the development of independent trade unions in Portugal.
181
 As a corporatist 
state the previous regime only had one official union, the Intersindical, which enabled an 
industrial policy of cheap and compliant workers. The coup triggered a wave of spontaneous 
industrial activity.
182
 Portugal was the subject for discussion at the meeting of the TUC’s 
International Committee on Monday 6
th
 May, when a decision was reached that a delegation 
should visit Lisbon.
183
 There was a rapid spread of new unions in Portugal, built with few 
resources. The TUC delegation planned how to assist the creation of strong independent trade 
unions that were not dominated by the Communist Party. They would later be approached by 
the British Government asking that the TUC offer assistance to Portuguese trade unions, but 
the initial impetus came from within the organisation.
184
 
British media interest in Lisbon (aside from journalists with expertise on Portugal 
such as Antonio De Figueiredo, writing for The Guardian and Bruce Loudon, writing for The 
Daily Telegraph) was only episodic, triggered by each political crisis in Lisbon. On these 
occasions the broadsheets’ international correspondents would visit Lisbon for a few days 
and Portugal would be a lead story, supported by editorial articles. Otherwise, there were 
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regular inside page reports in the foreign policy sections of broadsheets, reporting on politics 
in Lisbon and violence in Mozambique and Angola. Interestingly, many articles were written 
on the likelihood of events in Portugal inspiring a similar reaction in Franco’s Spain.185 
Although the Madrid Embassy wrote dispatches on the theme, this was not even considered 
likely or important at the highest level of the British Government. There were human interest 
reports on how events in Portugal affected British citizens, with stories about worried 
expatriates and stranded holidaymakers.
186
 That there was no sustained coverage of events in 
Portugal is unsurprising, 1974 was a turbulent year: two General Elections, Watergate, 
Cyprus and economic recession all jostled for headline space. Press coverage, particularly 
that of the Guardian newspaper, was an important factor in explaining the level of interest of 
Harold Wilson and other leading political figures in Portugal. However, Callaghan and other 
Labour MPs sustained a personal engagement with Portuguese affairs which went beyond 
either their official roles or the interest raised by the British media.  
The British media played an important role in events in Portugal as the regular source 
of reliable information for many Portuguese citizens. Writing in the late 1970s’ Jean Seaton 
and Ben Pimlott stress the interplay between the international media and events in Portugal, 
noting that there was an “enormous increase in the audience of the Portuguese section of the 
BBC”, and that British newspapers “were still eagerly read - even by politicians - as the most 
reliable sources on domestic events.”187 Rona Fields analysed the role of the western media in 
Portugal and concluded that the British media played a particularly significant role because of 
its perceived quality.
188
 The Panorama team put together an extensively researched 
programme on Portugal, during which they interviewed many of the leading figures in 
Lisbon.
189
 It is outside the scope of this study to try to assess the role of the British media, but 
its impact on the Portuguese political process would have increased the ability of the Labour 
Government to influence events. 
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There were a range of British businesses in Portugal who sought to protect their 
interests by lobbying the Labour Government during the Portuguese Revolution.
190
 Britain 
had been involved in the Portuguese economy for centuries, including its Lusophone overseas 
territories.  This meant that, “As the principal foreign lender to the Portuguese state, until the 
mid -30s the UK enjoyed a leading position in the foreign trade of its peninsular ally.”191 As a 
result British companies had significant assets which included “not only wholly owned 
British firms but also firms in which UK interests have a majority or minority holding.”192 
Before the April Revolution, an FCO official noted that Portugal “is already one of our best 
export markets per head anywhere in the world.”193 The FCO’s Annual Review for 1972 
recorded that Britain’s share of the Portuguese import market was 12.8%.194 In the north, in 
Porto, well-established wine merchants were largely insulated from the political instability in 
Lisbon and were able to defend their interests through Anglo-Portuguese trade associations, 
such as Canning House. British industrial firms were largely based in Lisbon, although these 
were not on the same scale as those from West Germany and the United States.
195
 While 
affected by political developments after the April Revolution, they were not the primary 
target of industrial unrest as were other states.
196
 In the south central region of Alentejo there 
were a significant number of British owned farms, although largely small-scale, and these 
were a target for communist organised land seizures during 1975.
197
  
 
The First Provisional Government, 15
th
 May – 9th July, 1974. 
President Spinola, after his investiture on 15
th
 May, appointed Adelino Palma Carlos 
as Prime Minister. A coalition was formed from politicians across the political spectrum.
198
 
The intention was to ensure that no-one remained outside government in a position to criticise 
and undermine the coalition. The Armed Forces Movement, however, did not disband; rather, 
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it formed a coordinating committee whose remit was to ensure that the provisional 
government remained true to the ideals of the coup d’état.199 The mandate of the new 
government was to prepare Portugal for elections and renegotiate its relations with the 
overseas colonies. It also faced the urgent need to address Portugal’s economic problems and 
end its diplomatic isolation. Predictably this first coalition proved unwieldy, lacking the unity 
of purpose to govern effectively, and it struggled to manage rising expectations and disorder. 
Palma Carlos’ attempt to assert more control over his coalition triggered a crisis in relations 
between the Prime Minister and the AFM which culminated in his resignation on July 9
th
. 
 Relations between the Labour Government and President Spinola were problematic. 
The British disliked the unconstitutional means by which he had attained power and his 
continued commitment to the establishment of a ‘Lusophone Commonwealth’ in Africa 
rather than immediate independence. It is illustrative that while the British sent a note of 
congratulation to Soares on his appointment as Foreign Minister, no direct congratulations 
were given to Spinola. The message sent to Soares was informal in tone: “My Dear 
Mario.”200 A similar note was not sent to President Spinola because “Such a message would 
have to go from the Queen, and this does not seem altogether appropriate, given the manner 
in which he arrived at that position.”201 The Labour Government was concerned at the 
political consequences for Portugal if there were no progress on decolonisation. Because 
Soares was devoting almost all his time to Africa, he stood “to lose much in terms of electoral 
advantage if he fails.”202 Lisbon was awash with rumours of a further coup d’état. The British 
speculated that “Should Soares’ talks fail completely, there seems a real danger of a swing 
back toward authoritarianism. The machinery is there.”203 The British feared that such an 
eventuality would slow down any settlement in the overseas territories.  
 The Labour Government assumed that the threat to the provisional government came 
from the political right, but soon became aware of the strength of the radical left. Initially it 
was surprisingly unconcerned at the potential prospects for the Portuguese Communist Party. 
They were well aware of its strengths. The PCP was positioned to do well; their situation was 
similar to that of the French and Italian Communist parties after World War Two. The PCP 
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was respected for its resistance to the former regime; the British noted that its leader, Alvaro 
Cunhal, “has the further advantage of a martyr’s crown, derived from fourteen years in prison 
under the old regime.”204 Cunhal was a charismatic leader, and the British Embassy 
appreciated he “would romp home, twenty lengths ahead of the field, in any leadership 
stakes.”205 The PCP was also, the British Ambassador noted, “the only party to have a 
functioning organisation in the country.”206 However, throughout the Spinola presidency the 
Labour Government was surprisingly sanguine that the Portuguese Communist Party would 
not achieve power in Lisbon; this was a markedly different conclusion from that of the 
United States. 
  The Labour Government was baffled by the role of the AFM. The continued 
importance of the armed forces in Portuguese politics was clear by the presence, during talks 
between Soares and Callaghan in London on the 26
th
 May, of Lieutenant Colonel Bruno; 
seemingly on good terms with Soares, “he made it quite clear that the armed forces were still 
in complete control and one was left with the strong impression that they played a 
considerable part in the decision-making process.”207 The British noted that “although not 
saying so the Colonel implied that the armed forces would intervene if the revolution took too 
leftward a swing.”208 However, the British were influenced by leading moderate politicians 
who “reported to us that General Spinola was (alone among the Junta members) prepared to 
stand up to them if he disagreed with their proposals.”209 The Labour Government came to 
believe that moderate politicians were in a position to resist any attempt by the radical left (in 
the provisional government and AFM) to achieve power. 
 The Lisbon Embassy’s principal sources of information in Portugal were leading 
moderate politicians. The British had very little contact with those on the radical left. They 
were continually being reassured that the political process in Lisbon was dominated by 
moderate politicians and not those on the radical left. However, British officials were being 
advised by Portuguese politicians who were in the process of forming competing parties, each 
of which desperately needed western support. It was, therefore, in the interest of each to 
exaggerate its importance, which collectively meant that a perception was formed of the 
strength of democratic parties relative to the radical left. The Lisbon Embassy came to 
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believe that if the new parties were to receive support and assistance Portugal would 
successfully make a transition to democracy, irrespective of the strength of other political 
movements. Paradoxically, support from overseas led moderate parties to assume their 
significance. An exasperated aide to General Spinola explained: “he felt that the respect and 
almost reverence with which Dr Soares was received overseas gave him an exaggerated idea 
of his own political strength at home.”210  
The Labour Government considered the success of the Portuguese Socialist Party to be 
essential. According to the British Embassy, “Soares is the only political personality of 
sufficient stature to meet Cunhal on equal terms.”211 However, the Labour Government aimed 
to support the PSP through the Labour Party rather than the Foreign Office. Thus when 
Harold Wilson expressed concern “over recent reports which point to the growing strength of 
the Portuguese Communist Party”, his proposed course of action was to ask James Callaghan 
“whether the Labour Party is now in a position to provide the help which the Portuguese 
socialists need and want,” suggesting that Ron Hayward visit Portugal because of his 
experience as a party organiser.
212
 These initiatives culminated in a discussion (at the 
Socialist International meeting on the 30
th
 June) about the issue of aid and support to the 
Portuguese Socialist Party. 
The Labour Government also encouraged British Trade Unions to support their 
Portuguese counterparts. They were aware that because the communists had infiltrated the 
former regime’s trade union, and that their repression gave them legitimacy, existing unions 
were vulnerable to total domination by the communists. The Labour Attaché at the British 
Embassy in Brussels noted: “They were mostly former migrant workers who had been trained 
by the French Communist union, CGT, in preparation for just such an occurrence as that of 
the 25
th
 of April, and who were now making use of the training they had received.”213 
However, it would be difficult for the Labour Government to aid the development of 
independent Trade Unions. The British Embassy in Lisbon had no permanent Labour attaché. 
It also had to defend British economic interests against militant trade union activity. As 
Portugal’s largest foreign investor, Britain was seen to have exploited the previous regime’s 
industrial policy of maintaining a cheap and compliant workforce.
214
 A proposal that an 
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industrial relations expert from the Foreign Office should be attached to the Portuguese 
Ministry of Labour
 
was problematic because the department was led by a communist. The 
British Ambassador observed that “the Minister of Labour, being a Communist, may well 
have other ideas on the best source of advice.” 215 The Labour Government, therefore, liaised 
with the TUC. On 21
st
 June the issue was discussed by the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary with Jack Jones, its International Committee chairman.
216
 The TUC also began 
talks with international trade union representatives in Brussels on giving assistance to 
independent Portuguese trade unions.
217
  
The TUC, however, having sent a delegation to Portugal soon after the coup d’état, 
decided on a “cautious and pragmatic line at present and would prefer to let the dust settle 
before making up their mind how to proceed.”218 There was a gloomy prognosis that the 
communists were likely to dominate the development of Portuguese trade unions for the next 
two years. However, the TUC was confident that the Portuguese trade unions considered 
themselves to be “West European Movements.”219 British delegations, although aware of the 
influence of the PCP amongst the trade unions, believed the workers saw “no point in 
swapping one dictatorship for another.”220 Therefore, although the TUC were pessimistic 
about the immediate prospects for the establishment of independent trade unions in Portugal, 
they did not believe that this would mean that PCP successes in organising trade unions 
would presage a communist takeover in Lisbon.  
         The Labour Government’s relations with the provisional government in Portugal were 
conducted almost exclusively through a series of regular talks between Callaghan and Soares. 
They held a second meeting in London on the 26
th
 May 1974, followed soon after by a 
meeting at a London airport on the 4
th
 June, while Soares was on transit to talks with the 
representatives of Guinea-Bissau’s national liberation movement.221 The principal issue was 
Africa, although they also discussed how this related to the political situation in Portugal.
222
 
Soares affirmed the influence of British support for his position on Africa. Points of leverage, 
such as the economy, were discussed, particularly that “Portugal would probably need outside 
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(EEC) help.”223 The Labour Government continued bilateral discussions with Soares at the 
Ottowa conference on the 18
th
 and 19th
th
 June. This was a celebration of the 25
th
 anniversary 
of the foundation of NATO. Attended by foreign ministers, it was organised in part to 
promote unity amongst the allies prior to President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union on the 
21
st
 June. There was a brief meeting between Kissinger and Soares, which was dominated by 
concerns at the security of NATO institutions. The Labour Government sought to act as an 
emissary between Portugal and the United States. A Cabinet Office minute of a meeting with 
Soares reveals: “Mr Callaghan said that Dr Kissinger was keeping in touch with him and 
regarded the U.K as being in the lead on this issue.”224 Soares’ strategy of encouraging the 
British to lobby for US restraint in Portugal can be seen at the meeting.
225
 He expressed 
concern at rumours that the Brazilian Government was encouraging the AFM to take over 
militarily, with the tacit support of the United States.
226
 Although Callaghan had no evidence 
that the United States planned an intervention, that these rumours were not dismissed 
suggests that the Britain considered it probable that the US would be planning a covert 
operation in Lisbon.
227
 Although the situation in Lusophone Africa dominated discussions 
between Soares and Callaghan, Portugal’s internal situation was now of a greater concern 
than had been the case at previous meetings.  
The British and Portuguese Foreign Ministers next met at the meeting of the Socialist 
International at Chequers on the 30
th
 June. Callaghan chaired the meeting and the issue of 
Portugal and the needs of the Portuguese Socialist Party were on the agenda. Soares was 
encouraged by Tom McNally to “bring a shopping list to the Chequers meeting.”228 The 
British Government’s understanding of the position of the Portuguese Socialist Party was 
shaped by an informative conversation between Tom McNally and Vera Matthews, Secretary 
of the International Council of Socialist Democratic Women.
229
 She gave the pessimistic 
prognosis that “The present state of the Portuguese Socialist Party’s organisation can be 
summed up in one word - ‘chaos’. The party has four full-time officials, little organisation in 
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the country and little coherent idea of how it plans to organise. The almost continual absence 
of Soares abroad as Foreign Minister and the presence in Government of his two most senior 
colleagues have left serious gaps in decision-making and party strategy.”230 McNally’s 
analysis of the strength of the Communist Party was more alarmist than the British 
Embassy’s, and he argued that it was imperative that the Socialist International must make 
available “organisational as well as financial help.”231 
Diplomacy between Britain and Portugal during Spinola’s first government was 
dominated by contact between Soares and Callaghan; however, the last meeting involved 
Harold Wilson and the Portuguese Prime Minister, Palma Carlos, at the British Embassy in 
Brussels on the 25
th
 June, prior to a gathering of NATO leaders. Unlike Soares’ meetings 
with Callaghan, discussion of the internal situation in Portugal dominated. The Labour 
Government wanted information on recent developments, particularly the Communist Party’s 
electoral chances. The British Prime Minister gave a promise to assist in any way efforts to 
establish democracy in Portugal, although he noted ironically that the British Labour Party 
“was not always very good at organisation itself.”232 There was a note of urgency in Wilson’s 
message that “If the Communist Party were to succeed in a free and open election, so be it; 
but no lover of freedom would want to see the other parties fail for sheer lack of 
organisation.”233 Palma Carlos, while noting the strengths of the Communist Party, defended 
the make-up of his political coalition. He expressed confidence that a majority of Portuguese 
supported democracy, but scepticism that they were pro-socialist, and in a veiled criticism of 
British policy argued that “they would wish for a centre-left rather than a Socialist party.”234 
When pressed by Wilson, Palma Carlos shared an assurance given by President Spinola that 
if the Prime Minister could no longer hold together the coalition, the President would dismiss 
the government and then nominate him to form the next. The Portuguese Prime Minister 
expressed confidence that “He now knew that he had the full support of the Armed 
Forces.”235 The Labour Government was, therefore, aware of Palma Carlos’ weakness but 
assumed that Spinola was in a position to appoint another moderate government. 
 The British Embassy, through an unidentified informant, knew that Palma Carlos had 
twice tendered his resignation, seeking to form a narrower and more coherent coalition. A 
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telegram sent from the British Embassy on the 5
th
 July suggested that a show-down between 
Spinola and the radical left was likely the following day. Ambassador Trench reported that 
“pressure will mount on President Spinola to ‘take a firm grasp of the situation’, to save the 
country from anarchy.”236 However, the embassy judged that President Spinola was in a 
strong enough political position to assert his authority. The British Ambassador had a 
meeting with the president on the 8
th
 July and the only issue discussed was Africa. There had 
been no discussion of any impending political crisis. 
 Prime Minister Palma Carlos, frustrated at having to resolve the increasing social and 
economic disorder facing Portugal without “requisite authority to forcefully address them”, 
resigned suddenly on the 9
th
 July.
237
 President Spinola, having initially had his first choice 
rejected, was pressured to appoint the AFM representative Vasco Goncalves as Prime 
Minister on the 17
th
 July. The British had failed accurately to understand the changing 
political circumstances in Portugal. The meeting between Harold Wilson and Professor Palma 
Carlos had given Britain confidence that moderate politicians would overcome the AFM. 
Soares gave repeated assertions that the radical left would not threaten democracy in 
Portugal, and that any threat came rather from a right-wing authoritarian government. These 
assurances diluted warnings from other sources that the radical left could achieve power. The 
British Ambassador wrote that he now realised that “We had heard a number of accounts 
from sources closely linked with either the Prime Minister or the President about the issues 
involved. It is clear that these accounts, and by extension we ourselves, underestimated the 
cohesion and weight of the Armed Forces Movement”238 
  British policy had aimed to assist rapid decolonisation of Portugal’s African overseas 
territories; the fear had been that a right-wing authoritarian government would replace the 
coalition government if it failed in this course of action. The Labour Government had 
believed that any attempt by the radical left to achieve power, rather than being successful, 
would merely trigger a response from the right-wing in Lisbon. The British Embassy did not 
engage sufficiently with the internecine political manoeuvrings which dominated Lisbon after 
the coup d’état; instead British diplomacy had largely been conducted through bilateral 
meetings with Soares. The British Embassy, having few contacts across the political spectrum 
in Lisbon, relied on information provided by officials from the previous regime. Hence the 
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Labour Government was surprised by the dramatic political shift to the left which followed 
the resignation of Palma Carlos. 
 
The Second Provisional Government (17
th
 July to 30
th
 September, 1974) 
The inauguration on the 17
th
 July of the AFM’s nominee for Prime Minister, Colonel 
Vasco Goncalves, signalled a left-ward shift in Portuguese politics. The appointment of six 
members of the AFM to the new Provisional Government meant that the radical left had 
moved into a “position of direct and powerful involvement in the Government.”239 The “hero 
of the 25
th
 April”, Otelo de Carvalho, was appointed military governor of Lisbon and deputy 
commander of a new military command, Continental Operational Command (COPCON), a 
military task force formed to intervene within Portugal. For the next two months Spinola and 
the AFM manoeuvred against each other, culminating in the ‘silent minority’ crisis in 
September which led to the President’s resignation. What exactly happened remains 
contentious.
240
 The British Ambassador concluded: “The allegations of a right-wing plot 
seem implausible but Portugal came close to civil war on 27/28 September.”241 It appears that 
Spinola planned to mobilise the centre and right to remove the radical left from positions of 
influence. They, however, countered this by rallying supporters of the AFM to force the 
President’s own resignation.  
The Labour Government was unsure as to the exact nature of the recent political 
changes in Lisbon. The FCO thought that Goncalves and Carvalho were “left-wing idealists,” 
rather than communists, but that their “associates are Marxists or even (in Goncalves’ case 
for instance) Communists.”242 Rather than a right-wing army coup from the senior ranks of 
the army, a coup from the junior ranks, through the AFM, was now considered more likely. A 
Foreign Office official reached the pessimistic conclusion that “One of these consequences 
could be military government,” and that this was “a prelude to the assumption of power by 
the Communists.”243 There was a realisation that the role and importance of the AFM had 
been inadequately understood. The Southern European Department criticised the Lisbon 
Embassy, complaining that “It would have been useful to have had a post-coup assessment of 
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the AFM’s organisation and motives.”244 Indeed, the first direct meeting between the AFM 
and the British Embassy did not take place until the 31
st
 July, when the British Ambassador 
met Carvalho.
245
 
The departure of the government of Palma Carlos appeared to complicate the British 
strategy of encouraging Portuguese decolonisation. However, in a surprise announcement on 
the 27
th
 July, Spinola abandoned his idea of granting self-government to the overseas 
territories within a Lusophone commonwealth, instead declaring that Portugal would 
negotiate immediate independence with each national liberation movement.
246
 Britain had 
achieved the principal aim of its policy towards Portugal since the coup d’etat, yet neither the 
Labour Government nor the British Embassy in Lisbon had been forewarned of Spinola’s 
change of policy. Indeed, it was neither a consequence of, nor influenced by, British 
diplomacy; rather, it was a result of domestic political imperatives.  
The policy of the Labour Government now shifted from a general concern at political 
developments in Lisbon to a strategy of immediate practical assistance aimed at ensuring that 
Portugal made a successful transition to democracy. This was instigated by the British rather 
than the Portuguese, motivated by fear that Portugal was teetering towards a populist coup 
d’état, which would bring the Communist Party closer to power. The Labour Government 
now gave their full support to the Spinola Presidency. The British Ambassador feared that, if 
Spinola could not restore order in Portugal, economic chaos would follow “with its obvious 
invitation to the Communists to exploit it.”247 Despite its radical left-wing orientation, the 
Labour Government sought to establish close ties with the new coalition, arguing that “A 
reconstituted Provisional Government is likely to need all the moral and other support which 
we can give it.”248 The Labour Government was no longer content with promoting democracy 
by encouraging assistance to Portuguese political parties and trade unions by their British 
counterparts. On the 14
th
 August, Trench held a meeting with Prime Minister Goncalves, at 
which the Ambassador reiterated an offer made by Wilson on the 25
th
 June to the previous 
Prime Minister, to help in the establishment of democratic institutions.
249
 The British assisted 
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in the development of electoral law; however, they were frustrated by Portuguese 
bureaucracy in their attempts to assist in police training and a new media law.
250
  
  However, effective intervention in Portuguese domestic politics was an extremely 
difficult proposition. An FCO official noted that “I think we might in any case approach it 
with caution. We are already tendering a lot of advice to the Portuguese on African problems. 
To involve ourselves in domestic problems as well would lay us open to the charge of 
interference in Portuguese internal affairs.”251 It was, therefore, decided to support moderate 
politicians in Lisbon through the British Embassy. An FCO official argued that “Mr Trench 
had good contacts with the centre in Portugal and I see advantage in his using these contacts 
to convey the message of unity.”252 Therefore, while Callaghan focused on bringing progress 
to negotiations on Africa, the British Embassy helped to promote democracy in Portugal by 
“giving a warning about the dangers of fragmentation of the moderate democratic forces in 
Portugal.”253 They were careful not to endorse any particular party or become “involved in 
party political manoeuvring in Portugal.”254 The Labour Government encouraged British 
political parties to establish links with their Portuguese counterparts, and the British Embassy 
supported the partisan activities of the Labour and Conservative parties.  
  The British Embassy demonstrated some bias in favour of centre-right parties in 
Portugal, despite their difficulty in attracting the support of a people overjoyed at the removal 
of an authoritarian government and the intimidating environment in which they now 
operated. The British Embassy was directly involved in the visit of Michael Young MP from 
the Conservative Research Centre to Lisbon where he met representatives of the emerging 
centre-right parties, particularly Spinola’s aspirant party, the Partido do Centro Democratico 
(CDS), but it was not involved when the Labour MP Ron Hayward visited the Portuguese 
Socialist Party.
255
 This was not only because Ron Hayward already had close connections 
with the PSP. The British Embassy followed closely the fortunes of the CDS party and urged 
the Foreign Office to encourage British political parties to provide assistance.
256
 Michael 
Young was also debriefed by the Southern European Department of the Foreign Office. His 
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report was somewhat at variance with the received wisdom in London, arguing that “the 
general opinion was that the Socialist Party (PSP) were in a weak position”, and 
pessimistically concluding, “A common guestimate was that the PSP would be lucky to get 
more than 10 per cent of the vote in the general election.”257 
  The Labour Government was also aware that moderate parties in Portugal were 
hampered “by the domination of the media by the extreme left.258 Although coverage of 
events in Portugal by the BBC (noted for its traditional accuracy and impartiality) and the 
British national press played a significant role in Lisbon’s political discourse - suggesting that 
the Labour Government would be able to influence the political process through cultural 
diplomacy - the importance of the British media also caused difficulties. The Lisbon Embassy 
was concerned at the adverse reaction to reporting by British newspapers. This was raised by 
Prime Minister Goncalves at his meeting with the British Ambassador. Trench recorded that 
“He asked me in particular, whether I could not do anything to put a stop to the extremely 
exaggerated and tendentious reporting of Bruce Loudon, the Daily Telegraph Stringer.”259  
The British Embassy was concerned that Loudon “might be thrown out of Portugal and that 
this might be blown into a cause célèbre by the British press.” This led the News Department 
of the FCO to “speak to the Daily Telegraph at a suitably senior level, to warn them.”260 The 
Embassy was also aware that a left-wing Portuguese newspaper had compiled a dossier of 
British involvement with the old regime and that, if this were published, it would complicate 
current relations between Portugal and Britain.  
  The Labour Government also encouraged a review of the support given by the TUC to 
the embryonic trade unions in Portugal. The Labour Attaché at the British Embassy in 
Brussels, where the activity of international trade union federations was monitored, liaised 
with delegations returning from visits to Lisbon.
261
 The British Government encouraged the 
TUC to actively support the expansion of organised labour in Portugal. Advice was given on 
collective bargaining, dispute settlement and the type of legislative framework most suited 
for representational functions.
262
 However, trade union delegations returning from Portugal 
remained optimistic about the prospects for democracy in Portugal. A report by an 
international delegation noted: “I believe that the accounts appearing in some foreign 
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newspapers or by radio and TV commentators that Portugal is currently moving toward the 
extreme Left are almost entirely mythical and based on very superficial impressions.”263  
  The Labour Government’s efforts to support the development of independent trade 
unions in Portugal were complicated by the criticism it faced that, as the largest investor in 
the Portuguese economy, it had exploited the previous regime’s policy of attracting overseas 
investment by controlling organised labour. The British Ambassador noted: “This resulted in 
labour being generally depressed in this country to a point where it was cheaper than 
elsewhere in Western Europe and noticeably less liable to industrial unrest.”264 It became 
increasingly difficult for the British Embassy to defend British business interests in Portugal. 
The British Ambassador noted: “Any representations by us could too easily be interpreted as 
an attempt to force the Portuguese to allow firms and individuals, which had come to 
Portugal for the advantages obtainable under the old regime, to continue to enjoy them 
against the tide of events.”265 The British Embassy had to deal with a Ministry of Labour 
headed by a Communist Minister unsympathetic to their concerns. Eventually, the British 
Ambassador raised the issue during his meeting with Prime Minister Goncalves, reminding 
him of “the need for the maintenance of a climate of confidence in Portugal, such as will 
encourage the foreign investment needed for development.”266  
 The leftward shift in Portuguese politics after the departure of Palma Carlos led the 
British Embassy to work even more closely with their US counterparts. The British 
Ambassador in Lisbon noted that “We have discussed recent events and future possibilities 
with the US Embassy here, who have received from different sources intelligence similar to 
ours, and whose conclusions appear to be broadly in line with our own.”267 Despite its 
erroneous analysis and limited influence over recent events in Portugal, the British Embassy 
was surprisingly still perceived to be one of the leading diplomatic players in Lisbon. The 
United States continued to be constrained in its ability to intervene in Portugal. The US 
Ambassador informed the British Embassy that he was aware “that the Communist Party 
would make a great deal of capital out of any evidence of American meddling.”268 Recent 
                                                             
263 Ibid. 
264 Trench to Thomas, ‘Labour Management’, 21 August 1974, FCO 9/2077. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Trench to Wiggin, 10 July 1974, FCO 9/2046. 
268 Ure to Thomas, 31 July 1974, FCO 9/2047. 
64 
 
events brought a review of US policy toward Portugal.
269
 A meeting took place between the 
British Ambassador and his US counterpart in Porto on the 31
st
 July. He had recently returned 
from “three days of intense discussions with the State Department, which had included a long 
session with Kissinger.”270 The minutes of the meeting between the ambassadors were widely 
disseminated across various Foreign Office departments. The United States decided to 
continue their policy of working closely with President Spinola, although they found him “a 
somewhat shrunken man.”271 The US was becoming increasingly pessimistic about the 
direction of Portuguese politics.
272
 The British Ambassador noted that “I found Mr Scott 
deeply worried about recent developments here.”273 However, although the British had the 
same concerns, their analysis differed.  
The Labour Government did not share the United States’ pessimism about 
developments in Portugal, remaining optimistic about the likelihood of an eventual transition 
to democracy. After the meeting with Ambassador Scott, the British Embassy noted: 
“Perhaps one should discount to some extent Mr Scott’s gloom about Spinola’s position.” 
The Labour Government judged Soares’ presence in government essential. The British 
Ambassador argued: “Rightly or wrongly, he seems to have become a symbol in the eyes of 
the world.”274 The United States was extremely concerned at the electoral alliance between 
the PSP and PCP, and raised the issue with Soares. However, the Labour Government, whose 
analysis at the highest level of government was influenced by close personal ties to Soares (in 
whose interest it was to downplay the links between the PSP and PCP), accepted his 
explanation that the pact was a tactical manoeuvre to avoid being outflanked by the radical 
left. The British Ambassador believed that Soares’ left-wing statements have “led him to 
sound a good deal more extreme than he is in private conversation.”275  
  The impending sense of crisis heightened American concerns at Portugal’s 
membership of NATO. The United States now addressed the issue of Portugal’s participation 
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in NATO’s planning committees. The US had already taken the unilateral decision, at the 
Heads of State meeting in June, to limit Portuguese access to sensitive documents. The 
NATO Headquarters Office had been instructed “orally by the Secretary’s office not to 
distribute Atomal and Cosmos Top Secret documents to the Portuguese.”276 The Labour 
Government was informed through a contact that “The US were now going to ask for the 
arrangement to be formalised and also for Portugal to be invited to leave the Nuclear 
Planning Group.”277 Clear differences existed between the US and its European allies. The 
latter concluded that, because Communists in the Portuguese government were not directly 
involved in foreign affairs, existing security arrangements were adequate. The Dutch 
delegation to NATO had expressed their fear “at the possible effect on Portuguese (and 
indeed Dutch opinion) of a Portuguese expulsion (even if ostensibly voluntary) from the 
NPG, as NATO’s reaction to a generally applauded change in the Portuguese 
Government.”278 The United States’ approach also exasperated the British, but they did not 
attempt to use their influence to change Washington’s policy. A Foreign Office official noted: 
“The Americans have not handled this well… Oh dear. But I’m not sure there’s much we can 
do.”279 Instead, Britain acted on their contacts’ information so as “to be ready to respond to 
the US approach.”280 The British liaised between the Portuguese and US delegations at 
NATO headquarters and sought a face-saving formula for the Portuguese. However, the 
approach failed; an official from the NATO UK Delegation concluded that “the US 
delegation had firm instructions from Washington to exclude the Portuguese from the 
beginning.”281 The Labour Government negotiated between the Europeans, whose views they 
largely shared, and the United States, whose actions they defended. The incident shows the 
British using information (known because of close institutional links) to formulate a 
diplomatic response aimed not at changing US policy, but to make other states accept US 
policy, without their being aware of the reasons for doing so.  
 President Spinola’s resignation followed an unsuccessful attempt to assert his authority 
over the AFM. On September 28 and 29
th
,  rumours spread that Spinola was planning to 
mobilise a ‘silent majority’ for a public display of support for the President, in response to 
which armed supporters of the AFM erected barricades on roads into Lisbon. After a stand-
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off, Spinola resigned the following day. The British Embassy had reported on “growing 
popular dissatisfaction with the present provisional government, its failure to get its edicts 
obeyed and the direction in which it is moving.”282 They foresaw that Spinola would attempt 
to reassert his authority and that this was likely to have some popular support. However, 
although the evolving political crisis in Portugal was discussed at Cabinet level in Britain, a 
fatalistic conclusion was reached: “It was agreed that in the short-term, and perhaps in the 
medium term too, there was little we could do other than watch and hope.”283 The only 
response was to ask McNally to consider what could be done at the party level, and the issue 
of Portugal was added to the agenda of the Foreign Secretary’s lunch with Dr Kissinger on 
25
th
 September.
284
 
 That the Labour Government, having endeavoured since the 25
th
 April to influence 
events in Portugal, should now respond so ineffectually to the latest crisis is explained in part 
by the distraction of the Cyprus conflict. Regular meetings between Callaghan and Soares, 
which had been such a marked feature of Britain’s relations with Portugal immediately after 
the coup d’état, did not take place during this decisive episode. The Foreign Secretary’s 
shuttle diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean, seeking a resolution to the Cyprus imbroglio, 
prevented anything but a cursory consideration of any other issue. John Killick in the Cabinet 
Office admitted: “Because of Cyprus, I inevitably have not been able to focus much on 
Portugal lately, but have become increasingly uneasy about the situation.”285 It was now 
decided that a visit to Portugal by James Callaghan was not appropriate. A Foreign Office 
official concluded: “One cannot help reflecting that – even Cyprus apart – this would hardly 
have seemed an appropriate moment for an official visit by the Secretary of State.” 286 It is 
surprising that, given the perceived seriousness of the situation in Lisbon, a visit by a more 
junior minister or representative from another department was not proposed. This may have 
been because the Labour Party had begun campaigning for the General Election, which was 
called for 10
th
 October, but it could also have been because, now that Portugal’s overseas 
territories were to be given their independence, Britain’s primary aim in its relations with 
Lisbon had been achieved.  
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Britain and the Spinola Presidency 
 The coup d’état in Portugal affected Britain’s interests in several ways, which meant 
there were a number of possible policy responses; the approach chosen by the Labour 
Government, therefore, reveals much about the nature of its foreign policy as well as the 
processes by which its decisions were reached. The Labour Government believed that the 
coup d’état benefited the British national interest by enabling a resolution of the Rhodesian 
crisis, one of the most intractable and contentious foreign policy issues facing Britain at the 
time. This required the success of moderate politicians in Lisbon who supported immediate 
independence for Portugal’s overseas territories. Above all, the Labour Government gave 
complete and unequivocal support to Soares and the PSP. This was to the exclusion of all 
other political movements, including that of the Portuguese President, Spinola. Britain could 
have been his close ally, since diplomatic circumstances were propitious.
287
 Moreover, his 
eventual resignation threatened the transition to parliamentary democracy in Portugal and 
triggered a Cold War crisis. Britain’s relations with Washington also became strained 
because of their markedly different approach to events in Portugal.   
 The Labour Government’s support for a single political movement in Portugal so as to 
advance the British national interest suggests that its encouragement of democracy in 
Portugal was merely rhetorical. The Labour Government, while maintaining correct formal 
ties with the Portuguese President, did not give its unequivocal support, despite the threat to 
democracy presented by the AFM and radical left. This was not only because of the 
unconstitutional means by which he came to power (British governments had been willing to 
maintain a cosy, comfortable relationship with an authoritarian government in Lisbon). The 
Labour Government also appeared relatively unconcerned with the process of developing 
democratic institutions and civil society in Portugal. However, whilst support for Soares by 
the Labour Government was seen as the best possible means to achieve the Lusophone 
decolonisation, there was also a conviction that the PSP would be the most successful party in 
any forthcoming elections and that this would be the means by which parliamentary 
democracy would be consolidated in Portugal. This was not a belief held by the FCO and the 
Lisbon Embassy. The assumption by the Labour Government that a democratic outcome in 
Lisbon was assured showed an optimism that Europe now shared a common set of political 
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values, and that, given the opportunity, the Portuguese people would embrace the same 
political system as other Western European states. 
 The assistance given to the PSP by the Labour Government might support an argument 
that the partisan advancement of democratic socialism was its principal concern. The 
existence of close ties between the Labour movement and the PSP prior to the coup d’état, 
and the detrimental consequences of that relationship on the conduct of British diplomacy in 
Lisbon, would appear to support this thesis. However, this is an erroneous assumption, not 
least because historians’ understanding of this Labour Government’s foreign policy is that, 
although influenced by its values, its approach was essentially pragmatic.
288
 The Labour 
Government’s decision to assist Soares was a natural extension of the links established prior 
to the coup d’état and was made without much deliberation or consultation with Portuguese 
experts in the Southern European Department; however, its belief that a resolution of the 
Rhodesian crisis was possible and that this was most likely to be achieved through the 
success of the PSP was also grasped immediately after the coup d’état. Therefore, while 
partisanship is a necessary factor in explaining Labour Government policy, it is in itself not 
sufficient; rather, there was a convergence between the government’s promotion of its values 
and the pursuit of the British national interest. This enabled the Labour Government to have 
an unusually coherent foreign policy towards Portugal where the Labour leadership worked 
alongside the wider Labour movement (including the affiliated TUC), unlike other cases 
during the Cold War when socialist governments in western democracies found it difficult to 
balance their values with power politics; relations with the US after the coup d’état in Chile 
were both a recent and pertinent example.  
 The Labour Government’s response to events in Portugal demonstrates that, while 
foreign policy was shaped by the close relationship with the United States, Britain was 
prepared to act autonomously in pursuit of the national interest, even if this caused tension 
with Washington. The foreign policy establishments of Britain and the US worked 
independently of each other, only occasionally sharing information. There were exceptions, 
particularly between those departments concerned with defence and security issues which 
maintained close institutional ties; however, their input into policy making competed with 
actors for whom the tenets of the Anglo-American relationship were secondary. There were 
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regular discussions at the highest level of government and between those directly responsible 
for policy toward Portugal; while their analyses were broadly similar, the relative weight 
placed on different factors varied according to the foreign policy goals of each state. The 
United States was concerned with the strategic implications of events in Portugal, particularly 
the renewal of leases on the Azores bases and the security of NATO institutions; Britain’s 
concerns were Rhodesia and the success of the PSP. The Labour Government, however, did 
not challenge American policy and worked assiduously to ensure that differences caused no 
damage to the wider relationship with the United States.  
 The British defence of United States policy towards Portugal within NATO, despite 
itself pursuing a radically different course, demonstrates the importance of the Anglo-
American relationship in shaping its foreign policy. Indeed, because the Labour Government 
was in some ways better placed to influence events in Portugal, it was able to facilitate 
American diplomacy. Henry Kissinger, now dominant in foreign policy making after the 
Watergate scandal and Richard Nixon’s resignation on the 9th August, viewed events in 
Portugal as a Cold War issue.
289
 However, James Callaghan was able to maintain a 
relationship of trust and cooperation with Kissinger throughout their discussions on 
Portugal.
290
 By contrast, Kissinger quarrelled bitterly with members of the State Department 
over the same issue.
291
 This supports the argument that the Anglo-American relationship is 
based on shared values and culture which, particularly when a personal rapport exists 
between its proponents, allows marked differences on an individual issue to exist without 
damaging the overall strategic alliance.
292
     
 The divergence between how Britain and the United States understood the correlation 
between events in Portugal and the Cold War is interesting. While the United States was 
profoundly disturbed by the governing coalitions in Lisbon, which included communists and 
radical left-wing politicians, Britain was seemingly unconcerned. The United States disliked 
Soares, believing his success would lead to a radical leftwing government, antithetical to its 
interests, and fully committed itself instead to supporting Spinola. The Labour Government 
shared the view of other west European states that the success of the Socialist Party would 
serve as a bulwark against the emergence of a communist-dominated government. The 
United States saw instability within the Mediterranean region - which included the decline 
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and impending death of Franco, the emergence of Eurocommunism in Italy and France, the 
Cyprus crisis (which triggered the coup d’état in Greece), as well as events in Portugal - 
principally in terms of their impact on superpower relations. The Labour Government 
believed that each crisis resulted from factors indigenous to each country. 
 The Labour leadership dominated how British policy toward Portugal was made 
throughout the Spinola presidency, although a wide range of protagonists both inside and 
outside government were involved in the process. It was the interest in Portugal shown by 
leading Labour politicians such as Ron Hayward, Joan Lestor, Tom McNally and particularly 
James Callaghan which ensured that related issues were considered at the highest level of 
government. His importance in shaping British policy is illustrated by the ineffectual 
response of the FCO to the events that precipitated Spinola’s resignation, since they 
coincided with Callaghan’s attempts to resolve the Cyprus conflict. Such interest resulted 
from a conviction that democracy could be established in Portugal, a view not shared by 
those who believed that only authoritarian government could succeed in the Iberian 
Peninsula. The tone of the correspondence written by regional specialists in the Foreign 
Office on occasions demonstrated this prejudice. Although there were differences between 
those who shaped the Labour Government’s response, policy was not an aggregate of 
competing interest groups and so does not fit the Bureaucratic Politics Model favoured by 
international relations scholars of American foreign policy.
293
 
 The Labour Government’s diplomatic role in Lisbon during the Spinola presidency 
demonstrates that, despite the decline in its military and economic strength, Britain continued 
to have the ability to influence world events. It was perceived by other countries to be a 
leading diplomatic player in Lisbon, having excellent contacts with leading politicians in 
Lisbon, whilst the BBC had a significant influence on public discourse. However, its ability 
to shape events in Portugal was actually limited; the successes of British policy during the 
Spinola presidency were a result more of good fortune than of influence. The existence of 
links between the Labour Party and Soares prior to the coup d’état meant that the Labour 
Government had a close relationship with the politician who, in the following year, would 
form the first democratically elected government in Lisbon. It also meant that the Labour 
Government was able to support socialism in Portugal without contravening the principle of 
non-interference in a sovereign state’s domestic affairs. Likewise, while Britain shared the 
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‘oldest alliance’ with Portugal and maintained constructive relations with the Salazar and 
Caetano regime (remaining Portugal’s largest trading partner), the tension between the British 
government and the Caetano regime immediately prior to the coup d’état meant that their 
association with the old regime was not resented in the Portuguese collective memory as was 
that of the United States. 
The resignation of Spinola and the emergence of the radical left in Lisbon meant that 
Portuguese affairs now became an international crisis. Since Britain had maintained only 
formal links with President Spinola, his resignation did not necessitate a shift in policy. 
However, the Labour Government now actively supported a transition to democracy in 
Portugal and worked more closely with the United States. The failure to predict the 
resignation of Spinola led to a review of the British Embassy’s operating procedures in 
Lisbon, and contacts were now sought across the political spectrum. The Labour Government 
continued to believe that, although Portugal was entering a period of likely chaos during 
which the radical left would seek to achieve power, the Portuguese people desired 
democracy: if an election were to take place as promised, moderate politicians would be in a 
position to form a government with a strong mandate. The British continued to be less 
concerned than the United States at the presence of Communist ministers in the coalition 
governments and the implications for Portugal’s membership of NATO. However, while 
Britain’s concern at the direction of events in Portugal intensified, its ability to play an 
important role in Lisbon now declined in comparison to that of the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 
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Chapter III – Britain and Portuguese Decolonisation 
(25
th
 April – 30th September, 1974) 
 
The previous chapter demonstrates that the principal concern of the Labour Government in its 
relations with Lisbon after the coup d’état was to promote immediate independence for 
Portugal’s overseas territories.294 This chapter considers the approach taken to achieve this 
aim and the motives behind the decisions reached. British policy during the previous decade 
had been to encourage an immediate ceasefire in Portugal’s African wars, to be followed by a 
negotiated independence. Britain condemned on moral grounds the continued existence of a 
Portuguese Empire, but its policy was predominantly concerned with Portugal’s territories in 
Africa because of their impact on the British national interest.
295
 Its influence amongst the 
newly independent African states was damaged by its inability to bring to an end the white 
racialist regimes in southern Africa, whilst the Rhodesian regime received critical support 
from the Portuguese colonial authorities.
296
 After the coup d’état there was also an awareness 
that a resolution of the African wars was necessary before Portugal itself could make a 
transition to parliamentary democracy. The Labour Party had a partisan interest in the 
outcome of events in both Portugal and Lusophone Africa. Therefore, because the Portuguese 
overseas territories affected British foreign policy in several ways, the Labour Government 
had a number of different options to influence the diplomatic process that brought 
independence to Portugal’s overseas territories. 
 The debate in Lisbon on the future of the overseas territories began with a fierce 
disagreement over the principles that would determine its negotiating strategy with the 
national liberation movements. The decision was between decolonisation, which would grant 
immediate independence to the national liberation movements, and self-determination, 
whereby a more gradual process of consultation with the people (through elections and 
referendums) would eventually lead to independence, with ties retained with the former 
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colonial power.
297
 The Armed Forces Movement promised rapid decolonisation immediately 
after the coup d’état, a position supported by the Socialist Party leader Mario Soares, and the 
Communist Party leader Cunhal. However, the newly appointed Portuguese President 
General Spinola, sought to implement the ideas outlined in his book, published immediately 
before the coup d’état, which called for gradual self-determination and the establishment of a 
Lusophone Commonwealth.
298
 In the uncertain political climate which followed the coup 
d’état, the emerging political groupings manoeuvred for influence in Lisbon in part by taking 
a stance on the issue of Portugal’s overseas territories; Guinea-Bissau, Angola and 
Mozambique dominated this discussion. Unlike all its other overseas territories, in Guinea-
Bissau Portugal faced certain military defeat (particularly after its air superiority was nullified 
by the Soviet Union’s supply of the SAM 7 anti-aircraft missile) and had few options besides 
granting independence.
299
 However, once decided, this would set a precedent which would 
increase pressure for immediate independence elsewhere. Angola and Mozambique were 
Portugal’s largest colonial possessions, with the most significance for the Portuguese 
economy and sizeable white settler populations. Granting independence to Angola and 
Mozambique was complicated by a lack of coherent national liberation movements with 
legitimacy across all ethnic groups. The other overseas possessions were small and, in most 
cases, not viable as independent states, a fact which was clear from the absence of significant 
political movements in their territories.   
The Portuguese Foreign Minister Soares’ initial contacts with the national liberation 
movements in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique were unproductive, compromised by the 
negotiating position insisted upon by the Portuguese President. However, the weakening of 
Spinola’s domestic political position seen in the previous chapter led to the surprise 
concession by the President of the principle of immediate independence for Portugal’s 
overseas territories. The negotiations proceeded rapidly thereafter - between the signing of 
agreements with the liberation movements in each colony and the formal handover of power, 
there was an almost instantaneous erosion of the authority of the Portuguese colonial 
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authorities: in any meaningful sense, Portuguese sovereignty over its overseas territories 
ended long before actual independence.
300
 
The Labour Government sought to encourage immediate independence for Portugal’s 
overseas territories through their relationships with the Portuguese Foreign Minister and the 
moderate African Commonwealth states. The Labour Government judged that opposition by 
President Spinola and his supporters was the most significant obstruction to any progress and 
sought to use British influence to bolster Soares’s political position in Lisbon. Britain also 
sought to facilitate Soares’ diplomacy by using its influence amongst moderate 
Commonwealth states to urge the national liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique 
to moderate their demands. Britain failed to understand the weakness of Spinola’s political 
position in Lisbon, however, and was taken by surprise by the announcement of the changed 
status of the overseas territories on 27 July. The Labour Government’s concern now shifted 
from encouraging rapid independence to its likely consequences in Angola and Mozambique: 
brutal civil war and proxy Cold War conflict. However, while the British had significant 
influence in Lisbon before the principle of immediate independence was granted, once 
conceded British influence diminished.   
 
Britain and Lusophone Africa 
The history of Portugal’s African colonies was closely connected to that of the British 
colonies in southern Africa. The Portuguese African Empire began as coastal enclaves and 
archipelagos acquired to enable trade with East Asia and to supply slaves to Brazil. However, 
the partition of much of Africa by European powers at the end of the nineteenth century 
caused a “dramatic invigoration of Lisbon’s imperial project.”301 Although unsuccessful in 
acquiring new territories, Portuguese colonial administration now expanded into the interior 
of its possessions.
302
 By 1914, Portugal was a major imperial power, although the 
development of effective administration and economic development in its overseas territories 
varied greatly. The economic development of Angola and Mozambique became closely tied 
with that of Rhodesia and South Africa: for example, the Zambezi railway, built in 1894, was 
largely financed with British capital. Norrie MacQueen has described how the relationship 
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“fostered an image of Portugal’s possessions as an empire within an empire.”303 Dependency 
theorists have even posited a relationship of dependence between Britain and Portugal.
304
  
After the Second World War, however, events in Lusophone Africa were to take a 
different course from those in other European colonies. Although Salazar never visited any of 
Portugal’s colonies, the empire was central to the regime’s legitimacy as a world power.  
Therefore, when European countries began decolonisation he was determined to retain 
Portugal’s overseas territories. The consequence was that, as MacQueen notes, “By the end of 
1964 Portugal, one of the poorest countries in Western Europe, was embroiled in three 
separate guerrilla wars in another continent.”305 Portugal struggled to find the resources for 
such a conflict, and the impact on Portuguese society of increased conscription and military 
casualties was to have profound political consequences.  
Salazar’s determination to retain Portugal’s overseas territories led inexorably to a 
crisis in relations with the British.  Britain’s failure to offer military or even diplomatic 
support after India’s invasion of Goa in 1961 was seen by Portugal as a betrayal of the tenets 
of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
306
 Once the African wars began, Portugal became steadily 
diplomatically isolated. The important exception was the United States which judged 
Portugal to be of such geopolitical significance that relations should continue.
307
  By the 
1970s the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to condemn the Portuguese and 
recognise the legitimacy of African national liberation movements. Portugal also became an 
embarrassment to its European allies in NATO who were unwilling to supply military 
equipment for fear of its use in Africa, while Nordic countries and Holland even gave 
assistance to Portugal’s opponents. Britain shared its European partners’ concerns although it 
abstained from voting against Portugal in the United Nations.
308
 A group within the Labour 
Party was formed to lobby for the interests of the Lusophone African national liberation 
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movements.
309
 There was strong criticism of Portugal throughout the British media which 
MacQueen argues formed part of the “coterie of western journalists and academics enlisted as 
supporters of the liberation movements.”310 
Britain’s transformation from the leading exponent of colonialism to would-be partner 
of the newly independent states also led to increased criticism of Portugal’s African policies. 
Britain sought to maintain its considerable influence in the region (critically, even the United 
States continued to follow the British lead on most African issues
311). Yet Britain’s failure to 
take decisive action against the Portuguese complicated its relations with the rest of Africa.
312
 
The continued existence of white racialist regimes throughout southern Africa was one of the 
few issues which unified otherwise disparate African states. Norrie MacQueen notes that “the 
African departments of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were keenly aware of 
Britain’s status in sub-Saharan Africa at a time when the continent , now effectively 
decolonized, seemed to be emerging as an important new component of the international 
system.”313 In particular, the principal aim of the newly formed Organisation of African 
Unity was the liberation of the African subcontinent from colonialism and racial 
discrimination.
314
 However, British economic interests in that region and sympathy for white 
settlers amongst some politicians and sections of the public prevented effective action.
315
 The 
potential for ruction within the NATO alliance if Portugal’s European allies criticised its 
colonial policy overshadowed all other calculations; a Foreign Office official observed: “So 
put, the question is rhetorical.”316 This was not the only dilemma Britain faced; a series of 
crises from the Congo to Biafra had largely ended optimism for political and economic 
progress. During talks on Africa between the State Department and the FCO, the head of the 
UK delegation in his opening remarks argued: “One outstanding feature of the last 10 years, 
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both within Africa and outside it, was that the gap between expectations and achievements 
had been widening and this had led to growing realism, or possibly a growing disillusion and 
cynicism.”317 The failure of constitutional government in its former colonies and the 
radicalism of the regimes that followed meant even relations with Commonwealth states were 
in crisis.
318
 Therefore, a successful resolution of the issue of white minority governments in 
southern Africa became crucial to Britain’s wider strategy of maintaining influence 
throughout the continent.  
Rhodesia became the dominant foreign policy issue facing British governments 
during the 1960s and 1970s.
319
 Britain’s refusal to cede ultimate sovereignty over the 
Rhodesian Parliament, unless the right of the black majority to representation was granted at 
some future date, led to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Rhodesian 
Parliament in 1963. The UDI humiliated the British Government, which was held responsible 
for resolving the crisis by the international community (particularly the newly independent 
Commonwealth and African states). Kenneth Kaunda, the Zambian leader, reminded Sir Alec 
Douglas Home during talks that “This was a British responsibility and Britain could play a 
key role both by exercising pressures in Lisbon and Pretoria and because the United States 
looked to Britain for a lead on southern Africa.”320 The Wilson Government had neither the 
means nor the inclination to resolve the issue by the threat of military force: rather it 
responded to UDI by sponsoring the United Nations’ economic sanctions against Rhodesia.321 
The Labour Government sought to enforce the sanctions by a naval patrol around the port of 
Beira in Mozambique, during which “Britain deployed 76 ships and over 24,000 men to 
enforce the blockade.”322 Sanctions, however, proved ineffective as many states, particularly 
South African and the Portuguese colonial authorities, failed to comply and Britain refused to 
act against those that broke sanctions.
323
 The Labour Government entered negotiations with 
Rhodesia on several occasions but was repeatedly humiliated by the stubborn and 
manipulative Rhodesian premier, Ian Smith.
324
 A historian observes that “To be continually 
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reminded of bearing the responsibility for Rhodesia, but lacking the power to enforce it, was 
a constant humiliation which Britain had to endure so long as the issue remained an issue of 
international concern.”325 Thus, when the Portuguese coup d’état occurred, despite 
Rhodesia’s importance as an issue to the British national interest, an impasse had been 
reached in diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Rhodesian question.  
Mozambique’s political status was crucial to Rhodesia’s continued independence. The 
ability of the Portuguese colonial authorities to maintain order in the border area of Tete 
prevented ZANLA (Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army) launching guerrilla 
operations from bases in Mozambique into the hinterland of Rhodesia, while the Portuguese 
colonial authorities’ refusal to enforce UN sanctions against Rhodesia guaranteed their 
failure.
326
 During talks with Soares Callaghan concluded, “Apart from the link with South 
Africa, Portugal was the most important factor in keeping Rhodesia going.”327 Therefore, 
Britain, unlike certain European allies which expressed a general abhorrence at the racial 
principles of Portugal’s colonialism, had a specific interest in the outcome of events in 
Mozambique. This did not mean support for the rebel Frelimo armies in Mozambique, 
although elements within the Labour Party favoured this approach. The tenets of Britain’s 
long established alliance with Portugal and the desire to defend its economic interests in the 
region prevented this. However, successive British governments took a close interest in the 
political situation in Mozambique. 
 
 There was a dramatic change at the beginning of 1974 in the southern Africa situation even 
before the coup d’état in Lisbon. Frelimo liberated one-third of Mozambique, including the Tete 
province.
328
 Zambia, which bordered the white minority states, sought to avoid further violence and 
instability in the region and, despairing of effective diplomatic intervention by the British 
Conservative government, pursued clandestine talks with both the Portuguese and South African 
governments.
329
 The British, believing the course of the war demanded negotiation and that 
relations between Britain and the Black African states were being damaged by Lisbon’s stance, 
became more insistent that the Caetano regime must now enter talks with the national liberation 
movements in its overseas territories. However, the need to avoid antagonising the Portuguese 
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regime and the refusal of Black African governments to cooperate with a Conservative government 
prevented progress. 
 
The Labour Party and Lusophone Africa  
The Labour Party’s manifesto of February 1974, although vague on detail, gave 
unambiguous support for change in southern Africa.
330
 It declared: “We shall oppose all forms of 
racial discrimination and colonialism. This will mean support for the liberation movements of 
Southern Africa.”331 The manifesto was then written, when in opposition, by the National Executive 
Committee rather than the party leadership, and this pledge would appear to have been sponsored 
by those on the ideological left of the Labour Party. The newly appointed Foreign Secretary, James 
Callaghan, had had previous experience working with leading Black Nationalist leaders in Africa 
and clearly sympathised with their cause. However, after the election it was left-wing MPs both 
inside and outside the cabinet, rather than the Foreign Secretary, who sought to ensure, against 
resistance within the FCO, that the manifesto commitment became policy. A number of Labour 
politicians took an active interest in southern Africa including the ministers Joan Lestor, Judith Hart 
and David Ennals, and Ron Hayward and Lord Gifford from the Labour Party.
332
 The Committee 
for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea had been set up during the previous parliament to 
lobby for their cause. It sought to ensure that one of the electoral manifesto commitments 
(according to Benn Pimlott, “In 1974, it was, at best, a shopping list, at worst a collection of 
slogans”) became a reality.333 The election of a Labour Government, therefore, brought a radically 
new approach to the Portuguese overseas territories resulting from the partisan ties between the left 
of the Labour Party and the national liberation movements and their sponsors.
 
 
 Immediately after his election in February Harold Wilson ordered a review of British policy 
toward southern Africa. An FCO official at the Rhodesian Department chaired the review, with 
submissions from interested parties. The process lasted until the end of 1974, but was largely 
superseded by events after the coup d’état.334 A number of actors were concerned with Britain’s 
policy toward Lusophone Africa. The left-wing Labour Party MPs already mentioned worked 
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independently of the Labour Government to develop relations with Frelimo and the surrounding 
black African Commonwealth states. Lord Gifford invited representatives of PAIGC (Partido 
Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde) informally to London immediately after the 
coup d’état.335 Callaghan worked closely with the Foreign Minister Soares and sought to facilitate 
his diplomatic efforts in Africa. The British consulates in the Portuguese Overseas Territories were 
principally concerned with the relationship between developments in Lisbon and the country in 
which they were based. This was a consequence of the FCO’s organisation, with consulates 
reporting to the Lisbon Embassy, and officials that served in southern Africa largely coming from 
postings in Portugal rather than surrounding African states. Finally, the reporting of embassies in 
southern Africa can be separated into those representing British interests in white majority states 
and those in radical black African states. It appears that without clear guidance from London, 
because of the policy review, the concerns of these embassies came to reflect those of the states 
within which they were assigned. In particular, the concerns of the Ministry of Defence and 
intelligence services about the likely implications of political change in southern Africa on the Cold 
War did not appear to have been addressed during this critical period.
336
 However, the nuances in 
approach between diverse actors within the British Government would enable them to play a useful 
role in facilitating negotiations between the Portuguese and their adversaries. 
The FCO had sought to signal a possible change of policy toward Portugal and the status of 
its overseas territories during the general election campaign. It emphasized that a period of 
deliberation rather than a change of policy was in progress, and was able to use the election as a 
means to assert this ambiguity. This was not done in the expectation of a Labour Party electoral 
victory, the FCO developing policy toward Guinea-Bissau “On the assumption that after the 
election we have a Conservative Administration.”337 However, the FCO used the pretext of the 
constitutional convention of impartiality during campaigning, and the norm that policy is reviewed 
by Whitehall Departments when parliament is dissolved, to signal a possible change of policy 
direction towards the overseas territories. The mechanism for doing so was FCO participation in the 
Africa Planning Group, formed within the European Political Cooperation framework (an attempt to 
coordinate the approach of The Nine to foreign policy issues, but which operated on 
intergovernmental principles outside the EEC’s existing institutions); this allowed discussion of the 
recognition and support for the national liberation movements in Portugal’s overseas territories 
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without damaging bilateral Anglo-Portuguese relations.
338
 This was a concession by Britain to its 
European partners who had long held that national liberation movements should be granted 
recognition and it was hoped that this might lead to reciprocal support for more effective 
enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia. Although not the expected outcome, the approach also 
prepared the FCO for any potential change of government. A senior official admitted that “I think 
the specialist committee does offer a chance to change our line gracefully should we have a new 
government.”339 However, the FCO was clear that any new approach to southern Africa should not 
be pursued to the detriment of traditional bilateral ties with the Portuguese regime.  
Immediately after the election, the FCO was confident that its approach to the 
question of the Portuguese overseas territories would be followed by the incoming Labour 
Government. It responded to a representation by the Portuguese Ambassador, concerned at a 
likely change of policy, by implying that the Labour Party’s manifesto commitment was mere 
electoral posturing.
340
 The FCO even took legal advice on the matter and was counselled that 
any recognition of the national liberation movements would not be legal under international 
law.
341
 Immediately after the election, a public statement made by Lord Gifford and Joan 
Lestor, calling for a change in policy, was noted by the FCO, and politely ignored.
 
It was, 
therefore, a rude awakening for officials in the FCO to be suddenly reminded by Labour 
ministers of the manifesto commitment.
342
 The group of Labour MPs concerned with 
southern Africa (Joan Lestor, Lord Gifford, David Ennals and Lord McNally) sent, in 
minutes and attachments to other documents, instructions to officials to “come to grips with 
the party manifesto.” 343 Neither Wilson nor Callaghan, in person or during cabinet 
discussion, was yet to be involved in this debate; rather, the disagreement appears to have 
been between individual ministers, supported by influential members of their party who, in 
the absence of Cabinet policy, pursued partisan interest against the FCO’s concern with the 
perceived national interest.   
  The episode appears to support Ben Pimlott’s contention that during Wilson’s second 
administration he aspired toward a style of government in which “The stress would be on 
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teamwork - letting ministers do their work without interference.”344 The government was 
wary of the obstructive powers of Whitehall, and the left-wing of the party was now 
determined to achieve its objectives. It also shows the difficulty experienced by the FCO 
during election campaigning to appear impartial, whilst manoeuvring so that any possible 
policy change introduced after the election would still allow continuity in approach. Finally, 
it reveals how the FCO was able to use Britain’s recent membership of the EEC as an 
instrument to shift policy subtly against the Caetano regime within an intergovernmental 
decision-making body, whilst maintaining a national position of close Anglo-Portuguese 
relations.  
The coup d’état in Lisbon abruptly transformed the prospects of Portugal’s overseas 
territories achieving their independence.
345
 It was clear that the coup d’état would have “far-
reaching effects on her relationship with Africa.”346 An FCO official at the Rhodesian 
Department noted that “Whether or not the Portuguese coup leads to early changes on the 
ground, the uncertainty now surrounding Portuguese policies in Mozambique will be a major 
cause of anxiety to the Rhodesian regime and should significantly increase the pressure on 
Mr Smith to make concessions to the Africans in order to secure a settlement.”347 It resolved 
the dilemma for the Labour Government of balancing the manifesto commitment and 
maintaining close relations with the regime in Portugal. Indeed, the aspirations of the Labour 
Party in southern Africa were now shared by leading politicians in Lisbon and, therefore, 
were more likely to be achieved. The existence of ties between the Labour Party and the 
Lusophone African national liberation movements, and the states that sponsored them (which 
had once antagonised the Caetano regime), would now become an important element in 
Lisbon’s approach to negotiations.  
The coup d’état in Lisbon meant that British policy toward Lusophone Africa was 
now considered at the highest level of the Labour Government and this was not only because 
Lusophone decolonisation was now an achievable objective rather than an aspiration. The 
Prime Minister was also responding to press coverage of events in Lisbon; front-page articles 
in the broadsheet newspapers gave equal weight to the implications of the coup d’état for 
southern Africa, including Rhodesia, and to those for Portugal. Harold Wilson ordered the 
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Cabinet to consider several questions relating to the impact of events on Rhodesia.
348
 
However, the attention of the Labour leadership did not lead to an immediate change in 
strategy; rather, the existing approach was pursued with renewed vigour.  
 
The London Talks on Guinea Bissau 
The newly appointed Foreign Minister Soares was instructed to begin immediate talks 
with the nationalist movements in Portugal’s overseas territories. There were disagreements, 
however, in Lisbon on what these negotiations should achieve. The military officers who had 
organised the coup d’état and the PSP and PCP sought immediate decolonisation. President 
Spinola and many of the white settlers in the colonies remained committed to the principle of 
self-determination. At his investiture Spinola declared that “Their future must be 
democratically decided by all who consider them their homeland. The action of minorities 
both in Portugal and the overseas territories must not be allowed to affect the free 
development of the democratic process.”349 Hence Soares had to try to negotiate on the basis 
of self-determination. However, such an approach was considered absolutely unacceptable by 
all the national liberation movements and aroused scepticism regarding Portugal’s motive for 
involvement in talks on the status of its overseas territories. Soares’ negotiating position was 
also complicated by domestic political pressures. An FCO official commented that a problem 
with Soares’ achieving progress on talks was that “the whole of the political scene here has 
been turned upside down by the coup and there is no fixed body of public doctrine on the 
basis of which the new regime could construct acceptable and coherent policies.”350 The 
success of political manoeuvring in Lisbon was also closely tied to the outcome of 
negotiations on the future of the overseas territories. Kenneth Maxwell argues that the two 
sides “in fact set out positions so diametrically opposed that they contained seeds of a conflict 
that could only be resolved by the victory of one over the other.”351 
Soares attempted to overcome these obstacles by beginning discussions between 
Portugal and the national liberation movements before agreement had been reached on what 
the overall outcome should be. A Foreign Office official observed that “Dr Soares hopes to 
gloss over these differences of interpretation in order to get agreement to measures which will 
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build up the momentum of decolonisation.”352 It was also hoped that because Soares was one 
of the only Portuguese politicians who shared the same socialist credentials as the nationalist 
groups, and because he was also an opponent of the previous regime who had suffered similar 
privations, his motives could be trusted.  
The Labour Government was aware of the dilemmas that Soares faced having held 
discussions on the issue even prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister on the 2
nd
 May. 
They reached the same conclusion that beginning talks was the best means to overcome 
obstacles to their progress and decided to give Soares’ diplomacy their unequivocal support. 
This not only reflected a partisan commitment to the success of Soares and the Portuguese 
Socialist Party (although there was a realisation that his success in negotiating with 
nationalist movements was critical to his political position domestically), but also crucially 
because it was judged that Soares’ approach to negotiations would best achieve the British 
national interest in southern Africa. However, the Foreign Office was more sceptical that 
Soares’ negotiating strategy would be successful; one official observed “But he may not be 
able to conceal this central difficulty and we cannot therefore be sure that his efforts and the 
negotiations will succeed.”353  
Soares chose to address the overseas territories issue by first negotiating with the 
PAIGC on the status of Guinea Bissau.
354
 The military situation there was most deleterious to 
the Portuguese. The national liberation movement Portugal faced in Guinea Bissau, the 
PAIGC, was clearly considered their legitimate representative by the local people for whom it 
fought.  Guinea-Bissau was geopolitically the least significant of Portugal’s African colonies, 
its original value as a fuelling station for steam-ships en route from Angola and Mozambique 
long since obsolete. International opinion was more strongly supportive of Guinea-Bissau’s 
cause than that of Portugal’s other overseas territories. The recently assassinated leader of the 
PAIGC, the charismatic intellectual Patrick Cambral, had propagated its cause so effectively 
that it obtained an international profile greater than Guinea-Bissau’s significance merited.355 
The PAIGC received support not only from radical Black African and Marxist regimes but 
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also from various European socialist movements.
356
 Guinea-Bissau’s very lack of geopolitical 
importance allowed western states to take a stance which nullified criticism of their policies 
toward issues, such as Rhodesia and South Africa, where their direct interests were at stake. 
The UN General Assembly had authorised a vote on the recognition of Guinea-Bissau during 
August, before the coup d’état, which would damage attempts by the new regime in Lisbon to 
change its international image.
357
 Hence Spinola’s government agreed that negotiations on 
Guinea-Bissau’s future status should proceed even though a consensus had not been reached 
in Lisbon on the principles which would govern negotiations with the nationalist movements 
in all the overseas territories.
358
  
Before talks between the PAIGC and the Portuguese authorities could begin, contact 
had to be established, but no state was acceptable to both sides as an intermediary that would 
instigate negotiations. The military strength of the PAIGC meant that there was little need for 
it to compromise during any negotiations, and therefore without a sympathetic state to 
advocate their interests it was feared that Portugal’s position in negotiations might soon 
become untenable. Although seeking an immediate withdrawal from Guinea-Bissau, the 
Portuguese were aware that the course of talks there would set a precedent for similar 
negotiations in Angola and Mozambique, in circumstances where Lisbon’s political and 
military position was far stronger. The surrounding black African states were the PAIGC’s 
sponsors and had not established diplomatic relations with Portugal in protest at its colonial 
policies. A press statement by the OAU in reaction to the coup d’état was uncompromising; it 
called for an “intensification of activities by Liberation Movements in Portuguese-occupied 
territories until final victory.”359 Portugal’s international isolation because of the African wars 
meant there was not an obvious candidate elsewhere to act as go-between.  
Therefore, Soares approached the Labour government for assistance in arranging talks 
between Portugal and the PAIGC.
360
 At a time when Portugal was diplomatically isolated, 
Britain was a friendly base for negotiations.
361
 During talks on 2 May, Callaghan had offered 
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to help Portugal by providing a venue in London and the advice of experts who had 
experience of decolonisation in Africa.
362
 In many ways Britain was a surprising choice to 
play this role. It had no diplomatic representation in Guinea Bissau and unlike other 
European states had had no previous dealings (aside from the Labour Party solidarity group) 
with the PAIGC.
363
 Britain was seen as sympathetic to Portugal and was viewed with 
suspicion by the PAIGC.
364
 That the PAIGC agreed to accept the invitation to London by the 
Labour Government demonstrates the respect with which those within the Labour Party who 
supported their interests were regarded. It also appears that practical factors were significant, 
in that the resources of the FCO and London’s position on international flight routes made its 
location attractive to all parties.
365
  
While Britain had no immediate national interest in Guinea Bissau, the Labour 
Government realised the importance of a settlement there to encourage independence in those 
overseas territories that were significant for its interests.
366
 The Labour Government also 
believed that successful talks between the Portuguese and the PAIGC would bolster Soares’ 
domestic position, and would in turn make decolonisation more likely to occur elsewhere.
367
 
If the Labour Government were to play a prominent role in negotiations this would placate 
the anger amongst Commonwealth states at Britain’s previous ineffectiveness in challenging 
white racialist states and so restore its leadership within the Commonwealth.
368
 The decision 
to support negotiations was also because Britain was concerned at the impending recognition 
by other states of the PAIGC as the legal representatives of Guinea Bissau. The Labour 
Government feared that at the UN debate in August, it would once again be pressured to 
abstain from voting against Portugal in solidarity with a NATO ally, and that this would 
further antagonise the G77 states.
369
 The PAIGC’s Marxist ideology did not appear to 
concern the Labour Government who accepted the reality that it was dominant militarily and 
would therefore form a legitimate government after independence.
370
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The Labour Government agreed to organise talks in London and these took place at the 
Hyde Park Hotel on 25-31 May.
371
 The British approach to the talks was to organise the 
venue and provide generous practical support to each party, but otherwise play no direct 
role.
372
 This was because the Labour Government was aware of Britain’s somewhat tenuous 
position as a neutral third party. The file relating to the London talks unfortunately has been 
mislaid within the National Archives and therefore the background and course of events can 
only, at present, be constructed by viewing other files tangential to the conference itself.
373
 It 
can be presumed that contacts with the PAIGC were made by Lord Gifford or other MPs who 
had its confidence. Throughout the talks there were regular meetings between Soares and 
Callaghan where the course of negotiations was discussed. 
The London talks were largely a failure.
374
 Although contact was established between 
the Portuguese and the PAIGC and a discussion of the principles of negotiation begun, the 
distance between their positions proved too great. There was also a stumbling block over 
consulting the population of the Cape Verde Islands over whether they wanted independence 
or to be incorporated within Guinea-Bissau. The Portuguese were also concerned with “the 
wish to treat the settlement in Guinea as a model for the settlements in Mozambique and 
Angola.”375 The PAIGC refused to attend further talks in London as was planned believing 
that their concerns would best be met in a state more considerate of their interests. Therefore 
the talks in London eventually broke down and were to continue in Algiers.
376
  
The movement to Algiers of talks between Portugal and the PAIGC would suggest 
that the Labour Government’s good offices had failed, but the British were able to exert even 
greater influence over the process. Soares openly discussed the progress of negotiations in 
Algiers with Callaghan and other ministers during transit through London’s airports.377 The 
Portuguese delegation came to depend on the British for diplomatic support, visiting the 
British Embassy in Algiers during negotiations for advice and using its secure 
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communications facilities. This assistance was invaluable for a state whose diplomatic 
service was inadequate for the mission in which it was now engaged. The British 
Ambassador in Lisbon retorted that “it was a bit hard to expect a machine which for years 
had been accustomed to amble quietly along in first gear to change suddenly into 
overdrive.”378 This role meant that the Labour Government had a clear understanding of the 
Portuguese negotiating strategy and, unlike its deliberately impartial position during the 
London talks, their advice to Soares became increasingly partisan. The PAIGC and the 
Portuguese also failed to reach agreement in Algiers.
379
 This led the former to pursue other 
diplomatic initiatives to reach independence.  
The PAIGC sought to have the issue of its recognition put to the United Nations 
General Assembly. This meant the Labour Government was now in a difficult position; while 
its European partners were ready and willing to recognise the PAIGC as the legitimate 
government of Guinea Bissau, the British wanted to avoid the issue of recognition while talks 
were in progress and were concerned that doing so would place undue pressure on Soares. A 
FCO official argued that “above all the Portuguese internal situation is delicate, and we 
would not want to see any steps taken which would weaken Soares’s position.”380 The British 
also wanted to avoid having to veto any UN General Assembly resolution fearing the 
implications for its reputation amongst developing states. However, the FCO were aware 
from information given to them in New York and by the American Embassy in Lisbon that 
the United States was prepared to veto any premature recognition of the PAIGC.
381
 This 
served British interests; an FCO official argued that “as seen from here, it would be to our 
advantage if the Americans took the lead.”382 The sharing of information between the United 
States and Britain meant the Labour Government was able to ensure that the Portuguese 
would not face UN recognition of Guinea Bissau, whilst refraining from using its own veto 
and thereby avoid damaging their reputation amongst African states.  
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The Lusaka Talks on Mozambique 
Soares’ strategy towards Mozambique was to establish contact with the largest 
liberation group Frelimo and begin talks while those with the PAIGC were in progress. 
During the talks in London arrangements were made for a meeting in Lusaka which took 
place on the 5 and 6 June. These were successful in establishing working relations. However, 
in contrast to talks with the PAIGC which despite obstacles made some progress, negotiations 
with Frelimo immediately stalled. The same domestic political constraints set by Lisbon that 
hindered negotiations with the PAIGC did so with these talks but they were also complicated 
by the military situation in Mozambique where, unlike in Guinea-Bissau, fighting had yet to 
reach a decisive point. This made the necessity for talks less immediate for the Portuguese 
and weakened Frelimo’s negotiating position. More fundamentally, however, Frelimo lacked 
legitimacy amongst Mozambique’s ethnic groups and was not able to claim convincingly to 
be a government-in-waiting able to assert full sovereignty over the country.
383
 Despite the 
warmth of personal relations established between Soares and Frelimo leaders, no foundation 
yet existed for a resolution of Mozambique’s status and even a military ceasefire, a 
prerequisite of Portugal’s participation in any further talks, appeared unlikely.  
The Labour Government was less willing to participate in negotiations on 
Mozambique’s status than it had been over Guinea-Bissau. This was a consequence of 
Mozambique’s greater geopolitical importance to Britain. There were substantial economic 
assets in Mozambique.
 384
 British business feared rumours that during a Frelimo government 
industry would “be nationalised without compensation,” and they lobbied the Labour 
Government accordingly.
385
 Although it was hoped that there would now be effective 
implementation of sanctions against Rhodesia, there was an awareness of Mozambique’s 
economic dependence on the white racialist states of southern Africa. The British consul in 
Lourenço Marques noted that “if Mozambique severed its economic ties with South Africa 
(and Rhodesia) annual budgetary revenue would fall by at least 50%.”386 The Labour 
Government’s attitude toward Frelimo also differed from that towards the PAIGC because it 
did not meet the prerequisite of British recognition of a government - full sovereign control 
of territory. Therefore, although independence for Mozambique was considered crucial for 
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achieving British policy objectives in the region, because political circumstances differed and 
economic interests were directly at stake, the Labour Government’s involvement in 
negotiations was more cautious than had been the case in Guinea Bissau. 
The Labour Government was even reticent to establish relations with Frelimo, despite 
the existence of ties between left-wing Labour Party MPs and the national liberation 
movement.
387
 The Minister of Overseas Territories, Judith Hart, and the Foreign Office 
Minister, Joan Lestor, held talks with Frelimo during their visits to Zambia and Tanzania.
388
 
The FCO argued against further contact, fearing that “A formal call by a British Minister at 
their headquarters might therefore be misinterpreted as implying a degree of support for 
Frelimo as the sole authentic voice of African opinion in Mozambique.”389 The FCO received 
delegations from political movements emerging in Mozambique such as Coremo, who 
offered themselves as alternatives to Frelimo, and it gave consideration as to whether these 
should receive support.
390
  However, most importantly it was believed that recognition would 
make Soares’ negotiating position more complicated; the FCO argued that Britain “would not 
wish to do anything which might make the task of the Portuguese Government more 
difficult.”391 This was the view with which Callaghan was most sympathetic, and after further 
internal debate instructions were given that Britain should not recognise Frelimo as the sole 
representative of the Mozambique peoples and must not establish any direct contact. 
Instead it was decided that Britain would liaise with Frelimo through the states that 
sponsored them politically and financially, Zambia and Tanzania. The Labour Government’s 
approach served several purposes. Tanzania, and particularly Zambia, were motivated in their 
relations with Portugal by a desire to bring a peaceful transition in southern Africa so as to 
avoid a disruption of the region’s (and therefore their own) economies.392 Encouraging 
Zambia and Tanzania to participate in negotiations on Mozambique and Rhodesia might 
safeguard British economic assets in the region. Supporting the initiative would also improve 
relations with these Commonwealth states which had been soured by the aftermath of 
Rhodesian UDI.
393
 The importance of improving relations with the black African states can 
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be seen by the visit of the Minister of Overseas Development to President Nyerere on 21 
June, during which an offer of development aid was made for the first time in nine years, 
despite Britain’s straitened economic circumstances.394 Close personal relations which 
developed during the 1950s existed between Nyerere, Kaunda and leading members of the 
Labour Party, including Wilson and Callaghan. The Labour Government was also aware that 
the Organisation of African Unity might consider the issue of the recognition of the new 
regime in Portugal if talks on the overseas territories made progress and that they might then 
pressure the liberation movements to moderate their demands.
395
  
Therefore, unlike the London talks with the PAIGC, it was Soares rather than the 
Labour Government who instigated discussions with Frelimo. Britain was not directly 
involved in the meeting in Lusaka on 5-6 June and was only informed that these had taken 
place by the Portuguese after the event.
396
 The outcome of the talks was discouraging; it soon 
became evident that the differences between them made progress impossible and Soares was 
unable to overcome these obstacles through the momentum of discussions as had been hoped. 
Spinola’s insistence on self-determination in the overseas territories was not an 
insurmountable obstacle in Guinea Bissau because of the popularity of the PAIGC; 
consultation in Mozambique would expose Frelimo’s lack of support amongst all ethnic 
groups and would enable other political movements to emerge and threaten its political 
dominance. Although not in a military position to determine the outcome of events in 
Mozambique, continuing hostilities by Frelimo would exert pressure on the government in 
Lisbon and was therefore considered the best means to achieve their objectives. Frelimo were 
encouraged in this course by the OAU which maintained their refusal to recognise the new 
regime in Lisbon. 
The Labour Government faced a dilemma in its approach to Mozambique after the 
failure of the Lusaka talks. The British became increasingly concerned at Soares’ failure to 
achieve a diplomatic breakthrough in Mozambique and the political crisis in Lisbon during 
July made the Labour Government realise that ending the Portuguese African wars was 
crucial to a successful transition to democracy in Lisbon. The Labour Government was 
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particularly concerned at the likely impact on Soares’ domestic political position if 
independence in the overseas territories was delayed further.  However, it remained 
convinced that a Frelimo government would compromise the long-term political stability of 
the region.
397
 An FCO official outlined the predicament as follows: “It is of paramount 
importance for the success of the new regime that it should bring the African wars to an end, 
yet the only way of achieving a ceasefire is to deal direct (sic) with these movements who are 
conducting the war but whose claim to represent African opinion as a whole is far from 
proved.”398 The British were becoming increasingly alarmed at the deteriorating political 
situation in Mozambique. The British consulate in Mozambique came to believe that “the 
existence of Frelimo is the only element in the political situation which might make 
Mozambique different from the Belgian Congo immediately prior to independence.”399 He 
also saw the need to “urge on the Portuguese leaders the realism of publicly accepting that 
independence is inevitable for their colonies in Africa.”400  
A process of consultation took place within the Labour Government on whether a 
British initiative could resolve the breakdown in negotiations. This required the use of British 
influence to persuade Spinola of the necessity of granting Mozambique the right to 
independence, and to pressure Frelimo to accept the right of the people to consultation prior 
to decolonisation. The British were in consultation with Zambia and Tanzania on the issue. 
However, although deciding that this was the best course for British diplomacy the Labour 
Government adjudged that it would at present be unsuccessful and should therefore await 
developments before taking any action. This outcome was also because these discussions 
coincided with the Cyprus crisis which consumed much of Callaghan’s time.401  
The difficulties in achieving progress in talks on Mozambique made it more 
problematic to raise the issue of Rhodesia with the Portuguese. There had been initial 
optimism that steps would now be taken to pressure Rhodesia into making concessions that 
Black Nationalist groups could accept, thereby leading to an overall constitutional settlement. 
The government in Salisbury confronted the cumulative effect of sanctions, a serious 
guerrilla threat, a diminishing flow of European immigrants and the change in government in 
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Portugal which “introduced a new element into the situation.”402 Harold Wilson saw this as 
potentially the most significant outcome of the Portuguese coup d’état and closely followed 
developments. The Labour Government was aware that Black African states thought 
likewise. An FCO official observed that “in our talks with the former British Africans, we 
were continuously reminded how closely they all watched Rhodesian affairs.”403 The Labour 
Government sought to raise the issue of Rhodesia in Lisbon. An FCO briefing document 
argued that “as soon as the new Portuguese Government have found their feet, we should try 
to get them to use their influence on Mr Smith to make concessions to the Rhodesian 
Africans in order to achieve a just settlement.”404  
However, it proved difficult to get the Portuguese to support measures against 
Rhodesia. The government in Salisbury sought to avoid confrontation and had been one of 
the first to recognise the new regime in Lisbon. A detailed memorandum was sent to Soares 
by Callaghan to remind him of “the general line” and “to list for him the various actions in 
the sanctions field which we hope the Portuguese will at least consider.”405 The 
overwhelming obstacle recognised by all parties was that measures to implement sanctions 
more effectively would have devastating consequences on the regional economy. The effect 
that raising the issue of Rhodesia with Lisbon might have on negotiations between the 
Portuguese and Frelimo was also a consideration. Soares confided to Callaghan that within 
his ministry there was “a group of former Ambassadors in South Africa and Charges 
d’Affaires in Rhodesia who constituted a reactionary bloc. He had not yet decided to break up 
this citadel.”406 On the issue of sanctions, as noted by an FCO official, Callaghan’s “concern 
for the health of the new Portuguese Government, on which future progress in the Territories 
depends, is the dominant argument in favour of restraint.”407 As the talks in Mozambique ran 
into difficulties, rather than pressuring the Portuguese to take action against Rhodesia, the 
sanctions issue was seen as a future aspiration to pursue once negotiations in Mozambique 
were successful. 
The initiative for British diplomacy to resolve the impasse in negotiations was with its 
consul in Mozambique, Stanley Duncan. An official of rare energy and intelligence, his 
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zealous reporting from Mozambique and surrounding African states also demonstrated a 
sophisticated awareness of developments in Lisbon. The possibility of a UDI in Mozambique 
supported by the Rhodesian government, which had dominated headlines in the British press 
after the coup d’état, was soon dismissed in consulate reports.408 Duncan observed that the 
political movements which represented the settlers were likely to be isolated in the political 
process in Lisbon, which demonstrated a greater understanding of the nature of the Carnation 
Revolution than the British Embassy had shown.
409
 On a trip to the region of Vila Pery in 
Mozambique he noted that “After this trip, my first outside Lourenço Marques since the 
coup, I am more than ever convinced that time is running out for the Portuguese.”410 He sent 
a number of detailed reports which accurately predicted the course of events in the next two 
years. His discussions with Hastings Banda in Malawi, a leader not consulted by his superiors 
in Whitehall, led him to believe that the ability of Portugal to influence events in 
Mozambique had ended.  
Unlike other British officials who were narrowly interested in the immediate concern 
of encouraging independence for the overseas territories, Stanley Duncan considered the 
likely long-term impact of this outcome on British interests. Initially he called for support for 
Spinola’s overseas policies and for the British Government to avoid moves that would 
enhance Frelimo’s status. He came to see the danger of a civil war and its likely impact on 
British interests and saw that engagement with Frelimo at the earliest opportunity (thus 
encouraging it to accept other political movements) was the best course of action.
411
 
Callaghan responded to Duncan’s reporting of the deteriorating situation in Mozambique by 
deciding to begin the diplomatic initiative planned with the Tanzanian and Zambian 
governments, whereby these states, with Zambia in the lead, would pressure Frelimo to 
moderate its demands and accept a ceasefire whilst Britain would persuade Portugal to 
compromise their stance on self-determination. This approach was not in itself different from 
Soares’ strategy, but because it was instigated by trusted outside parties with influence rather 
than by one of the protagonists it was hoped that a settlement could be reached. By necessity, 
this would need to be a carefully coordinated diplomatic process gradually bringing together 
the negotiating positions of Portugal and Frelimo. It was believed that the influence the 
Labour Government had with all the participants might make this achievable.  
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The British Foreign Secretary sent instructions to all embassies and consulates in 
countries which were of importance to the negotiations on Mozambique to explain the British 
initiative and ask for their support. There was an idea current in Lisbon which allowed 
independent supervision of a referendum by the UN in Mozambique. Consideration was 
given in London to a proposal by Duncan that this should be instigated by the British. Soares 
was informed of the forthcoming diplomatic initiative by the British Ambassador in Lisbon 
prior to his requesting an audience with President Spinola.
412
 The British Ambassador was 
given careful instructions that he must introduce the idea of Portuguese acceptance of the 
right to independence, an FCO briefing note argued: “But it is also clear that if we are to help 
we must do so discreetly. We may damage Soares’ standing in Lisbon if we are too 
active.”413 These individual actions by British officials were coordinated by Callaghan, who 
after deciding to encourage a diplomatic breakthrough was fully engaged on the issue. 
The Anglo- Zambian diplomatic initiative was superseded by Spinola’s unexpected 
and sudden announcement of Portugal’s readiness to accept the overseas territories’ right to 
independence. Spinola had responded positively to the British proposals.
414
 A further series 
of meetings in Lusaka between Soares and Frelimo were proposed. The British received a 
confidential statement from the Zambians, to deliver to Soares, that Frelimo “have agreed in 
principle to the idea of a Frelimo-dominated provisional government with an agreed timetable 
for holding elections.”415 These developments became the basis for the hasty negotiations that 
now took place between Portugal and Frelimo. The, Lusaka Agreement, signed on 7 
September, brought a ceasefire and provided for a complete hand-over of power to Frelimo 
the following year, uncontested by elections. From this point it was the rapidity of 
negotiations with the overseas territories rather than their obstacles that would concern the 
Labour Government.  
The British diplomatic initiative toward Mozambique was based on its own 
experience of decolonisation in Africa where self-rule had gradually led to independence at a 
pace determined by the colonial authorities.
416
 However, it had failed to realise the critical 
distinction that political circumstances in the metropole were radically different. Spinola’s 
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political weakness made it impossible to delay decolonisation further, and after his 
resignation the AFM favoured immediate withdrawal. The British had played a useful role in 
overcoming animosity between Frelimo and Portugal after the coup d’état. The Labour 
Government enjoyed a unique position of trust with most of the protagonists based on 
partisan ties with the Portuguese Socialist Party, with many of the liberation movements and 
with the African leaders who sponsored them. There was also a style of government in 
Wilson’s second term that allowed individual ministers with links to Frelimo a certain degree 
of autonomy to pursue their own initiatives on the issue.  
 
Spinola’s announcement  
 The declaration by Spinola on July 27, that the time had come “to reiterate solemnly 
the right of the peoples of the Portuguese overseas territories to self-determination, including 
the immediate recognition of the right of independence,” ended the stasis which negotiations 
had reached.
417
 The intention of the statement was reaffirmed in a joint UN/Portuguese 
communiqué of 3 August, following the visit of the UN Secretary-General to Lisbon. Spinola 
now regarded himself as personally responsible for the decolonisation process, entering talks 
with President Senghor of Senegal about Guinea-Bissau and with President Mobutu of Zaire, 
about Angola.
418
  
The Labour Government had received indications that Spinola was contemplating a 
change of policy. The recent OAU summit had given the regime in Lisbon an ultimatum that 
“Short of acceptance by Portugal of a firm commitment to independence the armed struggle 
by liberation movements must continue.”419 British analysis of political change in Lisbon 
concluded that “It would be reasonable to infer... that the process of decolonisation will be 
accelerated.”420 The Labour Government was first informed of the contents of Spinola’s 
announcement by Soares at the Socialist Party meeting at Chequers.
421
 However, the 
significance of the speech and other rumours was not realised and it was decided to ignore 
these and continue with the diplomatic initiative on Mozambique.  
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These signals of a possible change in policy were disregarded because the Labour 
Government assumed that Spinola would always be an implacable opponent of immediate 
decolonisation. Therefore, an FCO official in the Southern European Department, receiving a 
rumour that the Portuguese President might grant Guinea Bissau immediate independence, 
dismissed this on the grounds that “Since the Portuguese have hitherto taken the line that 
what happens in Guinea must inevitably be seen as a precedent for the other African 
territories, this is surprising news and I am inclined to treat it with caution.”422 Within the 
Southern European Department of the FCO, there were some sympathetic to Spinola, who 
questioned this assumption. They argued that his views on self-determination were outlined 
prior to the coup d’état, since when the “framework of the situation has changed radically”, 
and that “Spinola’s past career suggest that he is a man honest enough to change his opinions 
if the facts do not support them.”423 However, the Labour Government continued to believe 
that successful negotiations with the liberation movements in the overseas territories would 
only be possible when Spinola was persuaded to compromise his commitment to self-
determination; the possibility that he might abandon it altogether was not contemplated.   
The Labour Government was almost wholly reliant on Soares to inform its policy 
making on Portugal during this period. The regular meetings held with the PSP leader meant 
they were only being informed of developments from his perspective. The British Embassy in 
Lisbon, as discussed in the previous chapter, did not have close relations with Spinola and 
had yet to establish any contact with the AFM. This meant that Mozambique was not only the 
Labour Government’s principal concern because of its significance for the British national 
interest, but because its relationship with Soares made his priorities vicariously its own. The 
Labour Government did not consistently follow developments in Portugal and the overseas 
territories, being distracted by its domestic concerns and the Cyprus crisis. Therefore, the 
Labour Government’s policy toward Lusophone Africa was made with an inadequate 
understanding of domestic politics in Lisbon. Although continuing stubbornly to insist on 
self-determination, Spinola’s political position was threatened by the radical left of the AFM, 
who supported decolonisation, and was fatally weakened by developments after the 
resignation of his Prime Minister, Palma Carlos. The Labour Government was aware that 
divisions within the government in Lisbon affected negotiations on the overseas territories 
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but this led to unequivocal support for Soares rather than following developments in Portugal 
more closely and changing policy accordingly.  
The Labour Government’s reliance on Soares meant it was unable to assess the 
significance of diplomacy conducted by Spinola in Lusophone Africa, from which the 
Portuguese Foreign Minister was excluded. The British embassies and consulates in the 
region reported Spinola’s visit to Guinea-Bissau to the FCO; but its significance was 
inadequately understood and, consequently, the Cabinet Office was not briefed.
424
 Talks held 
by Spinola with President Senghor of Senegal (which resolved the differences between the 
Portuguese and the PAIGC) were assessed at departmental level within the FCO but were not 
considered worthy of consideration by the Labour Government itself.
425
 This was also the 
case with the complicated and still rather murky episode which saw Mobutu negotiating with 
Spinola and all three leading factions in Angola in an attempt to engineer the detachment of 
the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda.
426
 
  The most important failure by the Labour Government concerned Angola. Although 
Britain had significant economic interests in Angola, including ownership of the Bengula 
railway, it did not affect the national interest in the same way as Mozambique.
427
 Dispatches 
from Luanda, unlike Duncan’s reporting from Mozambique, concluded that “there had been 
no significant developments in Angola.”428 A report by the Central and Southern African 
Department of the FCO written after the coup d’état concluded that Angolan independence 
was not likely to be achieved soon.
429
 However, as Maxwell argues, “Angola was always 
close to the centre of the struggle between General Spinola and the Armed Forces Movement 
during the first turbulent months following the Lisbon coup.”430 Spinola’s aim of self-
determination was most likely to be realized in Angola which had the largest white settler 
population and the closest economic ties to Portugal. There was also no single liberation 
movement which could claim support across the whole country. This meant Spinola 
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“attempted to retain personal control of the Angolan negotiations.”431 In contrast many in the 
AFM shared ideological sympathy with the MPLA in Angola and were bent on achieving 
decolonisation. The Labour Government was unaware of the significance of these 
negotiations and that their failure would weaken Spinola’s political position in Lisbon and 
lead to his abandoning self- determination. 
There was a surprising lack of concern from the Labour Government at the wider 
strategic implications of developments in Angola since it was aware of the potential for 
expansion of communist influence in the region. The building of the Soviet blue-water navy 
during the 1970s and the decline of US power after the  ietnam War meant that “if the 
MPLA were to become the government or a dominant voice in it, it would result in Russian 
influence extending over Africa’s Atlantic seaboard.”432 This had become of increased 
strategic importance when oil supertankers began travelling around the Cape of Good Hope 
instead of through the Suez Canal. During 1975 the US, Soviet and Chinese clandestine 
intervention in Angola would end Britain’s position as the most influential power in the 
region. Whilst this threat was recognised by the MOD and intelligence services, the Labour 
Government itself did not give a great deal of attention to Angola, believing erroneously that 
Portugal would be able to maintain control in the territory for a number of years. Geraint 
Hughes notes that “Angola barely figured in Wilson and Callaghan’s discussions with 
Portugal’s new leaders, and there is no evidence to suggest any British partiality towards any 
of the warring Angolan factions.”433 
The negotiations on Portuguese decolonisation that followed Spinola’s announcement 
did not involve the British Government.
434
 The resignation of Spinola on 30 September meant 
that the AFM effectively became the dominant power in Lisbon. The Labour Government 
consequently became more concerned with events in Portugal than in Lusophone Africa.
435
  
The progress of negotiations in the overseas territories was now reported to the British 
through its embassies and consulates, rather than through discussions with Soares who was 
now increasingly isolated in Lisbon. The Labour Government also became distracted by the 
General Election in October and the deepening domestic economic crisis. It played no role in 
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the crises in Angola and East Timor which prefigured independence, and only concern with 
evacuating British civilians from Angola, after its descent into anarchy and civil war, was 
considered by the Labour leadership during 1975.
436
 
The Labour Government did not play a significant role in the issue of Portugal’s 
overseas territories in Asia. The FCO reported on Macau and East Timor, but it worked to 
ensure that Britain maintained a low diplomatic profile. There was concern that developments 
in Macau might have repercussions for Hong Kong, thereby disturbing the fragile 
relationship with China that had only recently been restored after the Cultural Revolution. An 
FCO official concluded that “The Chinese will presumably ensure that there is no serious 
proposal of self-determination for Macau. (We too, with Hong Kong in mind, would prefer to 
discourage any such proposal – although not in public.).”437 The Labour Government also 
sought to avoid becoming embroiled in the crisis that unfolded in East Timor after the coup 
d’état in Lisbon. An FCO official concluded that “There is no British interest in the region. 
There are no British subjects in Timor.”438 The FCO, although briefed on Australian policy, 
did not discuss the issue with either the United States or Indonesia. It is illustrative that while 
Britain had no diplomatic representation in either Guinea Bissau or East Timor, in the case of 
the former, the British played an arguably greater role than any other state in diplomatic 
efforts to bring independence; in the latter, despite mounting evidence of Indonesia’s 
impending annexation and the likely humanitarian catastrophe that would follow, British 
policy was publicly to deny any knowledge that what it knew was about to happen would 
happen.
439
 
 
Britain and Portuguese Decolonisation 
 The resolve to encourage negotiations between the Portuguese and the national 
liberation movements in Lusophone Africa existed prior to the election of a Labour 
government in February 1974. This was seen as a means to put pressure on the Rhodesian 
government into making the compromises that might lead to a constitutional settlement, a 
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development crucial to maintaining Britain’s influence in the region. The election of a Labour 
government was essential because the close relationship between certain left-wing MPs and 
nationalists in southern Africa made its success more likely. The Lisbon coup d’état 
transformed the prospects of a change of status to Portugal’s overseas territories. In London 
policy debate shifted in favour of those who wanted Britain to sponsor a diplomatic initiative 
in southern Africa and against those who had sought to maintain close ties with Portugal. 
However, rather than seizing the diplomatic initiative in southern Africa, the Labour 
Government remained cautious in its approach. It judged that the best means to achieve its 
objectives both in southern Africa and in Portugal was through unequivocal support for 
Mario Soares in his role as Foreign Minister and as leader of the Socialist Party.  
Although this approach achieved some successes immediately after the coup d’état, it 
was an unimaginative response to changed circumstances and to the opportunities that now 
existed for advancing Britain’s interests. The Labour Government could have insisted on 
Portugal’s enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia or given support to the nationalist 
movements in southern Africa, as its manifesto had promised. The decision to bind Britain so 
closely to the fortunes of one political movement in Lisbon also potentially endangered the 
national interest. The Labour Government’s policy was not based on an analysis of the long-
term significance of Portuguese decolonisation on southern Africa. While the regional 
departments of the FCO demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of how the coup d’état 
would affect politics in the region and how this could be used to Britain’s advantage, the 
Labour Government pursued existing policy primarily concerned with achieving a 
constitutional settlement in Rhodesia, failing to realise the likely implications of Lusophone 
decolonisation on southern Africa.  It was taken completely by surprise by Spinola’s 
announcement that the colonies would be granted immediate independence and played no 
part in subsequent negotiations.  
The Labour Government’s approach to the status of the overseas territories was also 
based on a premise concerning domestic politics in Lisbon which proved incorrect. It 
assumed, as discussed in the previous chapter, that influential groups sought a return to 
authoritarian government and the retention of an empire. Inadequate analysis by the British 
Embassy in Lisbon and the influence on decision making by Soares through his close 
relationship with the Labour leadership meant that the reasons for Spinola’s precarious 
political position and the nature and continued role of the AFM were not understood. The 
Labour Government concluded that Spinola’s insistence on self-determination, which 
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prevented Soares’ diplomacy making progress, would best be overcome by persuasion rather 
than an altercation, fearing Spinola’s government might be replaced by another right-wing 
authoritarian regime. The Labour Government failed to realise that the precarious nature of 
Spinola’s domestic political position and the profound changes brought by the Carnation 
Revolution meant that a rapid withdrawal from its colonies rather than resistance to 
decolonisation was the likeliest outcome.  
The Labour Government’s strategy of supporting Soares also meant that it did not 
establish relations with the national liberation movements in Portugal’s overseas territories, 
despite its manifesto commitment to do so and the existence of close ties with some within 
the Labour Party. The Labour Government was sceptical that, with the exception of the 
PAIGC, each had sufficient legitimacy to establish a government without civil war. That the 
nationalist groups were Marxist did not appear to be a significant factor in British 
calculations.  Instead the need to compel the national liberation movements to make 
concessions in order to facilitate Soares’ diplomacy was the dominant factor. However, these 
groups would clearly dominate Angola and Mozambique once decolonisation had taken 
place; in order to uphold British interests, relations with these groups would be essential. The 
Labour Government failed to establish contact at a point when they could have had great 
influence and attained the trust of the movement’s leadership; by failing to do so it now made 
relations more difficult in the future. It was not until after the Lusaka Accords that the Labour 
Government suddenly realised that in order to influence policy toward Rhodesia and protect 
its interests in Mozambique Britain’s relations with Frelimo would be critical. Despite 
optimism immediately after the coup d’état in Lisbon that independence for Mozambique 
would lead to an enforcement of sanctions against the new regime, this was not to be the 
case. 
The Labour Government’s approach to relations with Frelimo also illustrates that it 
was principally concerned with the overseas territories as a collective entity, whose status 
would be resolved in Lisbon, rather than understanding the circumstances within each 
territory and their impact on British interests. This appears to demonstrate Norrie 
MacQueen’s contention that the problem of ending Portugal’s African Wars was seen by 
western states as one even when each conflict differed significantly.
440
 The Labour 
Government’s policy was also influenced by the British experience where a common 
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approach to decolonisation was applied to most of their sub-Saharan colonies in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.
441
 The circumstances in Portugal’s case were very different with only 
a basic level of social and economic development in each colony and political convulsions in 
the metropole while negotiations took place. The British consulates, where present, often had 
an excellent appreciation of the nature of developments in their territory - more so than the 
British Embassy in Lisbon - but to a large extent their advice was overlooked in London. The 
Labour Government did not challenge the assumptions of the Portuguese approach to 
decolonisation and did not call for a different approach in each territory.   
 
These failures in the Labour Government’s approach to the overseas territories were 
in part a result of the process by which British foreign policy was made. To a large extent 
policy was developed by Callaghan after consultation with Soares with very little intervention 
either by Wilson or the Cabinet. This partly reflects partisan ties between Callaghan and 
Soares, but also demonstrates continued concern with Portuguese sensibilities. As Joan 
Lestor observed “The Government was very keen not to make the Portuguese position more 
difficult, or affect Dr Soares’ own position in government.”442 However, Callaghan was not 
able to give his attention to the issue of the Portuguese overseas territories consistently, being 
distracted by the Cyprus crisis, the renegotiation of Britain’s entry into Europe and the 
domestic political weakness of the Labour minority government. This allowed certain left-
wing members of the Labour Party to play a significant role in policy making, promoting an 
approach (particularly towards the liberation movements) which was independent of the 
Labour leadership.   
 
Two departments within the FCO, although at times sidelined and not directly 
involved in decision making, also sought to influence policy toward the Portuguese overseas 
territories. The African department of the FCO, through its embassies in the frontline 
Commonwealth states and the consulates in Angola and Mozambique, sought to promote 
policies in London that would advance British interests in its region. The Southern European 
Department, which had some influence over the consulates, particularly with regard to 
personnel, competed to influence policy promoting issues relating to Anglo-Portuguese 
relations. However, because Callaghan gave priority to relations with the Portuguese, despite 
                                                             
441 Austin, ‘The Transfer of Power’, pp. 3-33.  
442 ‘Record of Conversation between the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs and a delegation from the Anti-Apartheid Movement held at the FCO’, 23 July 1974, 
FCO 9/2064. 
104 
 
the knowledge and expertise of embassies in southern Africa, the Lisbon Embassy played the 
leading role in formulating British policy. There were no formal organisational arrangements, 
such as a specialist committee, in which the different participants in British policy-making 
could influence strategy and consider the longer-term implications of developments. 
Therefore, the Labour Government’s policy-making toward the overseas territories was not 
an aggregate of competing interest groups but was dominated by the Foreign Secretary unless 
his diversion by other issues meant otherwise. 
 
The Labour Government’s approach to the issue of Portugal’s overseas territories 
increases our understanding of the nature of Britain’s relationship with Africa during the 
1970s. Marxist historians posit that this relationship was primarily motivated by the need to 
protect British economic interests.
443
 However, while there was lobbying of government by 
businesses that had sizeable economic assets in Angola and Mozambique, the Labour 
Government was principally concerned with constitutional change in southern Africa.
444
 
Historians influenced by dependency theory argue that the primary motive for the policy of 
ending racialist regimes in southern Africa was not principle but the belief that they were no 
longer sustainable, and that promoting change would ensure that moderate Black Nationalist 
groups achieved power, allowing existing economic relations with Britain to continue. Carol 
Thompson argues that in southern Africa “the British came to understand that their interests 
could only be maintained if political hegemony were relinquished.”445 This argument is 
difficult either to sustain or disregard using the official archives. There is no record of this 
policy but it would be unlikely to be recorded in official minutes. There are examples of 
policy being influenced by business interests but this is a principal aim of the diplomatic 
service of any capitalist state and cannot be seen as evidence of a neo-imperial project. The 
argument that British policy was primarily motivated by business interests requires an 
acceptance of dependency theory prior to the interpretation of the official record. It also 
appears unlikely that those on the left of the Labour Party engaged with policy toward 
southern Africa would have accepted a policy motivated primarily by economic interests.
446
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The relationship with the United States was not a significant factor in shaping British 
policy toward southern Africa during 1974.
447
 There was a sharing of information and general 
discussions between the FCO and the State Department on sub-Saharan Africa and 
consultations took place prior to the recognition of the former Portuguese overseas territories 
as independent countries.
448
 The African Departments of the US State Department 
acknowledged that Britain would take the lead in diplomacy toward Rhodesia and 
Mozambique, and also relations with the Commonwealth states in Africa.
449
 Britain informed 
the United States of its role in negotiations on southern Africa, but there was no coordination 
of policy with the United States during this period. The approach taken by the Labour 
Government toward southern Africa demonstrated an acceptance that particular political 
circumstances indigenous to each state had led to the liberation movement’s success, rather 
than the involvement of the Soviet Union. Britain was more concerned with establishing 
stable sovereign states rather than the ideological allegiance of the liberation movements. It 
was aware through its defence and intelligence community that the United States was 
becoming increasingly concerned with the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and of 
the possibility that a competition for influence in southern Africa between the superpowers 
might occur once the Portuguese withdrew from Angola and Mozambique. However, the 
Labour Government was narrowly interested in how developments in each state affected 
British interests and was surprisingly unconcerned about the possibility of Cold War rivalry 
in the region. This reflects the fact that Britain had been the principal power in the region, 
whilst the United States’ concern primarily related to its bipolar confrontation with the Soviet 
Union.
450
 
The Labour Government’s approach to the Portuguese overseas territories reveals the 
critical importance of international organisations in shaping British foreign policy. This was 
not merely because of their significance in conducting diplomacy; indeed in many ways the 
FCO was sceptical of the effectiveness of each organisation. Maintaining the reputation of 
Britain within the UN, EEC and Commonwealth was now considered a national interest.
451
 
This was even the case with those organisations of which Britain was not a member. Internal 
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documents in the FCO were dismissive of the Organisation of African Unity but it still went 
to some lengths to influence the conference in Tanzania. Britain no longer had the power to 
directly shape developments in southern Africa, but the appearance of doing so in 
international organisations was a way of maintaining perceptions of its role as an independent 
power. Within the Commonwealth, the Labour Government had to give the appearance of 
seeking a settlement of the Rhodesian question and a failure to do so would lead to its 
isolation.  
 
The British role in encouraging decolonisation was a turning point in its influence on the 
continent. In order to maintain its lead role in Africa, the Labour Government encouraged political 
change in Portugal’s overseas territories, but once achieved it undermined British influence in the 
region. The United States and Commonwealth States, particularly Zambia and Tanzania, were now 
to pursue policy in the region independently of Britain. This was the dilemma of a declining power 
when faced with irreversible political change. The United States, in contrast, demonstrated an 
ability to pursue its interests whatever the consequences for its reputation in the region, even if this 
meant supporting tribal movements in Angola and Mozambique, and cooperating with the South 
African regime.
452
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Chapter IV –  
The First Crisis: Portugal’s lurch to the left  
(September 30
th
, 1974 – April 25th, 1975) 
 
The granting of independence to Portugal’s overseas territories meant the principal aim of the 
Labour Government in its relations with Lisbon had been achieved. Until the spring of 1975, 
Portugal became a less prominent issue for the Labour Government and it was not considered 
at cabinet level during this period; Britain remained committed to encouraging a successful 
transition to democracy in Portugal but the impetus for this policy now came from within the 
FCO. However, this was to change during the following year. The prominent position the 
radical left had achieved in Lisbon after President Spinola’s resignation emboldened the 
Portuguese Communist Party and Marxist military officers to assert their influence. This led 
to a series of political crises culminating in an attempted right-wing coup d’état in March. Its 
failure allowed the radical left to further strengthen its position in government, and with 
rumours that proposed elections in April were to be cancelled, a left-wing revolution now 
appeared likely in Portugal. The political instability precipitated outside intervention 
triggering an international crisis between East and West which was to continue until the 
formation of a moderate government in the autumn. These developments meant that once 
again Portugal had become a significant foreign policy issue for the Labour Government, 
which was now concerned at the implications for détente with the Soviet Union and Britain’s 
relations with the United States. This chapter will consider the British response to 
developments in Portugal from the resignation of President Spinola on the 30
th
 September, 
1974 until the constituent assembly elections of 25
th
 April, 1975. 
 The main argument of this chapter concerns the response of Britain and the United 
States to events in Portugal. Whilst the Ford Administration argued that the leftward direction 
of politics was principally a result of a strategy by the Soviet Union to undermine NATO’s 
southern flank, the Labour Government insisted that indigenous factors explained 
developments, and this suggests that their understanding of the Cold War differed during this 
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period.
453
 However, close cooperation between officials within their diplomatic and security 
services on Portugal demonstrate that a close relationship between Washington and London 
continued nonetheless. The shared conviction of the Labour Government and its Western 
European partners that parliamentary democracy would succeed in Portugal also suggests that 
a nascent concept of ‘Europe’ as a region with common political ideals now influenced 
foreign policy making.
454
 The chapter also demonstrates that although it continued to play a 
leading diplomatic role in Portugal, Britain’s decline as a power and the economic and 
political crises the Labour Government faced after the October 1974 election meant it lacked 
the means to shape events in Lisbon. 
There was no significant change in the relationship between Britain and Portugal in 
the immediate aftermath of Spinola’s resignation. The Labour Government’s strategy since 
the coup d’état had been to maintain a formal rather than close relationship with President 
Spinola, whilst pursuing its objectives through its relationship with the Portuguese Foreign 
Minister, Soares, with whom it shared partisan affiliation. Because Soares retained his 
position in government and remained a leading political figure in Lisbon after Spinola’s 
resignation, there was no immediate need for the Labour Government to change its approach 
to Portugal. Although there was concern in London at the appointment of a radical left-wing 
government, the conclusion was reached that any attempt to reverse the situation was likely 
to be counterproductive and that the best course was to await the proposed elections in April 
which would bring a successful transition to parliamentary democracy. The exception was the 
decision to raise concern at the PCP’s activity in Lisbon with the Soviet leadership during the 
Moscow visit. Meanwhile an internal enquiry (conducted by the Southern European 
Department) into the failure of the British Embassy in Lisbon to predict any of the political 
crises in Portugal that year concluded that it must establish contacts across the political 
spectrum. The Embassy began a dialogue with the Armed Forces Movement and sought to 
establish correct relations with the new President. James Callaghan’s visit to Lisbon in 
February 1975 aimed to strengthen relations with the Portuguese government.    
The considered response of the Labour Government to the appointment of a radical 
left-wing government in Lisbon contrasted with that of the United States, which expressed 
dismay at recent events. The United States’ previous policy of close relations with President 
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Spinola was now obsolete, and without influence amongst any of the leading emerging 
political movements in Lisbon it feared that developments were leading inexorably to the 
establishment of a communist government in Portugal.
455
 Kissinger predicted that Soviet 
intervention would mean that “the PCP will have massive funds available and that the 
campaigns for Communist candidates… will be highly sophisticated and well-financed.”456 
The administration’s response was to establish a new diplomatic mission to Lisbon with a 
mandate to reverse the course of recent events. The release of recent US archival record also 
shows that planning for a covert operation in Lisbon now began, which was designed to 
“maintain a stable government in Portugal, which will permit continued US use of the Azores 
Base, and honor Portugal’s membership in NATO.”457 However, whilst there was a clear 
difference of analysis between Washington and the Labour Government in Britain, in practice 
their approach to diplomatic relations with Lisbon did not diverge greatly. The new US 
Ambassador in Lisbon, Frank C. Carlucci III, whose appointment was meant to signal a shift 
in US strategy, was a maverick figure who, alongside supporters in the State Department and 
Congress, reached the independent conclusion that support for Soares and engagement with 
the new government in Lisbon was the best means to achieve US objectives.
458
 He later 
recalled: “I gradually became convinced that there were strong forces pushing against the 
trend … Portugal was not adjacent to the communist bloc. The ties to the West and NATO 
were strong. The Church was influential... The people were by and large conservative and 
they were interested in protecting their economic interests. I thought the electoral process 
could serve to undermine the communist control of the country.”459 However, despite the 
confusion in US policy, it was to have a far greater influence in Lisbon than other western 
states principally as a result of its ability to support diplomatic initiatives with sizeable 
economic aid.
460
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The most radical phase of the Portuguese Revolution began in February 1975 and was 
to continue until the following autumn. The remaining moderate figures in the hierarchy of 
the Portuguese armed forces were sidelined by their Marxist colleagues, who then adopted a 
programme of economic nationalisation. This culminated in the political crisis of the 
following March when the failure of an attempted right-wing coup d’état allowed an 
entrenchment in the position of the radical left in Lisbon; further legislation on a more radical 
economic programme was proposed and rumours circulated that communist ministers were to 
be appointed to senior positions. This confirmed the concern of Kissinger about the direction 
of events in Portugal. He sought once again to assume direct control over US policy, and to 
make clear to the Portuguese government in Lisbon that recent developments were 
considered unacceptable by Washington. The NATO allies, including the Labour 
Government, began to coordinate their diplomatic response in Lisbon. However, the 
somewhat surprising decision by the provisional government to allow proposed elections to 
take place in April largely assuaged their concern and instilled confidence that the radical 
left-wing direction of events in Lisbon could be reversed and a stable parliamentary 
democracy established in Portugal. 
   
Supporting the ‘Portuguese Kerensky’ 
The resignation of President Spinola on October 31
st
 brought not only the removal of 
his followers but the isolation of political moderates throughout Portugal. The military, 
through the revolutionary council of the Armed Forces Movement (referred to as the AFM 
Council), now played an active role in political affairs, whilst civilian politicians became 
increasingly marginalised, with the notable exception of the PCP with whom the AFM shared 
an ideological affinity. This remained the case even after the elections in April 1975 which 
brought the Portuguese Socialist Party to prominence. The AFM was divided between 
different factions whose exact nature and strength confused contemporary observers and has 
since been the subject of debate amongst historians.
461
 Paul Christopher Manuel refers to 
these differences as “ideological cleavages” and distinguishes between “AFM-radicals,” led 
by the Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves, Costa Martins and Rosa Coutinho, who believed 
themselves to be a revolutionary vanguard for socialism in Portugal, “AFM-populists,” 
headed by Otelo, Varela Gomes and Dinis Almeida, who shared the same aims as the above 
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but distrusted the influence of the communist party, and the “AFM-moderates,” led by Melo 
Antunes  and Vitor Alves, who sought to establish democratic institutions in Portugal.
462
 
Within the military council the “AFM-radicals,” emboldened by their successful resistance to 
President Spinola’s ‘silent majority’, rose to prominence and dominated the next phase of the 
Portuguese Revolution until their demise in the autumn of 1975.  
The sudden resignation of President Spinola and the shift towards the left that 
followed in Lisbon came as profound shock to the Ford administration. The cohesion of the 
western alliance appeared under threat now that “For the first time since 1949 communists 
were participating in the government of a NATO country.”463 It made redundant the US 
policy pursued by successive administrations after Kennedy to maintain close personal 
relations with the Portuguese President so as to protect its strategic interests.
464
 The 
administration’s alarm at President Spinola’s resignation was also a result of the sense of 
crisis that permeated Washington during the Watergate scandal, with an increasingly strained 
Kissinger now taking the lead on foreign affairs. The policy response towards Portugal was 
immediate. It was at this point Kissinger (believing “Our Portuguese Embassy is a 
disaster”465) removed Ambassador Nash Scott from his position and appointed a new team of 
Portuguese experts and experienced State Department operatives, led by the capable Carlucci. 
Their mission, as Kenneth Maxwell notes, was unambiguous: “It was to get the communists 
out of the government and keep them out.”466 This objective was articulated forcefully to a 
Portuguese delegation led by President Costa Gomes and Soares in an infamous meeting with 
Kissinger in Washington, when the US Secretary of State accused the Portuguese Foreign 
Minister of being a ‘Kerensky’ figure whose actions would presage a communist 
revolution.
467
 
The Labour Government also shared the US administration’s concern at developments 
in Portugal. A Joint Intelligence Committee report on recent events was entitled “Portugal: 
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Will it go Communist?” 468 The British Embassy in Lisbon, which had viewed positively 
Spinola’s attempt to restore social discipline in Portugal and assert his political authority, was 
taken aback by developments and alarmed at the spread of violence and disorder. The British 
Ambassador observed that “Portugal came close to civil war,” and that “there is a large 
question mark over the future, and the outlook is pessimistic.” 469 The British Embassy for the 
first time expressed real concern at the possible effect of developments in Portugal on UK 
interests. The Ambassador observed a noticeable “thinning out of the wealthier and more 
mobile expatriate community here.”470  
However, although concerned at the direction of events in Lisbon, in contrast to the 
Ford administration the Labour Government did not immediately alter its approach to 
relations with Portugal. Because the Labour Government had maintained formal rather than 
close ties with the Portuguese President whilst pursuing its objectives through partisan links 
with Soares, the departure of Spinola did not require the strategic volte-face forced on the 
United States. Moreover, Portugal’s importance to Britain as a NATO ally was not essential 
to its immediate national interest as it was to the United States, whose bases on the Azores 
Islands were critical to its role in the alliance. The Labour Government’s concern was the 
impact of Portugal on the overall cohesion of the NATO alliance and it consequently feared a 
US overreaction to developments in Lisbon as much as the events themselves. The lack of a 
decisive response by the Labour Government to events in Portugal can also be explained by 
the distraction of the campaign for the British General Election between the 30
th
 September 
and the election of the 9
th
 October, and thereafter governing a country with serious economic 
difficulties whilst only having a Commons majority of three.
471
 Thus while the Cabinet 
Secretary Sir John Killick (in a handwritten memo on Trench’s despatch concerning the new 
government in Lisbon) warned that “The clear objective in Portugal is to make ‘socialism’ 
irreversible”, there is no evidence that Wilson or Callaghan either addressed these concerns 
or were even aware of them during their first week in government after the General 
Election.
472
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 The Labour Government certainly did not share Kissinger’s view that there was a 
danger of Soares playing a ‘Kerensky’ role in the Portuguese Revolution, and continued to 
see his success and that of the Portuguese Socialist Party as crucial to any democratic 
outcome in Portugal. Whilst Soares received public admonishment in Washington after 
Spinola’s resignation, the British Embassy in contrast immediately sought his counsel. 
However, the nature of the relationship between the Labour Government and Soares did 
change. A shared interest in ending Portugal’s diplomatic isolation after the coup d’état and 
establishing contact with the national liberation movements in Africa brought regular and 
close cooperation. Yet, while there continued to be a strong relationship based on shared 
political values and personal respect between Callaghan, Wilson and Soares, this was no 
longer based on the immediate national interest as it had been before. Indeed, each party was 
now increasingly burdened by domestic crises. Soares was focused on the challenges to his 
party rather than on his role as Portuguese Foreign Minister. Consequently Soares’ visits to  
London, which had been a regular occurrence during the months immediately after the coup 
d’état, became less frequent particularly now that talks on the future of Portugal’s overseas 
territories, which had reached an advanced stage, were conducted by the AFM rather than by 
civilian politicians. One consequence of the changing relationship was that Callaghan did not 
raise Portugal as an issue with Kissinger during the months after Spinola’s resignation and 
therefore did not act as an advocate for Soares in Washington, as was the case immediately 
after the coup d’état.  
 The review conducted by the Southern European Department into the modus operandi 
of the British Embassy in Lisbon brought changes to its working practices which were to 
have an important effect on the conduct of British diplomacy in Portugal. The Foreign Office 
sought to establish why the Embassy had so signally failed to predict the course of political 
developments in Lisbon during the previous year. An FCO official stated that “I should be 
particularly interested to know what sort of contacts you have with politicians and pressmen 
and across what political spectrum.”473 The report concluded that the Embassy had too 
narrow a range of contacts which meant that it misread the balance of political forces in 
Lisbon and predicted that a counter-revolution rather than a strengthening of the radical Left 
was the most likely threat to British interests. In the coming months the British Embassy in 
Lisbon demonstrated greater professionalism in its conduct of diplomacy in Portugal and was 
more effective in understanding political developments. The Embassy had notable successes 
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in establishing working relations with the new Portuguese President Costa Gomes and the 
Armed Forces Movement. The extent to which the British Embassy had changed its approach 
is demonstrated by the visit of the political attaché to the PCP Conference in Lisbon.
474
 The 
new approach of the British Embassy led to a surprising degree of access, given their 
ideological differences, to leading politicians in the newly formed provisional government. 
The improved accuracy of the British Embassy’s reporting to the Southern European 
Department, alongside the infrequency of bilateral contact between the Labour Government 
and Soares, also increased the influence of the FCO on the development of British policy 
toward Portugal. 
 The approach that the British intended to follow for encouraging a successful 
transition to democracy in Portugal was outlined in a position paper written by the Cabinet 
Secretary, Sir John Killick, before Spinola’s resignation. It underlined the point that “There 
are a number of areas in which both HMG and appropriate non-governmental organisations 
can offer advice and assistance to Portugal.” 475 It was not, however, discussed by Cabinet 
until the resumption of government business in October after the General Election. Spinola’s 
resignation did not lead to changes to the proposals made by Sir John Killick, except to make 
their success all the more imperative. This was made clear in a detailed report written by the 
FCO entitled “How can we help make Portugal safe for democracy?”476 However, the 
political climate in Lisbon now made the implementation of its recommendations more 
difficult and it also had to balance initiatives to encourage democracy whilst maintaining 
constructive relations with the newly formed government in Lisbon. Sir John Killick, whilst 
recommending British policy, had warned, “But this has to be approached carefully: the 
Portuguese resent any hint that they are being patronised.”477 The consequence of this 
concern was that the implementation of British policy was left to the Foreign Office and non-
governmental actors.  
 The Foreign Office pursued initiatives immediately after Spinola’s resignation. An 
invitation was sent to Lisbon for a delegation of Portuguese civil servants to observe the 
planning and organisation of a General Election; this was arranged by Whitehall without the 
knowledge of the Labour Government.  It was seen to be a success, “British methods seemed 
especially suitable for use in Portugal because they were simple and did not require advanced 
                                                             
474 Ralph to Chatterjie, ‘Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)’, 9 October 1974, FCO 9/2047. 
475 Thomas to Killick, ‘Position Paper’, 24 September 1974, FCO 9/2047. 
476 Thomas to Ure, ‘How can we make Portugal safe for Democracy?’ 21 October 1974, FCO 9/2078. 
477 Thomas to Killick, ‘Position Paper’, 24 September 1974, FCO 9/2047. 
115 
 
or expensive machinery,” and played a role in the formulation of the Portuguese Electoral 
Law.
478
 This legislation gave the British greater confidence in a democratic outcome in 
Portugal.  An FCO official noted, “The publication of the provisions of the Electoral Law has 
promoted the idea that the elections will take place next spring and that the ship of state 
remains on course.”479 The Foreign Office also decided the difficult issue of whether covert 
SAS training of the Portuguese presidential guard should continue after Spinola’s 
resignation.
480
 There was concern that “The presence of British army personnel in Portugal 
on a mission of this nature could be misinterpreted.”481 It was eventually decided that this 
would usefully signal Britain’s desire to establish constructive relations with the new 
government in Lisbon, and that ending the programme would have signalled the opposite and 
thereby “have damaging consequences for Anglo-Portuguese relations.”482  
 The FCO also gave support to the development of independent political parties in 
Lisbon. The British Embassy gave immediate help to the Partido do Centro Democratico 
Social (CDS) after Spinola’s resignation, responding to threats that it might be disbanded.483 
The FCO encouraged Conservative Party support for the CDS, believing that such 
recognition was crucial to the party’s survival. An FCO official argued, “This demonstration 
of international recognition would help give the left at least some pause if they were 
considering crushing the CDS out of existence.”484 The British Embassy in Lisbon also 
sought to raise the profile of the party by briefing the British press.
485
 However, the FCO 
stopped short of giving the impression to the CDS that they were acting on behalf of the 
Labour government. The British Ambassador in Lisbon after organising a visit to London by 
the party noted that “We have been careful to avoid encouraging them to think that they could 
be an official guest.”486 The close support by the FCO to a party denied assistance by the 
Labour Government suggests that the Foreign Office also sought partisan impartiality in the 
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support of democratic movements in other states.
487
 The FCO also tried to establish contact 
between moderate Portuguese parties and the British Liberal Party (without success).
488  
 The Labour Government after Spinola’s resignation considered more drastic steps to 
influence the political process in Lisbon. The first was to establish ties with sympathetic 
officers within the Portuguese armed forces. The British Embassy had reached the 
conclusion, during discussions with the JIC based on the wider range of contacts it now had 
in Lisbon, that “the officer corps were two-thirds middle-of-the -road or Conservative 
bourgeoisie and one-third more or less left-wing radicals; the latter group inevitably 
contained most of the thrusting younger and middle-grade officers from whom the direction 
of the Armed Forces Movement is largely drawn.”489  The opportunity for the British to 
establish contact with moderate Portuguese army officers appeared as a consequence of the 
provisional government’s intention to restructure the Portuguese armed forces once its 
deployment in Africa ceased. The Portuguese government sought to fulfil its commitments to 
NATO, particularly the replacement of obsolete military equipment which the UN arms 
embargo had prevented. Britain had the opportunity with its historically close relationship 
with the Portuguese military to be its principal supplier of equipment and training. The 
Ministry of Defence began planning how to convince the provisional government to purchase 
British equipment immediately after the coup d’état, but any approach to Lisbon could not 
legally be made until the arms embargo had ceased.
490
 The debate in the UN General 
Assembly on ending the embargo coincided with Spinola’s resignation. This not only allowed 
negotiations on the supply of military equipment to begin but in the course of doing so 
contact would be established with moderate officers within the Portuguese armed forces 
possibly leading to political influence in Lisbon. However, although discussed in the FCO, 
this approach was not pursued by the Labour Government. Indeed the MOD was to play no 
direct role in the formulation of British policy towards Portugal.
491
 The Labour Government 
appeared uncomfortable with involving the MOD in the political affairs of another state and 
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the British armed forces themselves were reluctant to become involved in anything besides 
the sale of arms.  
 The second means of influencing the political process in Lisbon was for the Labour 
Government to provide financial assistance. The political crisis in Portugal that followed the 
coup d’état and the economic disruption which followed decolonisation led to a rapidly 
growing deficit, eventually leading to intervention by the IMF in 1976. Although the fiscal 
conservatism of the Caetano regime prevented an immediate crisis after Spinola’s resignation 
it became clear that Portugal would require financial assistance to prevent economic chaos. 
The fear amongst western states was that the Soviet Union might increase its influence in 
Lisbon by providing financial aid. A Foreign Office official noted that “The Communists in 
Portugal are unlikely to have any difficulty in arranging for the Russians to be ready with 
offers of help”492 In the United States, Edward Kennedy was able to mobilise Congressional 
support for an economic aid package for Portugal during the autumn of 1974.
493
  The Federal 
Republic of Germany, Sweden and Norway also gave financial help.
494
  However, although 
this was the clearest way to exert influence on events in Lisbon, the parlous state of the 
British economy meant the Labour Government was in no position to offer substantial aid 
during 1975. 
 However, the Labour Government did give consideration to how it could provide 
some financial aid. The FCO asserted that “It would be noticeable, strange and harmful if we, 
Portugal’s oldest ally, were seen to be unwilling to help, more particularly in the light of the 
links between the Labour Party and the PSP.”495  However, a bureaucratic struggle between 
the Overseas Development Ministry and the Treasury resulted. The ODM argued that 
Portugal did not meet its criteria for assistance, as the OECD did not recognise it as a 
developing country.  The Minister, Judith Hart, although personally sympathetic to the cause, 
was adamant that the Labour Party’s manifesto commitment that overseas aid would go to the 
poorest states, rather than those that strengthened British interests, excluded Portugal from 
receiving aid.
496
 Instead she argued that aid should come from joint ventures, or investment, 
by the British public sector, an approach that had doctrinal appeal to the left of the Labour 
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Party.
497
 The Treasury was equally insistent that any economic assistance must not be 
allocated from its overstretched budget, warning the FCO that ‘it would be premature to 
regard your line as settled policy.”498  
The FCO sought to mediate a solution between the two departments before 
Callaghan’s visit to Lisbon in February 1975. The Secretary of State, on all other occasions 
dominant on decision making towards Portugal was unable to convince either the Treasury or 
ODM to compromise, despite pleading “I can’t go to Portugal empty handed.”499 British aid 
promised was therefore limited to technical assistance for Portuguese democracy, such as the 
training of journalists allocated by the FCO from the budget for the British Council. Although 
the provisional government agreed to receive such aid there was little enthusiasm in Lisbon 
for the initiative and in practice it proved ineffectual.
500
 It was only the involvement of the 
Labour Government in discussions within the European Council on the provision of EEC 
economic assistance to Portugal at the end of 1975, considered in chapter VI, which enabled 
it to have the influence in Lisbon that the United States had had as a result of providing aid 
since 1974. 
 The initiative for British policy towards Portugal during the period immediately after 
Spinola’s resignation came from within the Foreign Office and non-governmental actors 
rather than the Labour Government. The Southern European Department executed a cautious 
but purposeful approach in encouraging democracy in Portugal; the emphasis was on 
practical support for institutions where possible rather than high-profile public diplomacy. 
However, considering the political climate, an FCO official admitted, “it is all pretty small 
beer and the effects pretty marginal.”501 There was recognition of the limited importance of 
outside support during democratic transitions and that internal factors would be the ultimate 
determinant of the outcome. There was also concern rather than alarm at recent developments 
and continued confidence that a democratic outcome was the most likely scenario despite 
evidence to the contrary. This position was consistently held despite the difficulties it made 
for the Labour Government. The exception to this consensus in the Labour Government was 
that of the UK Delegation at NATO where strategic concern at the wider effect of events on 
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western interests predominated.
502
 Thus, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, the British Ambassador in 
Washington, was in communication with Kissinger concerning the implications of the 
appointment of communists to the government in Lisbon for NATO nuclear planning.
503
  
The differing analysis of events in Lisbon by Britain and the United States and their 
approaches to policy would appear likely to strain the relationship between the two allies, but 
it was not to prove the case. This was primarily due to the unexpected course set by the new 
US diplomatic mission in Lisbon which, despite its briefing from Washington, reached the 
conclusion that Soares and the Portuguese Socialist Party was the only viable option to 
promote US interests. Thereafter, until Kissinger once again restored his primacy over the 
formulation of US policy towards Portugal (after the attempted coup d’état on March 11th), 
the US Embassy in Lisbon was to act with increasing independence of Washington. Thus the 
diplomatic mission was able to elicit tacit support from elements of the State Department and 
Congress for its approach, despite the hostility of Kissinger and his advisers.
504
 This meant 
that US policy in Lisbon was in practice surprisingly close to that of Britain: since neither 
Embassy was closely supervised by its superiors in London nor Washington they were able to 
continue close cooperation to promote shared interests.
505
 An FCO official noted that “It is 
satisfactory that we and the Americans appear now to be viewing prospects for Portugal in 
much the same way. With the period of over-reaction on the American side receding, it will 
be easier to handle the bilateral and multi-lateral problems which the Portuguese cause for us 
and the Americans.”506 The fact that Callaghan did not take the lead on British policy toward 
Portugal during this period also prevented their differences from causing any difficulty in 
relations between Britain and the United States.  
The moderation of the US policy towards Portugal during the final months of 1974 
was seen by some contemporary observers, and historians since, as a deliberate strategy to 
allow radical left-wing elements in Lisbon to succeed; the resulting chaos would be an 
example to other west European states if a similar situation occurred. The so-called 
‘ accination theory’ was put forward to explain the relatively tolerant attitude of the US 
administration to developments in Portugal despite their concerns elsewhere, particularly 
across the southern Mediterranean, where political instability and the rise of Euro-
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Communism threatened NATO’s ‘southern flank.’507 Carlucci later recalled that many within 
the administration thought that “it was probably best to write Lisbon off and teach them a 
lesson in order to protect the rest of the countries in Europe.”508 The theory posits that the 
United States’ relationship with Western Europe during this period was hegemonic and that it 
sought to use détente to assert control over what it saw as its sphere of influence in Western 
Europe. The contrast between Kissinger’s defiant interview with Costa Gomes and Soares 
with the US’s subsequent moderate policy in Lisbon is used as supporting evidence for this 
argument. However, there is no evidence that the Labour Government either supported such a 
theory, or even that it was aware of its existence, despite both the close personal ties between 
Callaghan and Kissinger and the relationship between the security and diplomatic 
communities in London and Washington. The analysis of events in Portugal within the 
Labour Government did not make links with other cases across the southern Mediterranean. 
Crucially there was an understanding that Cunhal and the PCP were close allies of the Soviet 
Union rather than a part of the Eurocommunist movement.
509
   
 
“Democracy, Democracy, Democracy”510 
 Whilst alarm amongst the US and West European governments after Spinola’s 
resignation had largely been replaced by optimism that a democratic outcome remained the 
most likely scenario, a series of events during the first months of 1975 made Portugal’s 
prospects appear bleak. The political crises in Lisbon began with a dispute between the PCP 
and the PSP over the nature of proposed trade union reform in Portugal. The PSP insisted that 
the new labour law should allow for the creation of new trade unions, fearing that the 
previous regime’s single union, Unicidade, had become dominated by the Portuguese 
Communist Party. The PCP argued that the retention of a single union allowed effective 
collective bargaining for workers’ interests. The division between political movements 
signified a wider struggle between the two movements over the allegiance of the Portuguese 
working-class.  
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Since the coup d’état the Labour Government had argued that the emergence of 
independent trade unions was essential for any transition to democracy in Lisbon. The 
circumstances in Portugal were compared with Eastern Europe after World War Two when 
the domination of trade unions by the communists was the prelude to a seizure of power.
511
 A 
Financial Times article argued that “Liberty is really at stake. From a single trade union to a 
single party the distance could be small.”512 Therefore the Labour Government followed the 
debate in Lisbon on trade union reform closely; there was regular communication between 
the Labour attaché in the British Embassy, the overseas labour advisers within the FCO, Tom 
McNally in the Cabinet and Jack Jones, chair of the International Committee of the TUC.
513
 
However, despite its perceived significance it was difficult for the Labour Government to 
have any influence on the debate in Lisbon; any direct intervention was likely to be 
condemned as interference by a power which had been willing to trade with the Caetano 
regime despite its record on workers’ rights and might therefore strengthen proponents of a 
single trade union.
514
 The United States also sought to support independent trade unions in 
Portugal, but its impact was impaired by the widespread perception that a covert CIA 
programme was in progress similar to that conducted in Chile during 1973.
515
  
The Labour Government decided to encourage the TUC to use its position within the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
516
 A delegation would be sent to Lisbon to 
remind the provisional government of the implications for Portugal if its proposed legislation 
was not compatible with the provisions of the International Labour Organisation.
517
 The 
British government particularly drew attention to the right of labour organisations to affiliate 
freely with trade unions elsewhere and the fact that it would be impossible for Portugal to 
ratify key human rights conventions if this were not the case.
518
 An ICFTU delegation would 
also strengthen the PSP, because its contacts in Portugal, an FCO official noted, “have in the 
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main been through the Portuguese Socialist Party and Mario Soares in particular.”519 The 
Labour Government also encouraged Washington to follow the same approach; the FCO was 
instructed, “it would seem very worthwhile to discuss all this with your American 
colleague.”520 Therefore, the Labour Government used non-governmental actors affiliated to 
international organisations, using international law to legitimise their actions, as a means by 
which to achieve its foreign policy goals without appearing to intervene in the internal affairs 
of Portugal. 
The PCP was eventually successful in using its influence within the AFM so that the 
provisional government was instructed to legislate for a single trade union on the 14
th
 
January. The dispute had a number of outcomes for politics in Lisbon. The appearance of 
unity between the PCP and PSP which had been maintained since the coup d’état ended. The 
AFM was emboldened to see its role as a vanguard for a radical revolution in Lisbon and 
produced an economic plan calling for the nationalisation of sectors of the Portuguese 
economy. The PCP encouraged the AFM to go further, urging that the elections scheduled for 
April, which they feared would expose lack of popular support, be delayed or postponed. 
After the setback of the trade union question the PSP was determined that these elections 
would be held. It became increasingly prepared to confront the AFM on the issue and was 
willing if necessary to withdraw from the provisional government.
521
 During the following 
months, Soares concentrated much of his time on preparing for the forthcoming elections 
rather than on his role within the provisional government. 
The failure of the PSP to prevent the trade union legislation and the rumours that 
scheduled elections would be delayed led to increasing concern within the Labour 
Government. Trench noted, “In the light of this conjuncture of events, and of communist 
propaganda against the holding of early elections (on the grounds that the electorate is 
insufficiently aware of the issues yet), right-wing observers in Lisbon are speaking of the 
possibility of an early communist attempt at a coup.”522 The British Embassy in Lisbon 
observed the manoeuvrings that would lead to the 11
th
 March coup d’état attempt. Trench 
further reported that “Recent moves by Spinola towards the Socialists are represented as 
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being partly a move to guard against this eventuality.”523 In the United States Kissinger 
became increasingly concerned that Carlucci’s moderate approach in Portugal was failing to 
prevent the radical left from achieving power.
524
 Kissinger publicly made the derogatory 
comment, “whoever told me Carlucci was a tough guy."525 The Labour Government now had 
to respond to the AFM’s economic plan that proposed the nationalisation of sectors of the 
Portuguese economy. The Lisbon Embassy was lobbied by British industrialists and 
landowners concerned with developments, including a CBI mission that was “received 
attentively at a high level.”526 The Lisbon Embassy also had to react to numerous rumours of 
threats against British citizens; in one such case the ambassador reported that “Reuters are 
carrying a story about two British managers who are locked into their factory by their 
employees and subjected to threats in connection with an industrial dispute.”527 These 
developments led to a review in the FCO of evacuation plans for British citizens in Portugal 
in the case of a further deterioration.
528
  
 The political crisis in Lisbon made it more difficult for the Labour Government to 
pursue its strategy of maintaining constructive relations with the Portuguese government 
whilst meanwhile supporting Soares. It was essential that Britain, under pressure to defend 
economic interests in Portugal, retain its influence within the AFM, but maintaining a 
dialogue was difficult as there was a climate of paranoia about outside powers interfering in 
Portugal’s affairs. The British Ambassador observed that “the Provisional Government and 
important sections of the Armed Forces Movement (AFM) are pathologically frightened of 
the CIA and any other form of manipulation by the ‘forces of capitalism and reaction.’”529 
Therefore, although the Labour Government supported the PSP’s efforts to ensure that 
elections were held, it became more difficult to raise the issue with the provisional 
government.  
The Labour Government responded to this dilemma by changing the means by which 
it gave support to the PSP. It made fewer public statements of support for the PSP and 
bilateral meetings between Callaghan and Soares were held less frequently. This was in part 
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because Britain could not match the level of support for the PSP given by other countries, 
particularly the United States and West Germany. Instead delegations were sent by the 
Labour Party, through its International Department, to lobby the Portuguese government and 
to establish direct contact between the memberships of each party. Thus the FCO used Tom 
McNally to pass on a note to a Labour Party delegation led by Ron Hayward to communicate 
its views on trade union reform to the government in Lisbon.
530
 The Labour Party provided 
financial assistance by fundraising at constituency party meetings, and visiting delegations 
gave practical advice on election campaigning and moral encouragement.
531
 The extent of its 
support is difficult to ascertain from the Labour Party archives, but there are records of a 
series of small donations, most of a few thousand pounds (for example £32,316 was raised 
through collections at local party associations; these appear to have been delivered in person 
by visiting Labour MPs).
532
 The priorities of the Labour Government towards Portugal had 
not changed; Callaghan and Wilson remained committed to a successful democratic transition 
and both participated in Socialist International meetings concerned with Portugal during 
1975, despite their increasing distraction by domestic issues. Instead a more active role for 
the Labour Party became an effective way for the Labour Government to achieve its foreign 
policy objectives.  
The Labour Government’s relationship with the provisional government was also 
complicated by the role of the BBC in Portugal. The media institutions which had served the 
previous regime were taken over by their workers who owed their allegiance to the extreme 
left. Consequently the Portuguese public came to see the BBC as a crucial source of objective 
and impartial reporting, making the editorial line of the BBC a factor in Portuguese domestic 
politics. The provisional government complained to the British Embassy that BBC reporting 
was biased against the political left in Lisbon. The British Ambassador, whilst explaining to 
the provisional government’s representatives that the  British government could not be held 
responsible for BBC reporting, also encouraged the FCO to approach individual editors and 
journalists in London to inform them of the impact that their reporting was having in Lisbon. 
When rumours circulated that it was planning to broadcast a statement from General Galvao 
De Melo, a representative of President Spinola, an FCO official approached the BBC to 
inform them “I am sure the BBC will be aware of the political implications of this. But if not, 
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you might consider pointing this out.”533 Therefore although no controls were placed on BBC 
reporting (indeed there were no mechanisms for doing so), its importance in Lisbon as a 
source of independent information complicated Britain’s relations with the provisional 
government even if it increased its influence with the public as a whole. 
The success of the AFM led to a deterioration of the political climate in which 
moderate parties in Portugal operated. This raised the issue of whether the Labour 
Government should support a range of moderate parties in Lisbon, in order to encourage 
multi-party democracy, or remain committed to the success of the PSP alone as the best 
means of guaranteeing a transition to democracy in Portugal. The CDS, the most right-wing 
of the centre parties, had sought the Labour Government’s support after the coup d’état but 
had been rebuffed. However, it had received financial support and advice from the British 
Conservative Party at the instigation of leading members who had an interest in Portugal. The 
CDS was involved in an incident that tested the Labour Government’s strategy of 
maintaining constructive relations with the AFM and provisional government whilst working 
to ensure that elections were held. The activities of the CDS had become increasingly 
disrupted by radical left-wing groups and during a visit by a Conservative delegation to a 
CDS conference in Porto on the 26th January protesters surrounded and blockaded the 
building overnight. The incident made front page news in the British press and was raised 
during a meeting between the Conservative MP, Geoffrey Rippon, and the Portuguese 
President and Foreign Minister.
534
 The Conservative Party became so concerned at the 
treatment of CDS members that Lord Carrington raised the issue privately during a meeting 
with Callaghan.
535
 There was no direct reaction from the Labour Government; although 
encouraging the Liberal and Conservative Parties to support the centre, it continued its 
strategy of providing direct assistance to the PSP through the Labour Party. 
 The difficulties the Labour Government had in conducting a coherent foreign policy 
towards Portugal during the first months of 1975 culminated in the visit of Callaghan to 
Lisbon during February 1975. The invitation for a state visit by Callaghan to Portugal had 
been made immediately after the coup d’état in April 1974. The Labour Government was 
eager for this to happen, believing that it would change perceptions of Britain which had been 
damaged by its relations with the previous regime, and that it would be a means to bolster the 
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position of the PSP. However, it had proved difficult to arrange a suitable date; the Cyprus 
crisis and General Election had delayed a visit that was due to take place at the end of 
1974.
536
 This meant that Callaghan reached Lisbon when tensions were rising between the 
provisional government and the western alliance, and when a range of issues complicated 
bilateral relations. As a result the visit was largely formal and focused on trade and state 
relations rather than on the partisan ties between the Labour Government and the PSP as had 
been planned for the postponed visit in 1974.
537
  
The moderate response of the Labour Government contrasted with that of the United 
States. The outcome of the trade union debate and the proposed national economic plan 
challenged Carlucci’s assertion that Portugal would not become socialist. His despatches 
were increasingly at variance with Kissinger’s gloomy prognosis about the course of 
developments in Lisbon.
538
 On January 20
th, Kissinger told President Ford that “Portugal is 
going as predicted. Soares is massively incompetent. The fight now is over the unified labor 
law. If he leaves the government, the Communists will be the only organized force and either 
they will take over or the army will. We should have a covert action plan, but it could 
leak.”539 The United States began once again to put diplomatic pressure on the AFM and 
provisional government and insisted that a NATO naval exercise in the mouth of the Tagus 
River, Exercise Lock Gate, go ahead. This was seen in Washington as a ‘litmus test’ of 
Portugal’s commitment to the alliance.540 As a result Carlucci’s delegation, which continued 
to share a similar analysis to that of the British Embassy in Lisbon, became increasingly 
marginalised in US decision-making.
541
 The Lisbon Embassy still worked closely with its 
American counterparts, and the FCO with its counterparts in the State Department, but the 
issue of Portugal was not discussed in bilateral contact between the Labour Government and 
the Ford administration apart from during Wilson and Callaghan’s visit to Washington in 
January 1975.  
During the first months of 1975 the Labour Government responded to threats to 
British business interests by attempting to retain influence in the AFM council and the 
provisional government, but this made it difficult to assertively defend its national interest on 
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other issues.
542
 The widespread climate of paranoia that outside powers were interfering in 
Portuguese affairs made strong protest impracticable and made it more difficult for the 
Labour Government to support the institutions and parties necessary for a successful election 
to take place in April. Increasingly assistance for democratic institutions in Portugal was 
instigated through non-governmental actors in Britain, such as the Labour Party and TUC. 
However, the importance of these elections taking place was consistently maintained by the 
Labour Government and was seen as crucial for a successful transition to democracy in 
Portugal.  
  
The Moscow Visit 
The Labour Government’s concern at the increasing activity of the PCP in Lisbon led 
Callaghan to raise the issue with the Soviet leadership during a visit to Moscow in February 1975. 
The Labour delegation’s visit was considered a significant foreign policy success. It was the first 
official visit to the Soviet Union by a British Prime Minister since January 1968, following the 
Prague Spring and the mass expulsion of KGB agents from London which made Anglo-Soviet 
relations the worst amongst the western alliance.
543
 This meant that opportunities existing during 
détente for trade agreements or the resolution of long-standing differences were missed.
544
 
Wilson, who always expressed his pride in an ability to mediate between east and west, later 
recalled that these talks “were the most comprehensive a British Prime Minister had had for many 
years”, and that they “covered more ground than any since Winston Churchill’s historic visits in 
the Second World War.”545 The Moscow visit also had international significance as the first 
meeting between Brezhnev and a western leader since ill-health had forced his withdrawal from 
public life, leading to speculation that he had been replaced.
546
 
Before the Moscow visit, Wilson and Callaghan held talks in Washington. Although a 
largely functional occasion (centring on east-west relations and the intended line to be taken by 
the British delegation in Moscow), as the first meeting between Wilson, Callaghan and President 
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Ford it was also an important opportunity to “establish a personal understanding”, thereby 
strengthening relations which had become strained during Nixon and Heath’s time in office.547 
There was also concern that the meeting should have a constructive outcome to counter 
perceptions that Britain’s importance as an ally had been reduced following its recent withdrawal 
from military commitments and continuing economic problems. Between the Washington and 
Moscow visits, Callaghan also went on his official state visit to Lisbon.     
The memoirs of Wilson and Callaghan both recall events in Portugal being raised during 
the Moscow visit. Wilson only briefly refers to a discussion taking place between Callaghan and 
Kosygin,
548
 whilst Callaghan includes a lengthy description of the meeting. He recalls that “I had 
no hesitation in tackling Prime Minister Kosygin” and that “I made a strong request to him to use 
his undoubted influence to ‘call off’ the Portuguese Communist Party.” Callaghan observed that 
“I understood that détente was the first priority of the Soviet Union” and threatened that they 
“would surely understand that these prospects would be blighted if a communist coup in Portugal 
took place against the wishes of its people.”549 Callaghan recalls that Kosygin discounted this 
assertion, insisting instead that the PCP supported Portuguese democracy. His memoir recollects 
that “From these and his other comments, together with his calm response, his lack of resentment 
at our remarks and the tone of his replies, we concluded that the Kremlin was not seeking a new 
adventure in Portugal and regarded the success of their détente policy as more important than the 
success of the Portuguese Communist Party.”550 This account closely matches that given in a 
telegram sent by the FCO after the meeting, suggesting that Callaghan either retained a copy or 
was able to recall its content.
551
 
Callaghan’s account suggests that Soviet involvement in Portugal was seen as a significant 
Cold War issue. This has led historians studying the international dimension of the Carnation 
Revolution, basing their understanding of Britain’s role on Callaghan’s memoirs, to conclude that 
Portuguese democracy was supported through British diplomacy with the Soviet Union.
552
 
However, the British archival record supports neither argument. The Labour Government was 
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fully committed to the success of the Moscow visit. During months of planning (delayed by 
Brezhnev’s ill-health), FCO officials sought to remove every possible diplomatic obstacle. The 
Soviet interpretation of détente was assessed and careful consideration given as to how this might 
be included within the final communiqué. Killick warned that “On East-West relations generally, 
they will seek to present a definition of détente and peaceful coexistence – which they regard as 
compatible with continuance of the ideological struggle.”553 However, despite the FCO’s 
scepticism at Soviet motives during détente, no mention of events in Portugal was made during 
planning for Moscow. Instead, its objective was “to turn to the maximum advantage the 
opportunities presented by this, the most important British contact with the Soviet Union for 7 
years.”554 In view of this careful planning, for a British delegation to be willing to jeopardize its 
wider objectives by intervening on Portugal’s behalf appears somewhat surprising.555 
Callaghan’s warning to the Soviet Union of negative consequences for détente suggests 
that events in Portugal were being considered within the context of wider east-west relations. 
However, this had not been the case during the Labour Government’s immediate response to the 
April Revolution. Chapter II demonstrates that despite concern at communist influence, it did not 
believe the PCP were in a position to seize power. There is no evidence that events in Portugal 
were seen as being part of a wider crisis on NATO’s southern flank; of greater concern was an 
overreaction by the US to events. Likewise, as Chapter III demonstrates, the Labour 
Government’s principal concern in sub-Saharan Africa remained the reaching of a settlement of 
the Rhodesian Question. The Marxist national liberation movements of Lusophone Africa were 
accepted as legitimate representatives of their peoples, rather than being evidence of the 
expansion of Soviet influence. The only Cold War concern expressed by the Labour Government 
was the strategic implications for NATO in the southern Atlantic were Soviet bases to be built in 
Cape Verde or Guinea Bissau, following independence.
556
 It was only after the PCP thwarted 
attempts to establish independent trade unions, and rumours began that scheduled elections might 
be cancelled that the Labour Government first expressed alarm at communist influence in Lisbon. 
Therefore, concern at events in Portugal only emerged during the final stages of planning 
for the Washington and Moscow visits. It was first mentioned within a draft of the steering brief 
for the US visit. This document aimed “to set out the British view of détente and other important 
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international questions.” 557 The principal issues were Wilson’s proposal for nuclear arms-control 
with the Soviet Union, alongside Cyprus, the Middle East, and the energy crisis. There was no 
mention of Portugal in early drafts, which demonstrates that it was not considered a leading issue 
to be included within a discussion of east-west relations. A short summary of recent events in 
Lisbon was included in the steering brief on the 21
st
 January, but the first reference to the 
seriousness of the situation was an addendum on the 27
th
 January which warned that “the 
communists are simultaneously holding their own on the streets and increasing their control over 
political developments.”558 However, the Labour Government did not raise these concerns with 
the Ford Administration, which, given that the intention in Washington was to obtain approval for 
their approach in Moscow, makes Callaghan’s subsequent exchange with Kosygin also appear 
surprising. 
This all suggests that Callaghan’s decision to raise the subject of Portugal with Soviet 
leaders was the result of developments in Lisbon immediately before the Moscow visit. The 
addendum on Portugal within the Washington steering brief explained that it had been 
included “After the return to open intimidation in Oporto last week.”559 In the weeks that 
followed, the British Embassy sent alarming reports warning that “recent developments have 
perhaps increased the chances that a left wing military regime with communist support will 
push the fledgling democracy out of the nest.”560 Callaghan’s official state visit to Lisbon 
heightened concerns. He later recalled that “Soares and I discussed how to avoid the danger 
of the Communist Party taking sole control of the election procedures and machinery.”561 
However, Soares did not request that communist activity be raised with the Soviet Union; 
rather, he noted that “the failure of détente would have serious internal repercussions in 
Portugal.”562 He argued that “A lowering of tensions between the blocs would make 
Portuguese internal problems easier to solve and facilitate the implantation of democracy in 
Portugal.”563 Therefore, although Soares influenced Callaghan’s decision to raise events in 
Lisbon with the Soviet Union (also demonstrating his influence on the Labour Government), 
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he did not request an intervention, and explicitly rejected negative consequences for 
détente.
564
  
 
There is no record of the FCO planning Callaghan’s exchange with Kosygin on 
Portugal, unlike all other policy areas discussed during the Moscow visit. This suggests that 
there was no intention of raising Portugal prior to the visit. Callaghan also appears to have 
reached his eventual decision without wider consultation. This might result from policy 
towards Portugal being made outside the formal structures of Whitehall decision-making 
(involving the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Labour Research Organisation) as the 
situation in Lisbon deteriorated. The difference between the significance given to the meeting 
with Kosygin within Callaghan’s memoirs and the archival record may result from events in 
Portugal being raised more forcefully with the Soviet Union than Whitehall officials were 
aware. The discrepancies in Callaghan’s account might also be because he confused this 
exchange with Kosygin with later, more forceful, interventions during the Hot Summer. 
 
It is significant that Callaghan decided to raise events in Portugal with Kosygin. An 
FCO briefing on the Politburo advised that whilst Kosygin “may also appear from time to 
time”, “broad themes” would “best be reserved for the meetings with Brezhnev”, and 
“specialist subjects (e.g. CSCE, Cyprus)” were “better discussed in detail with Gromyko.”565 
It appears that Kosygin’s position within the Politburo allowed Callaghan to raise Portugal 
forcefully (and report this to Soares) without affecting negotiations on more significant issues 
and therefore the overall success of the Moscow visit.
566
 It is illustrative that within the 
extensive bound FCO departmental series on the visit, only a single telegram reports the 
exchange with Kosygin, which consequently appears to be at variance with the overall 
account of the visit.
567
 Therefore, although events in Portugal were considered a significant 
foreign policy issue, and the Soviet Union an important influence on their likely outcome, it 
was considered to be an issue separate from wider east-west relations.  
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The warning by Callaghan that support for the PSP in Lisbon might lead to consequences 
for east-west relations did not result from concern that Soviet interpretation of détente allowed 
communist activity in Western Europe. During a meeting with Kissinger immediately after the 
Moscow visit, Wilson and Callaghan discounted the possibility of a communist takeover in 
Portugal; when asked whether the USSR remained committed to a policy of détente, an FCO 
official noted, “The Prime Minister said very definitely yes.”568 Instead Callaghan’s warning was 
an attempt to pressure the Soviet leadership into exerting its influence over the PCP to address 
specific concerns, particularly the survival of independent trade unions and the moderate political 
parties.  
The effect of intervention in Moscow was more limited than the memoirs of Wilson and 
Callaghan suggest. The Labour Government did not consider events in Portugal to have wider 
implications for east-west relations. The leftward direction of the Portuguese Revolution was seen 
to result from indigenous factors, principally the sudden removal of a right-wing authoritarian 
government, rather than outside intervention. Callaghan warned of negative consequences for 
détente in an attempt to make the Soviet leadership urge restraint on the PCP (although it was not 
seen as being controlled by Moscow). Ironically, the political crisis in Lisbon that immediately 
followed the Moscow visit did lead to genuine concern within the Labour Government at 
Moscow’s intentions in Portugal.  
 
The 11
th
 March attempted coup d’état and its aftermath  
  The opposition to the AFM’s programme of nationalisation and the frustration and 
despair of Portuguese nationals returning from the overseas colonies brought a volatile 
political climate to Lisbon during February, in which rumours circulated that the former 
president Spinola was planning to seize power. On the 11
th
 March Portuguese paratrooper 
and air force units seized key buildings in Lisbon in what appeared to be an attempted coup 
d’état although the exact nature of events was unclear to contemporary observers.569 
Historians since have debated whether this was a genuine coup attempt planned by Spinola, 
or a spontaneous uprising within the military, deliberately provoked by the AFM as an 
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opportunity to decisively crush their right-wing political opponents.
570
 The uprising by pro-
Spinola military units was certainly disorganised and poorly planned, failing to seize crucial 
strategic buildings in Lisbon, whilst the response of COPCON, the AFM’s military command 
in Lisbon, was immediate and decisive, defeating the attempted coup with minimal 
casualties.  
The aftermath of the failed rising led to further radicalisation of the Portuguese 
revolution. The constitutional arrangements of the provisional government that had existed 
since April 25
th
 1974 were eroded by the establishment of a ‘Revolutionary Council’ which 
institutionalised the leading role of the AFM in Portugal. Immediate plans were released for 
further nationalisation within the Portuguese economy. The arrest of right-wing politicians 
implicated in the 11
th
 March attempted coup made it difficult for moderate politicians in 
Lisbon to operate effectively in opposition to the provisional government and there were 
rumours that the forthcoming election would be postponed. There was also a reorientation of 
Portuguese foreign policy towards a non-aligned position in international politics. These 
developments led to concern amongst the western allies that the AFM intended to establish a 
left-wing military dictatorship in Portugal.  
The British Embassy, despite the FCO review into its modus operandi, had once again 
failed to predict a significant political development in Lisbon. It appears that although it had 
successfully established relations with the radical left after Spinola’s resignation, the 
Embassy did not maintain contact with his supporters. The FCO had monitored with 
mounting alarm British press reports during February that suggested “the beginnings of a 
Spinolist revival at grass roots level in the AFM.”571 The British Ambassador in Lisbon 
reacted dismissively, believing “the atmosphere is volatile and full of rumours.”572 On the 
11
th
 March he was on a trip to Porto and duty staff in Lisbon had to deal with the immediate 
consequences of the attempted coup.
573
 The British Embassy’s initial reaction to the dramatic 
events in Lisbon was one of great concern, with reports that “we are approaching a situation 
of anarchy, to all intents and purposes.”574 The British Ambassador, however, was less 
inclined than colleagues from other western states in Lisbon to believe that the prospects for 
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democracy had ceased.
575
 He noted reports that “the voting for the promotion boards in the 
various armed services suggests a movement of opinion at lower levels away from the more 
extreme leaders.”576 Therefore, once the initial surprise at events in Lisbon subsided the 
British Embassy continued to predict with confidence “For the present, I see no reason to 
revise the view that progress towards the elections will continue.”577  
The Labour Government made no immediate public response to the attempted coup 
d’état but a review of British policy towards Portugal was begun which reached its 
conclusion several weeks later. As a result there were no clear ministerial instructions as to 
how the British Embassy should respond to the political crises that followed the attempted 
coup. There was alarm within the Labour Government as the radical left strengthened its 
position in Lisbon. The sudden announcement by the provisional government that banks 
would be nationalised was seen as an ominous development. An FCO official observed that 
“its introduction at this stage, just a few weeks after the publication of economic plans that 
excluded it, signifies a strong shift of economic policy towards the left.”578 The Labour 
Government’s apprehension at developments was also affected by reports that the usually 
ebullient Soares was in a “mood of resigned pessimism.”579 Speculation followed within the 
Labour government that Portugal would follow the “Peruvian solution” of authoritarian rule 
by Marxist military officers.
580
  
Despite its concerns at the direction of events in Lisbon the Labour Government also 
had to give consideration to how it could protect British interests in Portugal. There were a 
number of bilateral issues with Portugal that the Labour Government had to address, 
particularly with the impact of developments on British businesses and the expatriate 
community. Although organised violence against British citizens was not expected, an 
embassy official speculated, “I can envisage a situation in which some chance encounter, 
involving civilian or military casualties, could lead to an angry mob plundering any premises 
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which they think look prosperous.” 581 Such was the concern that, an FCO official recorded, 
“Sir John Killick has suggested that we should look urgently into the question of a Services 
assisted evacuation plan from Portugal.”582 Despite the seriousness of British concerns there 
was uncertainty as to the best course of action; the view was widely shared that “We do not 
want to help to bring about the ‘worst case’ by acting (or, still worse, speaking) as though it 
has already happened.” 583  Therefore it was decided that the existing invitation for a visit by 
the Portuguese President Costa Gomes to London should be allowed to continue despite the 
change in circumstances.  
The measured response of the Labour Government was in contrast to that of the Ford 
Administration. The strengthening of the radical left after the failed coup d’état confirmed 
Kissinger’s conviction that Portugal was gravitating towards the Soviet bloc.584 The United 
States expressed alarm to the British at reports that the Soviet Union was being offered 
facilities for its merchant ships in Portuguese ports by the government in Lisbon.
585
 The 
failure of Carlucci (previously a moderating influence on US policy) to predict either the 
coup d’état or its aftermath, led to his increasing isolation from policy-making in 
Washington.
586
 However, because the United States was widely seen to have given support to 
those who had planned to seize power, apparently confirming those rumours that a covert 
CIA programme was in operation in Portugal, there was an upsurge in anti-American 
feeling.
587
 The British Embassy had been able to maintain a low profile after the attempted 
coup (the FCO reporting to Cabinet that “There have been no reports of British nationals 
being endangered. No hostility has been shown to our Embassy”), but the US Ambassador’s 
residence in Lisbon was physically attacked by protesters, leading the military commander in 
Lisbon to suggest that they leave the country, and a visceral newspaper campaign in the 
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communist-dominated press exposed the supposed intervention of the United States in 
Portuguese politics.
588
 
Although the Ford Administration was determined that Portuguese politics must not 
be allowed to move further to the left, it judged that any public statement to this effect would 
probably be counterproductive. The lack of diplomatic options for the US led it to approach 
its European allies, believing they were in a better position to influence the government in 
Portugal; it was particularly interested in a possible diplomatic role for the EEC and 
encouraged the Labour Government to raise Portugal as an issue within meetings of the 
European Council (which was emerging as a nascent foreign policy-making entity). The Ford 
administration pursued a similar approach in response to events in Greece during the same 
period.
589
 Thus the State Department contacted the British Ambassador in Washington to 
express “the hope that the Nine would consider these latest developments in Portugal and see 
whether from the European side there was any way in which they might exert a beneficial 
influence.”590  
The mounting concern amongst Portugal’s NATO allies at the direction of events in 
Lisbon culminated in a diplomatic crisis triggered by rumours that several communist 
ministers were to be appointed to leading positions in the provisional government. A secret 
emissary, from the PSP to an official within the SPD, led the West German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt to conclude that Portugal was in danger of slipping outside the western 
sphere of influence.
591
 The Chancellor immediately contacted his allies to share his concern 
and called for a vigorous and coordinated diplomatic response. Schmidt requested that the 
Secretary General of NATO call an “informal meeting of the Fourteen (less Portugal),” and 
that Garrett Fitzgerald, the Irish Foreign Minister, should “utter a warning to the Portuguese 
leadership on behalf of the Nine.”592 Schmidt’s analysis of developments in Portugal now 
shared the wider geopolitical considerations that Kissinger had always advocated; this 
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enabled Washington to encourage a common response by the NATO alliance which it 
believed would be more effective than unilateral action.
593
 
The Labour Government reached a more sanguine conclusion than did Schmidt or 
Kissinger about the significance of further communist ministers being appointed to the 
provisional government. The British Embassy had been aware of this possibility since the 
failed coup, but focused its concerns on whether elections proposed for April would be held 
and the climate in which campaigning would take place. Schmidt telephoned Harold Wilson 
on the 20
th
 March to discuss developments in Portugal. The conversation took place on an 
unsecured line and despite its significance issues were discussed through confused allusions 
and euphemisms.
594
 The possibility of further appointments of communists to the government 
had not reached Cabinet level. This was the first time Wilson had given consideration to this 
possible eventuality and he gave a positive response to Schmidt’s suggestion. It was also the 
first time since the April 25
th
 coup d’état (when Wilson urged consideration of the 
implications of change in Portugal on Rhodesia) that the prime minister was the focal point of 
policy-making towards Portugal.  
However, there was scepticism within the FCO about both the veracity of Schmidt’s 
information and whether any representation made to the provisional government would 
achieve its purpose. The British Ambassador in Lisbon counselled, “All these rumours are 
little more than intelligent speculation on the basis of interviews carried out by the 
Portuguese Prime Minister in the course of his efforts to reconstruct his government,”595 and 
“attempts here to influence the composition of the Government would be not only 
unproductive, but harmful.”596 Although Callaghan shared this view he also held talks with 
Kissinger during his brief stopover in London on 23
rd
 March.
597
 The statement prepared by 
Callaghan for Cabinet on the 25
th
 March argued that although the situation was 
“unpredictable,” he did not accept Schmidt’s principal concern that the appointment of 
communist ministers “would represent a step towards the establishment of a totalitarian 
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regime.”598 The Labour Government opposed Kissinger and Schmidt’s proposal that the 
Soviet ambassador in each NATO member-state be summoned and warned of the 
consequences for East-West relations if further gains were made by the PCP in Lisbon. It 
remained sceptical that any representation to the provisional government in Lisbon would 
succeed, believing it would be seen as interference in Portugal’s internal affairs. The Labour 
Government argued that the only effective course was to put pressure on Lisbon to ensure 
that free and fair elections were held. Despite these differences the British remained 
committed to multilateral diplomacy towards Portugal; Callaghan concluded, “We attach 
considerable importance to acting with our allies.”599 The Labour Government reached the 
decision that if the United States proposed that the western allies coordinate their diplomatic 
response in Lisbon then Britain would have to participate.
600
 Therefore Callaghan 
recommended that “On possible action we shall wish to decide what to do in light of what the 
Americans do and the recommendations of the NATO council.”601 The response shows that 
the Labour Government viewed its relations with Washington as more significant than the 
pursuit of Britain’s national interest in Lisbon. 
The United States and West Germany were determined that a clear démarche be given 
to the Portuguese government. The western allies decided that each would send their 
ambassador in Lisbon to deliver a statement outlining their alarm at recent events with both 
the timings and content of each message coordinated. By doing so, the apprehension of the 
western allies would be raised more robustly with Lisbon whilst charges that they were 
intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state were less likely to be made against any 
one ally. The forum where this approach was discussed was the NATO Council in Brussels. 
Despite the Labour Government’s scepticism at the likely effectiveness of the proposed 
action, Britain played a leading role in achieving agreement amongst the allies.
602
 This was 
partly because the UK representative on the Council saw the appointment of communist 
ministers in Lisbon primarily in terms of its impact on the cohesion of the NATO alliance 
rather than its implications for Portugal. The UK representative argued that “A Communist 
Minister without Portfolio has already led to Portugal being excluded from certain alliance 
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activities. Should Communists receive important portfolios such as the interior the 
consequences would inevitable be considerably more serious.”603 The UK delegation also 
clearly understood that its role in the Council was to facilitate US diplomacy in Europe and 
maintain the cohesion of the alliance and that this was to be done irrespective of its judgment 
of the national interest on a particular issue. It demonstrated a professionalism and 
resourcefulness which meant it often took the lead on issues, and its understanding of internal 
politics in Washington enabled it to interpret the likely direction of US policy. Therefore, 
although the UK representative in the Council noted that “In the absence of Kissinger from 
Washington and in the light of the confused instructions which the US delegation appear to 
be receiving it seems doubtful whether a US lead will be forthcoming over the weekend,” 
because Callaghan had held discussions with Kissinger on the 23
rd
 March the UK delegation 
was able to take the initiative within the Council, confident that it understood the policy that 
Washington would follow.
604
   
The NATO allies therefore organised their ambassadors in Lisbon to call on President 
Costa Gomes in a series of coordinated visits to put pressure on the provisional government 
not to appoint more communist ministers. However, there was some nuance in their 
approach. The US representation was most vociferous in its criticism of recent developments 
in Portugal, particularly the incidents of anti-Americanism, but because Carlucci was able to 
discuss the possibility of further financial aid to Portugal the reaction of Costa Gomes was 
more subdued than with the other delegations.
605
 The British Embassy made representations 
to the Portuguese President on the 24
th
 March. In contrast to the US demarche, it was 
instructed to “concentrate on the importance of consolidating democracy in Portugal” but to 
“stop short of representations directed to the composition of the Portuguese government.”606 
The information given to the western alliance that a number of communist ministers were to 
be appointed to the provisional government proved to be exaggerated. In the event although a 
more left-wing government was constituted, the PCP did not make significant gains. During 
the following month it was clear that political moderates continued to have influence in 
Lisbon and on the 25
th
 April 1975 democratic elections were held as planned. It appears that 
West Germany and the United States had interpreted rumours that communists would be 
appointed to the provisional government as being significant because of their concern with 
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the wider context of events on East-West relations rather than as a development within the 
fluid political situation with Portugal.
607
 
The West German Government also attempted to solicit action by the European 
Council. The Labour Government showed no enthusiasm for this approach despite the 
likelihood that the European Council would have greater influence on the provisional 
government in Lisbon. Callaghan noted that “Portugal is likely to attach considerable 
importance to its links with the EEC.”608 Britain believed that West Germany’s motivation 
for encouraging a response by the Nine was also a desire to see the nascent institutions of the 
European Community take a common approach to a foreign policy issue. A West German 
official admitted to the British Ambassador in Bonn that “he attached importance to the idea 
of an initiative by the Nine more because he thought it would be good for the Community to 
act together in a matter such as this than for any particular impact it might have had on the 
Lisbon scene.”609 In contrast the Labour government showed no enthusiasm for expanding 
the political role of the EEC, instead remaining committed to the NATO alliance and the 
prominent role it gave the US in Europe.  
The review of British policy towards Portugal conducted by the Labour Government 
after the attempted coup d’état was published as an internal FCO document on 17th March.610 
It was the most detailed analysis of British policy since April 25
th
, 1974. For the first time it 
considered the wider strategic implications of developments in Lisbon, including the 
possibility of Portugal’s withdrawal from NATO and the likely impact of events on regime 
change in Spain.
611
 The review wrestled with the central dilemma of British policy towards 
Portugal, whether to engage with the provisional government so as to maintain influence and 
protect its interests, or to encourage political change by supporting its political opponents. 
The review concluded that British policy toward the provisional government required a 
continued Faustian pact whereby “our best guideline will still be to continue to befriend and 
seek to influence the Portuguese leadership as long as some prospect for democracy 
remains.”612 The Labour Government decided to continue with a proposed visit by the British 
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army chief of staff to Lisbon and by President Costa Gomes to London, believing that doing 
so was a chance to develop relations with the provisional government and “influence their 
way of thinking and outlook.”613 It also committed Britain to providing technical aid to 
Portugal but refrained from providing financial aid. It continued to encourage a multilateral 
approach to Portugal whereby “We should continue to exchange views with our allies in 
NATO and within the EEC and encourage Western governments to follow our approach.”614 
Although there was no dramatic change in British policy the review was less optimistic at the 
prospects for democracy in Portugal, and gave serious consideration to the possibility of 
further radical left wing change in Lisbon that might result in its withdrawal from NATO and 
also the necessity of evacuating British subjects. 
 The FCO report concluded that the direction of events in Lisbon “would depend greatly on 
the Soviet Union’s own desires”, and led to Sir John Killick’s response, “I shall be interested to 
see any assessment of these produced in Moscow or London.”615 The British Ambassador in 
Moscow, for the first time since the April Revolution, was consulted on Soviet intentions in 
Portugal. His opinion was contradictory, believing that the Soviet Union “would eventually see 
their best interests served by a NATO initiative to exclude Portugal from the Alliance” because 
“such an exclusion would lead to a process of unravelling which would enhance the tendency 
towards disintegration of the southern flank.”616 However, he expected that “They do not wish 
anything to happen in Portugal, in the short-term, which would provoke a sharp reaction in 
Western Europe against what would be represented as a Soviet-assisted take-over by the 
Communists. This might cause problems for Soviet détente policy as a whole and would certainly 
make life more difficult for Communist Parties in Western Europe.”617 This led the Labour 
Government to expect that, although an imminent communist takeover in Portugal was unlikely, 
once the Helsinki Summit ended, an attempt would be made to seize power.
618
 His advice became 
the most significant influence on Labour Government policy towards Portugal during the Hot 
Summer. 
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The Labour Government considered the holding of free and fair elections to be 
absolutely critical for preventing another authoritarian regime being established in Portugal. 
The premise of its policy since the April 25
th
 coup had been that the PSP was the most 
popular political movement in Portugal and would emerge after elections as the largest 
political party, enabling it to form a government with a mandate to establish parliamentary 
democracy. Therefore rumours after the 11
th
 March attempted coup d’état that elections 
would be postponed were a cause of greater concern to the Labour Government than the 
crisis over the appointment of communist ministers. It was also apprehensive at mounting 
evidence that, even if elections were held, campaigning would not happen in a political 
climate in which parties could operate freely.
619
 The British Embassy was particularly 
alarmed at the arrest of opponents and their detention without trial.
620
 Soares’s resignation as 
foreign minister on 27
th
 March made the successful holding of elections even more 
imperative for Britain. The Labour government’s close personal and partisan relationship 
with Soares had enabled it to have a degree of influence within the provisional government 
and a reliable source of information concerning political developments in Portugal. His 
departure was akin to the United States’ loss of influence after President Spinola’s 
resignation. Therefore the success of the PSP in the forthcoming elections became absolutely 
essential for Britain’s future relations with Portugal. 
The provisional government confirmed on March 20
th
 that elections would be held on 
April 25
th
, 1975. Despite the significance of these elections for Britain, it was difficult for the 
Labour Government to have any influence once campaigning began. The PSP’s electoral 
strategy was to establish noticeable distance from its overseas supporters so that it could 
campaign “on the themes of freedom and national independence,” which would contrast 
“with the Communist Party who were stooges of the Soviet Union.”621 Therefore the Labour 
government was only able to participate in Socialist International support for the PSP during 
the elections.
622
 By contrast the Conservative Party gave active support to the CDS including 
the presence of the MP Michael Young in Lisbon to “hold their hand” during campaigning.623 
The Conservative Party also called for an all-party delegation to visit Lisbon during the 
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elections but the proposal was rejected by the Labour Government. The Conservative Party 
was also denied its request that Callaghan “gave the nod” as required by its contacts in the 
City of London before any funding for democratic parties in Portugal would be available.
624
 
This decision was reached despite the fact that, as an FCO official noted, “there is little doubt 
that the Portuguese Communist Party is receiving covert financial and other support from the 
Soviet Bloc.”625 Therefore, the Labour Government’s policy of actively encouraging 
democracy (which it had pursued since the April 25
th
 coup d’état) changed, once election 
campaigning began, to one of non-interference in Portugal’s internal affairs. 
 
Britain and the ‘lurch to the left’  
Immediately after the April 25
th
 coup d’état the Labour Government believed that a 
return to right-wing authoritarian government was the most likely threat to any democratic 
outcome in Portugal, but the increasing strength of the radical left that followed Spinola’s 
resignation presented a new challenge for policy towards Portugal. Plans to nationalise 
Portuguese industry endangered British business interests, whilst the NATO alliance’s 
stability was threatened by the presence of Marxists in government, and these developments 
led “Ministers to look afresh at their attitude towards Portugal.”626 However, there were few 
viable options to prevent the radical left from expanding its influence in Lisbon. Resentment 
at past interference by outside powers in Portugal was a source of popular legitimacy for the 
radical left, and any intervention was therefore adjudged likely to be counterproductive. The 
Labour Government decided to pursue a policy of engagement rather than confrontation with 
the provisional government, believing that any other course would merely confirm the dictum 
“les absents ont toujours tort.”627   
The response of the Ford Administration to Spinola’s resignation differed 
significantly from that of the Labour Government. Kissinger interpreted events in Portugal 
through the prism of the Cold War, believing that the Soviet Union had instigated events in 
Lisbon to undermine the stability of the NATO alliance.
628
 The Labour Government, 
although aware of the wider implications for the western alliance of the developments in 
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Portugal, believed that they were caused by indigenous factors and was dismissive of any 
significance being given to Soviet involvement.
629
 As a result it remained confident that a 
parliamentary democracy would be established in Portugal and the radical left isolated as a 
result. In a similar manner, unlike the Ford administration, the Labour Government did not 
make any connection between the ideological disputes in Lisbon and those in Angola and 
Mozambique which on independence led to brutal proxy cold war conflicts.
630
   
However, the differences between Britain and the United States on Portugal did not 
affect their wider relations. The FCO and State Department and their respective embassies in 
Lisbon continued to share information and analyses, demonstrating the strength of 
institutional ties. During the crises that followed the attempted coup d’état in March, the 
Labour Government accepted and encouraged US leadership of the western alliance’s 
diplomatic response. The absence of regular meetings between Kissinger and Callaghan 
during the period after Spinola’s resignation meant that policy differences on Portugal did not 
have a detrimental impact on their close personal friendship. However, the relationship 
between Britain and the United States on Portugal was clearly asymmetrical; Britain could 
play a useful diplomatic role in Lisbon but it was the US which had disproportionate 
influence. The Labour Government sought to be Washington’s most loyal ally within the 
western alliance and was prepared to subsume the pursuit of its national interest in Portugal 
to the wider goal of maintaining close relations with the United States. 
During the period after Spinola’s resignation the Labour Government remained 
confident that despite the strength of the radical left the majority of Portuguese favoured a 
transition to parliamentary democracy. Regardless of the fluid political situation in Lisbon the 
Labour Government was unwavering in its prognosis that if elections were held no more than 
20-30% of the electorate would vote for the Communist Party, and that regional differences 
within Portugal meant areas such as Porto would always remain strongly conservative.
631
 
Influential Labour ministers, such as Joan Lestor and Tom McNally, were convinced that the 
majority of the Portuguese public perceived themselves to be ‘European’, entitled to the same 
rights and political freedoms as those in neighbouring states.  Immediately after the April 25
th
 
coup d’état this view was not shared by all officials within the FCO, some of whom 
expressed scepticism as to whether democracy could successfully be established in Portugal, 
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but during the period that followed Spinola’s resignation there is no evidence that those 
within the FCO expected anything other than a democratic outcome.  It appears that the 
failure of the British Embassy to accurately predict events in Lisbon led to a re-evaluation of 
previously held assumptions. It may also have been that with Lisbon moving towards the 
radical left rather than authoritarian right, British business interests were now directly 
threatened by nationalisation, and the FCO became enthusiastic proponents of parliamentary 
democracy to prevent such an eventuality.  
Although the Labour Government understood that the Portuguese electorate favoured 
democracy there was an inadequate understanding of the importance that the Portuguese 
military would have on such an outcome. Institutional change within Portugal’s armed forces 
is now accepted by most historians of the Carnation Revolution as the most significant factor 
in explaining developments after the April 25
th
 coup d’état.632 The British Embassy was 
aware that the Portuguese military was not a monolithic entity and allegiances were shaped 
by hierarchy and generational differences. The British Ambassador dismissed the notion that 
the AFM was representative of the military as a whole, arguing “one is tempted in present 
circumstances to regard it as no more than the foam at the top of a Cappuccino.”633 However, 
although the MOD and FCO explored the option, there was no serious attempt to influence 
personnel within the Portuguese military (as the United States had done in Latin America to 
thwart communist subversion after the Cuban Revolution); the preference instead was to 
support organised political movements in Portugal.
634
 It appears that the convention in 
Britain, that there should be a clear division between its armed forces and civilian politicians, 
prevented serious consideration being given to such an approach. The diplomatic isolation of 
Portugal during the Lusophone African wars also meant that there had been no meaningful 
contact between the Portuguese and British armed forces for two decades. 
Britain’s economic weakness during this period affected its relations with Portugal. 
The inability of the Labour Government to offer financial aid to the provisional government 
significantly reduced its influence in Lisbon. Its domestic difficulties also meant it was 
unable to give sustained attention to events in Portugal, as it had immediately after the April 
25
th
 coup. The Labour Government’s failure to provide substantial financial assistance to the 
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PSP also made its friendship of less importance to Soares. But the opportunity still existed for 
Britain to have influence on the political process in Lisbon; in particular the FCO’s 
professionalism enabled it to play a role coordinating the western allies’ diplomatic response, 
particularly within the NATO alliance.
635
 However, the absence of clear leadership from the 
executive on Portugal (necessary for any coherent foreign policy in Britain), and the inability 
to support diplomacy with economic and military power, meant that there was a surprising 
degree of fatalism in the British response to the crises following Spinola’s resignation, 
compared with its vigorous response after the April 25
th
 coup d’état. Despite its historical, 
diplomatic and cultural ties with Portugal, Britain had less influence over developments after 
Spinola’s resignation than did the United States and other Western European states. 
The Labour Government’s declining influence means its policy towards Portugal 
cannot be used to support the argument of political scientists that outside powers played a 
crucial role in the outcome of the Carnation Revolution.
636
 The Labour Government played 
no direct role in establishing the political institutions or encouraging the framework of civil 
society necessary for a successful transition to democracy in Portugal. This is most clearly 
seen during election campaigning in April 1975 where Britain had no significant role. 
However the ‘soft power’ of Britain, alongside that of other Western European societies, was 
crucial to the emergence of democracy, and historians have revealed that their example was 
crucial in shaping Portuguese public opinion.
637
 In particular the BBC remained central to 
public discourse, though this was not fully understood by the Labour Government, which 
instead agonised over the decline in the traditional instruments of its foreign policy 
making.
638
  
 The period between the resignation of Spinola and the elections in April saw 
significant changes in how Britain’s foreign policy towards Portugal was made. Prior to the 
announcement that her overseas territories would be granted their independence, both Wilson 
and Callaghan took a close interest in Portugal because of its significance to the Rhodesian 
question. They had regular contact with Soares, which meant that they were aware of 
developments within the provisional government. However, the successful outcome of 
negotiations on Lusophone Africa, and Soares’ political isolation in Lisbon that followed 
Spinola’s resignation (alongside the distraction of campaigning for a General Election and 
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Britain’s economic difficulties), meant that although a close personal relationship between 
Soares and Wilson and Callaghan remained, it was now of less significance.  
The declining interest of Downing Street in events in Portugal meant that the initiative 
for British policy now came from the FCO. The decision by the provisional government in 
Lisbon to concede the principle of self-determination to its overseas territories shifted 
authority on Portuguese policy within the FCO from the African departments to the Southern 
European Department and the Western Organisations Department. These differed in their 
analysis of events in Portugal, with the former being principally concerned with 
developments within Lisbon and the latter with their wider implications for international 
politics. The British Embassy, after its failure to predict the removal of Spinola, now actively 
sought to engage with the AFM in Lisbon and despite clear ideological differences showed a 
greater willingness to discuss developments with leading radical figures. In contrast those 
within the British foreign policy-making establishment most concerned with relations with 
the US, particularly defence and intelligence, sought to promote policies conducive to 
maintaining a close relationship with Washington. The decreasing ability of Britain to have 
influence over events in Lisbon also led it to take a more multilateral approach with its west 
European allies. Therefore, although policy towards Portugal did not alter dramatically after 
Spinola’s resignation, there were significant changes in the way it was pursued.  
Throughout the period after Spinola’s resignation the Labour Government believed 
that were an election to be held it would give a clear popular mandate to moderate politicians 
in Lisbon. However, the Labour Government had little understanding that the weakness of 
civil society, the absence of a free media and of a plurality of political parties meant that, 
despite the election of April 25
th
, those in Portugal who sought an alternative path to 
parliamentary democracy were still in a position to challenge for power during the summer of 
1975.  
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Chapter V – The Second Crisis: The Hot Summer  
      (April 25
th
 to September 9
th
, 1975)
 
 
The holding of constituent assembly elections, rather than leading to the establishment of 
parliamentary democracy, precipitated a political crisis in Lisbon which threatened civil war. 
This was the most crucial point of the Portuguese Revolution. The radical left, dismissing the 
outcome of the elections, sought to entrench its position within the provisional government; 
the moderate parties, emboldened by their electoral mandate, sought its reversal. A power 
struggle ensued through political intrigue, mass public demonstrations and shifting 
allegiances within the armed forces. As a result the economy spiralled out of control; 
inflation and strikes (exacerbated by the return of Portuguese nationals from the overseas 
territories) brought the collapse of industrial output and the withdrawal of international 
capital. During the summer of 1975 there was widespread social breakdown throughout 
Portugal. In the regions of the south, agricultural labourers seized control of land, whilst 
conservative smallholders in the north, encouraged by the Catholic clergy, openly defied the 
provisional government’s authority. The political vacuum prevented Portuguese 
administrators from overseeing a peaceful transition to independence in the overseas 
territories, and events moved inexorably towards the brutal proxy cold war conflicts that 
would follow. This chapter will consider the response of the Labour Government to these 
dramatic events, from the constituent assembly elections of 25th April to the establishment of 
a moderate regime on the 9
th
 September.  
 
   The political crisis in Portugal during the summer of 1975 coincided with a period of 
significant international diplomacy, with the superpowers attempting to restore the 
momentum of détente after the setbacks of the previous year. In preparation for the Helsinki 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the NATO alliance held a series of 
meetings to maintain cohesion amongst its member states. There were ongoing discussions 
between representatives of the leading western states to coordinate their response to the 
energy crisis and deepening global recession. The Labour Government attended all these 
gatherings, as well as instigating a Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting to 
encourage a negotiated settlement on the Rhodesian question. Although events in Lisbon 
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were rarely the principal subject of discussion, they were integral to any attempt to reach 
diplomatic agreement on other issues, particularly as developments in Portugal were not only 
considered to be a direct threat to western interests, but also a litmus test of Soviet intentions 
elsewhere.
639
 
The main argument of this chapter considers the Labour Government’s conviction 
that events in Portugal now threatened the integrity of the NATO alliance. The possibility 
that a regime sympathetic to communism might be established had potentially disastrous 
implications for the western alliance, and made Britain more assertive in its approach towards 
Portugal. Despite unease that intervention might be perceived as interference in Portugal’s 
sovereign affairs, and that wider east-west relations might be negatively affected, the rapid 
deterioration of the political situation in Lisbon led to the decision that the subject of Portugal 
should be raised with the Soviet Union. The Labour Government’s analysis of events was 
now similar to that of the Ford Administration, but its approach to policy continued to differ; 
whilst the US was concerned with the political consequence of these events on Western 
Europe and their effects on wider global strategy, Britain was more narrowly concerned with 
their impact on the military effectiveness of the western alliance. This suggests that Britain 
and the United States had a different concept of the nature of the NATO alliance. The chapter 
will also argue that Britain’s economic weakness prevented it from having a significant 
influence on events in Lisbon. It received repeated requests for economic aid which it was 
unable to meet and it failed to prevent the damage to its business interests. Therefore, the 
Labour Government pursued its aims through diplomacy within NATO, the EEC and (as a 
party) within the Socialist International, rather than though bilateral relations with Portugal, 
as before. This meant that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s capacity for encouraging 
consensus within multilateral institutions became crucial for the pursuit of the British national 
interest in Portugal.  
 The Labour Government’s approach to Portugal began to change even before the 
holding of constituent assembly elections. The conviction that the majority of Portuguese 
would support moderate parties once elections were held, leading to the establishment of 
parliamentary democracy, was superseded by the realisation that the radical left in Lisbon 
would attempt to consolidate their power irrespective of the results of any election. The 
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gravity of the situation meant developments in Portugal were considered at Cabinet level 
during this period.
640
 Leading figures within the Labour Government who had not previously 
taken an interest in these events began to play a significant role. During the Helsinki Summit 
in August 1975, Wilson and Callaghan raised PCP activity in Portugal with the Soviet 
delegation at their bilateral meeting. However, the Government’s commitment to preventing 
radical socialism in Lisbon exacerbated ideological tensions within the Labour Party; many 
democratic socialists on the left of the party, sympathetic to radicals in Lisbon, expressed 
their dissatisfaction with Anglo-American policy. Those departments within the FCO 
concerned with relations with the United States and the NATO alliance became more 
prominent in policy making, whilst the influence of the Southern European Department and 
the Lisbon Embassy declined. The Labour Government was also influenced by the lobbying 
of the British business community in Portugal, particularly after they were successful in 
persuading the Conservative opposition to raise a series of questions in parliament on the 
issue.  
 During the summer of 1975 the United States became committed to the removal of the 
radical left from the government in Lisbon, but it remained difficult for Washington to act 
decisively in Portugal without having a detrimental impact on Portuguese public opinion. 
Kissinger was informed by an NSC official that “because the abortive coup attempt has led to 
a serious weakening of moderate forces and a resulting lurch to the political left, its effect has 
been to further weaken our already limited ability to influence events in Portugal.”641 There 
was suspicion inside Portugal that the United States was seeking to destabilise its politics and 
society (as it had recently done in Chile), which limited Washington’s policy options.642 
Although sharing its concerns the Labour Government sought to prevent the US from 
pursuing actions which it believed would be counterproductive in Portugal. However, by 
giving substantial economic aid to the Portuguese Government and financial assistance to the 
Socialist Party, the US had greater influence on developments. Britain’s inability to provide 
substantial economic assistance to Lisbon also undermined its usefulness to Washington on 
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Portugal. Less clear is the covert role of the United States in Portugal. Indeed some 
contemporary observers believed that Washington was pursuing a strategy of intervention in 
Portuguese political affairs during this period and recent historical research in Portugal 
stresses this role.
643
 Whether such a policy involved the Labour Government is unclear and 
will be explored. There was certainly closer cooperation than had been the case in previous 
months, principally because there was a series of bilateral meetings between the highest 
levels of government during the period which gave the opportunity for policy towards 
Portugal to be discussed. The two allies certainly shared the same broad assumptions about 
the correct course of western policy towards Lisbon. 
 The events in Portugal referred to as the ‘Hot Summer’ began soon after the elections 
for the constituent assembly. The takeover of the independent media by the radical left 
triggered the withdrawal of the PSP from government, leaving the communists as the most 
influential party; non-communist members of the AFM, supported by the moderate parties, 
responded by challenging their authority. A second crisis in August saw the armed supporters 
of different factions within the AFM confront each other on the streets of Lisbon. The 
collapse of governmental authority brought Portugal close to civil war and economic disaster 
during the autumn of 1975. The restoration of military discipline by moderate elements 
within the AFM led to a return of social order, and after a final attempted coup by the radical 
left, a government was established which was committed to parliamentary democracy in 
Portugal. 
 
“Two cheers for democracy”644  
The results of the constituent assembly elections surprised even the most optimistic 
western observers. Despite calls by the AFM for voters to boycott the election, the turnout of 
92% was higher than in many established democracies at the time. The moderate parties 
together achieved a plurality of the Portuguese electorate, with the PSP being the most 
successful (obtaining 37.5%, across a wide range of constituencies), but even smaller 
moderate parties, despite intimidation from the media and left-wing militants, achieved a 
sizeable proportion of the vote. By contrast the PCP received only 12.5% of the vote, drawn 
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largely from certain districts of Lisbon and regions in the south.
645
 International media 
coverage which had been previously centred on events in Lisbon, during the campaign 
reported the violence against the PCP in the north, thus showing that communist support was 
mainly confined to urban areas. 
However, the radical left remained determined to maintain its dominant political 
position in Lisbon. The outcome of the election was dismissed as the result of an electorate 
conditioned by fifty years of authoritarian rule. Instead the acceleration of social and 
economic reform was seen as essential before a revolutionary socialist democracy (as 
mandated by the April Revolution) could be established. Therefore, immediately after the 
constituent assembly elections a power struggle between the radical left and moderate centre 
began.
646
 The political crisis in Lisbon, combined with worsening labour discipline, land 
seizures and the economic dislocations of decolonisation, led to a rapid deterioration in the 
Portuguese economy. Although the withdrawal of international capital following the 
nationalisation of its industry brought accusations that Portugal was being undermined by 
western powers, the resulting hardships led to calls for greater social discipline and an urgent 
requirement for international capital, giving the west political leverage.  
 The British Embassy in Lisbon enthusiastically greeted the outcome of the election, a 
noticeably different attitude toward the prospects for democracy in Portugal than was shown 
immediately after the April Revolution. The outcome of the election was considered to be 
hugely significant; the Ambassador reported, “The scale of the Socialist victory in the 
elections was the first setback of any real importance to the Communists in Portugal during 
the year since the coup.”647 However, further difficulties were foreseen as a result of the 
election, leading to his observation that “The Socialists’ victory has strengthened their 
position as the main champion of a pluralist democracy in Portugal, but has increased the 
dangers to them from further confrontation from the radicals.”648 The Ambassador strongly 
urged that greater assistance be given to Portugal, arguing that “the election provides a signal 
opportunity for Her Majesty’s Government, and the West in general, to underpin the 
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Portuguese forces working for representative democracy both by appropriate expressions of 
support as well as tangible gestures of assistance.” 649 
However, after the radical left became dominant in Lisbon following the events of the 
11
th
 March, the Labour Government had no longer believed holding elections for a 
constituent assembly would be a decisive step towards parliamentary democracy. The 
assembly elections were considered significant as a means to confer legitimacy on the 
moderate parties, countering the claim of the radical left to a popular mandate from the April 
Revolution, but any electoral success by the moderate democratic parties would merely lead 
to an inevitable power struggle. The Labour Government remained optimistic that Portugal 
would eventually become a parliamentary democracy, but the possibility that a left wing 
authoritarian regime might emerge instead caused a fundamental reassessment of relations 
with Portugal. The potential threat to the cohesion of NATO of developments in Portugal 
became the Labour Government’s principal concern. It sought to maintain constructive 
relations with the provisional government in order to have sufficient influence to prevent 
such an outcome. This meant that often during this period it was difficult for the Labour 
Government to publicly support the PSP (for fear of antagonising the provisional 
government) or to protect British business interests in Portugal.   
This policy change resulted from informal correspondence between government 
ministers. This exchange culminated in a pressing question put by Roy Hattersley to James 
Callaghan: “If the worst happens and the Russians get bases in Portugal what do we do?”650 
The response is recorded in scrawled handwriting on the letter, “I don’t know the answer.” 651 
As a result, there was an urgent policy review, conducted by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir John 
Killick. This was clearly influenced by his briefing document written at the time for a 
forthcoming House of Lords debate on relations with the Soviet Union.
652
 The review 
concluded that “we think we can best help further progress towards a greater degree of 
democracy in Portugal by continuing our policy of building up a constructive relationship 
with the new forces in Portuguese society.”653 In order to achieve this strategy, he stressed 
that “We shall pursue this both by bilateral contacts and by using our influence where 
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appropriate in western organisations.”654 The opportunity to do so was presented by a 
“forthcoming crescendo of meetings” between the western allies.655 This was the first time 
since the April Revolution that policy towards Portugal was decided at Cabinet level.
656
 The 
correspondence between ministers demonstrates that events in Lisbon were being followed 
closely, even by those for whom foreign policy was not an immediate concern.  
The Labour Government’s strategy of maintaining influence within the provisional 
government made it difficult to publically support the PSP. The power struggle between 
radical left and moderates following the constituent assembly elections meant that any 
contact by the Labour Government with the PSP might disrupt relations with the Portuguese 
Government. Therefore on occasions, despite its recent electoral success, the Labour 
Government publicly maintained distance from the PSP. Killick informed the FCO that 
Callaghan “does not repeat not want us to get into a position of advising Dr Soares on how he 
should play his hand.”657 As a result the USA and West Germany replaced the Labour 
Government as the PSP’s principal supporters, which encouraged them to work together on 
Portugal, and reduced Britain’s influence further.658    
The Labour Government’s policy of engagement with the provisional government 
also meant that measures suggested to reduce Portugal’s access to sensitive information 
within NATO were opposed. The United States had argued since the April Revolution that 
the presence of PCP ministers in government compromised the Alliance’s security and that 
the forthcoming Helsinki Summit meant a resolution of the issue became critical, because 
“Portuguese membership of the MBFR Ad Hoc Group could, if NATO’s intentions were 
passed by the Portuguese to the Soviet Union, prejudice the Alliance’s objectives in these 
negotiations.”659 The Labour Government, however, believed that placing restrictions on the 
Portuguese delegation could antagonise Lisbon and Portuguese public opinion to such an 
extent that it might withdraw from the NATO alliance. To avoid this scenario, the FCO 
argued, the western alliance “would have to balance the losses arising from the possibility of 
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continued (but at a slightly lower) leakage of information to the Soviets against the political 
and military value of continued Portuguese participation in the Alliance.”660 This led the 
Labour Government to conclude that “whatever doubts we might have privately about the 
future of Portugal,” in public, “we should behave to the Portuguese as if we had confidence in 
them.” 661  
The first opportunity for the Labour Government to raise events in Portugal with the 
government in Lisbon was at a NATO Summit in Brussels. The aim of the gathering was to 
improve relations between the allies prior to negotiations with the Soviet Union at the 
Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
662
 The Labour Government 
worked assiduously to ensure that its strategy of constructive relations with the provisional 
government would succeed. During a meeting in Washington to establish a common 
approach to the Brussels Summit, Wilson and Callaghan presented their plan to influence the 
new government in Lisbon.
663
 Although receiving a sympathetic response from Kissinger, a 
State Department minute, passed to the FCO by the US Ambassador, revealed his scepticism: 
“He himself did not believe that the way to help the moderates was to support the radicals, 
but he would let the British have a run at their policy and he had no alternative to offer.”664 
However, the British Ambassador in Washington stressed that the “pessimistic view of the 
future of Portugal is not shared at all levels of the State Department, nor by the US 
Ambassador in Lisbon.”665 This demonstrates that close institutional ties enabled an 
awareness of US bureaucratic politics, but this was only used to facilitate British diplomacy 
and not to influence the Washington policy debate. 
There was a realisation amongst British officials that a successful outcome to their 
meeting with the Portuguese delegation in Brussels would depend on the offer of economic 
aid. The FCO pressured the Treasury to consider this, arguing that “We should give the 
Portuguese what help we can bilaterally in the way of financial and technical assistance, and 
encourage international agencies to give as positive a response to their requests as 
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possible.”666 However, the Treasury opposed the provision of bilateral aid, maintaining that 
Britain’s economic problems made this impossible. The Labour Government accordingly 
went to the Brussels Summit without having an offer of substantial economic assistance and 
the British delegation was therefore denied the most effective means, given Portugal’s 
economic circumstances, of influencing the political process in Lisbon. The failure to support 
political strategy with economic diplomacy contrasted with the provision by the United States 
and by West Germany of substantial bilateral aid throughout this period.
667
  
By the time the NATO allies gathered in Brussels summit proceedings were 
overshadowed by the seriousness of the situation in Lisbon. An Economist editorial argued, 
“The fear that Portugal might slide irrevocably into being a left-wing dictatorship, and the 
possibility that similar things might happen in other European countries, require a new 
definition of what the alliance is trying to do in Europe.”668 A desperate Soares pressured 
western allies to confront the Portuguese delegation, demanding that the west “fight a bit for 
Portuguese democracy.”669 The British decided to raise their concerns with the Portuguese 
delegation during a private bilateral meeting rather than at the open forums within the 
summit, as did other NATO members. However, despite this sensitivity towards the 
Portuguese delegation, there remained insuperable obstacles to establishing constructive 
relations with the provisional government. The Portuguese raised the issue of British press 
coverage of events in Lisbon, leading the British delegation to defend the BBC’s editorial 
independence. The Portuguese also requested that the withdrawal of British capital, seen as 
an “economic boycott,” or, “economic sabotage,” should be countered through the provision 
of bilateral aid. Killick later concluded that the bilateral meeting “probably leaves us better 
placed with the Portuguese than anybody else”, but warned that “our capacity to deliver the 
kind of outside assistance they are liable to ask us for is unlikely to measure up to their 
expectations.”670  
After the Brussels Summit the Labour Government considered whether to continue 
working closely with the United States on Portugal. The British were concerned at the 
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willingness of the US to contemplate Portugal’s withdrawal from NATO.671 The existence of 
“considerable suspicion of the US in Portugal” meant that Britain’s policy of engagement 
with the provisional government was hindered by close Anglo-American relations.
672
 There 
was also concern at Washington’s inconsistent approach, the FCO noting that it “has shown a 
tendency to adopt a wait and see attitude, interrupted by occasional sudden rushes 
forward.”673 The Labour Government therefore made the decision to withhold sensitive 
information from the US on Portugal (which did not happen at any other stage of the 
revolution); an FCO official noted that “Reservations about some recent developments, and 
doubts about the future, are best kept to ourselves. We do not wish gloomy prophecies to 
become self-fulfilling.”674 However, because wider relations with Washington were of greater 
concern than events in Portugal, the FCO continued to facilitate US diplomacy in Lisbon. 
Kissinger’s later acceptance that support for the PSP was the only means to promote US 
interests in Portugal gave west European social democratic movements (including the Labour 
Party) a prominent role in US policy.
675
 
 The Labour Government welcomed the results of the April elections believing these 
validated its confidence that despite recent political instability in Lisbon an eventual 
democratic outcome in Portugal was likely. However, after the elections the direction of 
events in Lisbon alarmed the Labour Government, not least because they directly threatened 
British business interests. This made it essential to maintain constructive relations with the 
provisional government, but the approach was undermined by Britain’s failure to provide 
substantial economic assistance. The integrity of the NATO alliance after the appointment of 
communist ministers into the provisional government meant the Cold War now became the 
principal concern of the Labour leadership in Portugal. Although this meant Britain and the 
USA now shared the same concerns with events in Lisbon, their approach to Portugal 
continued to differ.  
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The República Affair    
The power struggle between the PCP and PSP began after violent clashes took place 
between armed supporters during May Day celebrations in Lisbon. Serious unrest ensued, the 
economy spiralled out of control, government services largely ceased functioning and the 
overseas territories were close to civil war. The worst and most symbolic confrontation 
occurred at the offices of the socialist aligned República newspaper, the last significant media 
organisation outside the control of the PCP; communist sympathisers occupied its premises, 
leading to an armed standoff with PSP supporters throughout the following weeks.
676
 The 
República affair demonstrated the strength of each movement and came to symbolise 
competing visions for Portugal’s future. Although the power struggle led to Soares’ 
resignation from the provisional government on the 17
th
 July, he was able to skilfully exploit 
the crisis to attract Western European support.
677
 The PCP had been politically weakened the 
most, being blamed for the violence and anarchy in Lisbon, while moderate elements within 
the armed forces council bolstered their claims to be the guardians of public order against the 
PCP and other elements of the radical left.   
The Labour Government’s policy of engaging with the provisional government was 
now increasingly at variance with the direction of events. As the situation deteriorated Soares 
contacted London to request a “strong statement in support of the party and genuine 
democracy.”678 However, the need to maintain constructive relations with the provisional 
government, an FCO official explained, meant that “the hyper-sensitivity shown by 
Portuguese leaders” required the Labour Government “to show sympathy and understanding 
for their problems,” leading inexorably to a position where “we may have to befriend them 
more than their treatment of the democratic parties deserves.”679 During this critical period, 
contact with Soares was made through the British Embassy in Lisbon rather than by Labour 
ministers directly, as had been the case during all previous political crises since the April 
Revolution. Soares’ resignation as Foreign Minister meant that there was no longer the 
opportunity for regular contact during official business. Callaghan was distracted by the 
referendum campaign on EEC membership, with normal government business disrupted by 
the suspension of Cabinet collective ministerial responsibility.
680
 Within the FCO there was 
                                                             
676 For an account of the República crisis see, Manuel, The Uncertain Outcome, pp 101-103.  
677 Gomes and Moreira, Carlucci vs Kissinger, pp. 212-220. Mario Del Pero,‘'Which Chile, Allende?', pp.642. 
678 Trench to FCO, ‘NATO Summit,’6 June 1975, FCO 9/2290. 
679 ‘Briefing Note - NATO Summit: Brussels,’ 29 May 1975, FCO 9/2289.  
680 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp. 658-9. 
159 
 
once again concern about the effectiveness of the Lisbon Embassy. Their reporting of events 
was considered insufficiently regular, accurate or comprehensive; an FCO official pleaded 
that “What we need, and need it badly, is brief reporting to let us know apparently what is 
going on.”681 There was concern amongst officials that during crucial episodes, “we had to 
rely on reports in the Times.”682  
Although close institutional ties continued between the United States and the Labour 
Government they differed significantly in their approach to Portugal. The US was 
increasingly concerned with the wider international implications of events in Portugal. 
During a visit to Washington, a State Department official shared with Foreign Office minister 
Roy Hattersley “more general Administration concern about the evidence of a left-ward trend 
in European politics which might be in the direction of neutralism.”683 This led to the 
somewhat ominous conclusion that “If NATO’s defensive resolve was to be maintained, a 
line might have to be drawn to show the limits beyond which developments on the 
Portuguese model would not be tolerated in the Alliance.”684 By contrast, the Labour 
Government continued to maintain that Portugal’s membership of NATO was more 
important than any wider political implications for the western alliance. The US was also 
concerned with the impact of the power struggle in Lisbon on the outcome of events in 
Angola, but there is no archival evidence that similar concerns shaped British policy.
685
  
The Labour Government became aware of the attitude of the Ford administration 
towards British policy through the release of a ‘missing message’ by the US Embassy. The 
message had been sent by Kissinger to Callaghan on the 22
nd
 May, but concerned officials in 
London, dismayed by its undiplomatic tone, delayed its despatch until after the Brussels 
Summit. In the message Kissinger informed Callaghan that he had supported British policy 
“hardly out of conviction,” but because “we are unable to wean our European friends from 
their illusions.” He speculated, “I wonder, if Soares is finally put down, if the Europeans will 
try to find another ‘moderate’ dark horse until finally the left-wing, Communist supported 
neutralist dictatorship is there in place as an example for others to follow in Western 
Europe.”686 The analysis of the British Ambassador in Washington suggested that “The short-
temperedness of his message no doubt reflected a momentary fit of exasperation over the way 
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in which we were combining with his officials to urge on him a course of action in which he 
did not believe.”687 He strongly advised that “It might be politic, however, to avoid keeping 
on at him too much on the subject through personal messages.”688 Throughout the critical 
period that followed, Callaghan contacted Kissinger to discuss Portugal on fewer occasions. 
During the República affair, the conflict between Kissinger and the State Department 
on policy towards the Portuguese Revolution was resolved, leading to a programme of 
support for political moderates in Lisbon.
689
 The return of Ambassador Carlucci to Lisbon 
after a period of ill-health reinvigorated US diplomacy.
690
 He established contact with a 
group of officers within the AFM, led by Melo Antunes, who wanted a government 
established with an electoral mandate. There was a new strategy of energetically building 
relations with the moderate parties in Portugal including, despite its previous aversion, the 
PSP.
691
 The tarnished reputation of the US in Portugal, following previous interventions, 
meant assistance for political moderates was channelled through west European social 
democratic parties and trade unions, including the Socialist International; this approach 
restored the close ties between the US and the moderate left in Western Europe, established 
during the first phase of the Cold War.
692
 Despite Britain’s excellent contacts in Portugal and 
close partisan ties with the PSP, the US decided to operate through other West European 
states, principally West Germany, Netherlands and Sweden.
693
 Therefore the evolution of US 
policy towards Portugal marked a turning point in the Labour Government’s role in Lisbon. 
Since the April Revolution the Labour Government had often taken the lead in diplomacy 
with the Portuguese and this had been actively encouraged by the United States. However, 
the seriousness of the political situation in Portugal over the summer of 1975 meant that the 
US and other western states now sought to become directly involved in the active support of 
political moderates. The participation of other western powers meant that the Labour 
Government became less significant as an ally of the PSP and the policy of continuing to 
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maintain constructive relations with the provisional government further accelerated this 
process.   
 
 The making of British policy towards Portugal was affected by the ideological 
factionalism within the Labour Party during Wilson’s final term. The attempt to support 
moderate parties and protect British businesses, whilst ensuring the integrity of the NATO 
alliance, was fiercely criticised by those who favoured a democratic socialist outcome in 
Portugal.
694
 These criticisms were made most forcefully by members of the International 
Department of the National Executive Committee. This body challenged the government to 
uphold the internationalist aspirations of the recent Labour Party manifesto, rather than revert 
to an agenda set by a foreign policy establishment of Whitehall mandarins, Fleet Street and 
business corporations. The International Department requested access to all recent 
communications with Lisbon, and submitted a report critical of government policy. This 
recorded that bias within the British press meant that events in Portugal were “set against a 
background of hysteria in Western Europe and the United States.” 695 The International 
Committee concluded that Judith Hart should visit Lisbon during the summer recess and 
report her findings on her return.
696
 Therefore, as the power struggle in Lisbon intensified, an 
alternative view of events was held by several members of the Labour Government.  
The threat to British interests increased as the situation in Portugal deteriorated. A 
greater number of British citizens raised their concerns with the Lisbon Embassy, leading the 
Ambassador to report that “I do fear that the point is approaching at which real trouble may 
break out. Hence my preoccupation with the British community on which I am spending a 
disproportionate time at present.”697 As a result there was increased lobbying by private 
citizens, businesses and their interest groups in Westminster. In particular, a series of 
parliamentary questions was raised by Conservative Party MPs. However, although leading 
government time to be spent on resolving specific concerns, such lobbying did not directly 
influence overall policy on Portugal which remained focused on promoting democracy and 
maintaining the integrity of the NATO alliance. The British Ambassador, responding to the 
FCO’s request for more regular and accurate despatches, now reported not only on the power 
struggle in Lisbon but also on the unfolding crisis elsewhere. In marked contrast to the 
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optimistic tone of the Ambassador’s reporting immediately after the constituent assembly 
election, his despatches became increasingly pessimistic, including the bleak conclusion “I 
discounted the likelihood of a civil war, because I could not see who would be fighting 
whom; now a division does seem to be taking shape.”698  
The relationship with the provisional government was also affected by the importance 
of the British media’s coverage of events in Portugal. As the most trustworthy source of 
news, particularly after the radical left monopolised state media, it once again played a 
crucial role in shaping public discourse.
699
 Inevitably individual reports and articles by 
British journalists caused offence to leading Portuguese politicians. The controller of 
European Services at the BBC, Alexander Lieven, reported that when comments on Portugal 
were broadcast from “‘The Times,’ ‘The Daily Telegraph,’ ‘The Guardian,’ ‘The Economist,’ 
etc, this material is more often than not critical of present trends in Portugal, and, as such, 
unwelcome to those in power there.”700 The BBC World Service, the most trusted and 
reliable source of information in Portugal, caused the greatest difficulty for the Labour 
Government. The British Ambassador reported that Soares emphasised “the importance of 
maintaining the impartiality of the BBC Portuguese Language Service, to which the 
population were turning again, as in the days of fascism, for an objective account of what is 
happening here.”701 The criticism the BBC received from across the political spectrum 
initially reassured Bush House that reporting was politically neutral. But ensuring this was 
maintained proved difficult because of a reliance on a small number of native speakers whose 
ideological views and level of political engagement was largely unknown. Lieven confessed 
that “our Portuguese staff are themselves far from immune from the fiery enthusiasms and 
ferocious fractious factional disputes which grip their fellow intellectuals at home.”702 This 
was a problem exacerbated by spending cuts which prevented further recruitment of 
Portuguese language specialists and made maintaining discipline amongst existing workers 
more difficult.  
There were a number of incidents when the impartiality of the BBC World Service 
coverage was criticised, but an occasion when delivery of a broadcast was disrupted by 
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audible laughter within the studio (during an interview with a moderate politician, whilst the 
interviewer wore a symbol of a far-left party in Portugal
703
) brought the issue of impartiality 
to the fore, triggering criticism in broadsheet editorials and a Westminster parliamentary 
debate.
704
 Therefore the significant role of the BBC in Portuguese public discourse did not 
translate into tangible influence; indeed there were occasions when British diplomacy was 
instead undermined by reporting. Because editorial impartiality was its essential appeal to the 
Portuguese public, the Labour Government could not, despite some internal discussion to the 
contrary, influence its output. Thus the BBC was not the immediate asset for British foreign 
policy which its importance in the Carnation Revolution suggests. The editorial independence 
of the BBC meant that it could not be used as an instrument of British foreign policy through 
direct appeals to Portuguese public opinion, although there was debate within the FCO over 
whether control of World Service funding enabled this. As a result the Labour Government, 
despite having the opportunity, did not go beyond the traditional instruments of state 
diplomacy to influence events in Portugal.
705
  
The Labour Government’s policy of engagement with the provisional government 
following the coup d’état attempt was based on the view that there had been a backlash 
against the moderate parties in favour of the radical left amongst the Portuguese populace. It 
sought to explain to the provisional government at the Brussels Summit the implications of 
any action which might compromise its membership of NATO, but tried at the same time to 
avoid needlessly antagonising the provisional government by raising issues relating to British 
interests or support for the moderate parties. The Labour Government’s approach had only 
the tacit support of the Ford Administration, which doubted its likely effectiveness and 
consequently, alongside its inability to support its diplomacy with bilateral economic aid, 
Britain was unable to pursue an effective policy during the period that followed the 
constituent assembly elections. The Labour Government’s analysis meant that it failed to 
fully understand the implications of the elections, despite the British Embassy’s realisation 
“that backlash has itself generated a further reaction in the direction of moderation, among 
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the populace.”706 The Labour Government remained committed to Soares and the PSP as it 
had been since the April Revolution, but policy after the constituent assembly elections 
weakened this relationship, and did so as the US and other west European states offered 
unambiguous diplomatic and financial support. However, Portugal’s future was not yet 
decided; as the British Ambassador observed, “Nevertheless, there was still a long way to go 
before the effervescence prevailing throughout the country could be neutralised”.707 
 
The ‘Hot Summer’  
 The power struggle between the PSP and PCP culminated in Soares’ decision to 
withdraw from the provisional government on the 15
th
 July in protest at proposals to 
institutionalise the role of the armed services in government, which the PSP considered “a 
frontal attack on the democratic institutions and preparing the way for an eventual communist 
dictatorship.”708 The PCP made a final attempt to seize power in Lisbon, rallying their 
supporters among the political parties and AFM, but were fiercely resisted by an unwieldy 
coalition of moderate and Maoist political parties and their opponents within the armed 
forces; each side organised a series of strikes and demonstrations throughout Portugal, while 
the PCP organised land seizures in the Alentejo region in the south.
709
 This crisis culminated 
in a dramatic live television debate between Cunhal, the PCP leader, and Soares.
710
 The 
communists’ attempt to seize power ended with the release of an AFM communiqué on the 
21
st
 June, which signalled that they would remain committed to political pluralism for 
Portugal. A second political crisis followed within the AFM between those with alternative 
visions for Portugal’s future: direct democracy or pluralistic democracy.711 By the autumn, 
armed groups confronted each other on the streets of Lisbon, as divisions within the AFM 
threatened a civil war throughout Portugal. The political chaos in Lisbon brought near 
anarchy throughout Portugal (coined the ‘Hot Summer’ by contemporary observers) and 
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almost led to economic collapse, exacerbated by the problem of assimilating Portuguese 
nationals returning rapidly from the overseas territories.
712
 
The British Embassy greeted developments with confusion and alarm. Everyday 
business was increasingly disrupted by events, with more time spent protecting British 
citizens and their interests. The fluid political environment made accurate reporting difficult. 
As the political situation deteriorated, the Ambassador complained that “In the feverish 
political atmosphere which has prevailed for the past ten days, it is difficult to determine the 
weight to be given to the many, often conflicting, reports reaching us.”713 There was 
mounting concern at the dominant position of the radical left in Lisbon, the Ambassador 
reaching the conclusion that “So we are faced with a scenario which is either totally gloomy 
or highly dangerous, depending on whether one considers the slide to Communist-dominated 
military rule to be likely to progress unresisted, or to provoke effective opposition.”714 The 
British Embassy continued to maintain, however, that eventually the political moderates 
would achieve power. The significance of the AFM communiqué was immediately 
recognised, an FCO official arguing, “This was a crucial event in the development of the 
Portuguese Revolution.”715 The Ambassador, rather than recommending changes to British 
policy and believing there was little scope for effective intervention, concluded, “I confess 
that, beyond the very limited types of action which we have been discussing – visits, aid, etc 
– I do not see that there are many options open to us.”716 It followed that, unlike the 
American Embassy, which actively intervened in the political process, the British Embassy 
instead gave “a high priority to examining the troubles and possible dangers facing the British 
Community.”717 The British Ambassador in Lisbon sent detailed despatches to London 
outlining incidents of harassment, intimidation and the takeover by workers of many British 
businesses, and recommended that “Strong representation should be made to the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister about the difficulties being experienced by foreign firms and nationals.”718  
The Labour Government’s initial reaction to developments in Portugal was to 
maintain existing policy. An FCO official reiterated that Britain must “keep in touch with the 
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moderate elements in Portuguese life and give them what legitimate support and 
encouragement we may,” whilst attempting to “pursue contacts with some of the more radical 
and influential members of the AFM who still have fairly open minds,”719 Such contact 
reassured the Labour Government as to the direction of events in Portugal. A meeting on the 
4
th
 July between Hattersley and Major Alves revealed that “radical solutions were being 
considered, but things would change and more moderate compromises would emerge.”720 
During a meeting held in London on 27
th
 June, Callaghan was impressed by the newly 
appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Major Melo Antunes, who “came across as an earnest, 
intelligent and forceful person who wished to create in Portugal a democratic socialist 
society.”721After the meeting he informed Kissinger “that those within who favoured 
totalitarianism were vocal but not the majority within the AFM.”722 However, as the political 
crisis worsened, the Labour Government came under pressure from Soares to give more 
active assistance to the moderate parties. On the night of his resignation from the provisional 
government, he called at the British Ambassador’s private residence to urge the Labour 
Government not to attend the Helsinki Summit as a protest at the Soviet Union’s role in 
recent events and, alongside its western allies, to organise military manoeuvres in Portugal. 
He also called on the Labour Party to support the PSP by providing greater funding.
723
 
During the following weeks, as the situation in Lisbon deteriorated, a clandestine meeting 
was arranged with the Embassy where Soares revealed, through an emissary, that “he 
expected a left-wing coup within the next few days,” and that “he was determined to resist 
and start an underground movement.”724 An associate of Soares later clarified “He meant 
money and maybe even arms.”725 These meetings, during periods of greatest uncertainty, 
reveal that Soares continued to consider the Labour Government a close ally despite the 
continued moderation of its policies.
726
  
The Secretary of the Conservative Foreign Affairs Committee, Winston Churchill 
MP, urged the Labour Government to give greater assistance to the moderate parties in 
Portugal. He had been persuaded by Soares during a visit to Portugal that the PCP was 
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receiving substantial support from the Soviet Union.
727
 He was approached by British 
businessmen involved with trade to Portugal, who asked what constructive help they could 
offer the democratic parties there. His advice, he revealed in a private meeting with 
Callaghan, was that “the only party worth supporting in the immediate term was the Socialist 
Party,” which meant that “This would have to come seemingly from the Labour Party.”728 On 
the 25
th
 July he spoke about Portugal to Wilson, who, agreeing to his proposal, “thought that 
it may be possible to arrange some means of getting funds to Portugal.”729 However, Tom 
McNally MP, representing the Labour Party, remained sceptical, protesting to Callaghan that 
“It is not an original idea and we have no evidence that Mario Soares is at the moment hard 
up for cash.”730 Harold Wilson’s motivation, he implied, was party political, because during a 
recent parliamentary foreign policy debate on détente, the Conservative spokesman had 
raised the issue of Portugal. He observed, “Churchill is well able to generate publicity and 
may therefore need to be treated carefully.”731 Callaghan’s decision to endorse the proposal 
was partly political; so as to maintain the Labour Government’s distance from the initiative, 
he was emphatic that “any funds he collects should be sent to Hayward direct – not through 
me.” 732 The decision to review financial support for the PSP did not signal a change in 
Labour Government policy, and there remained scepticism as to whether any intervention 
would be effective. There is no documentary record in the National Archive or the Labour 
Party Archive that the Labour Government did encourage British businesses to support the 
PSP during the Portuguese Revolution, suggesting that this was an initiative that either did 
not transpire, or only involved private individuals on a small scale. 
The Ford Administration’s decision to support the moderate political parties in 
Portugal brought pressure on the Labour Government to do the same. Throughout the ‘Hot 
Summer’ concern increased in Washington at developments in Portugal and their 
international implications. The appointment to the overseas territories of administrators 
sympathetic to Marxist national liberation movements meant that they received support prior 
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to independence. A visit to Cuba by the influential AFM leader Carvalho Otelo at the end of 
July raised serious concerns in Washington, leading to the return of Ambassador Carlucci to 
discuss developments in Portugal with Kissinger on the 11
th
 August.
733
 The Ford 
Administration decided to intervene more actively in Portuguese politics to prevent further 
radicalisation. Soares was now considered the best hope for pluralistic democracy and given 
unambiguous assistance.
734
 Likewise the moderate Antunes group within the AFM received 
direct support and advice.
735
  
However, the exact nature of US intervention remains unclear, particularly the role of 
the CIA, its relationship with the Catholic Church and right-wing nationalist groups in the 
Azores.
736
 There are a number of files from the CIA’s 40 Committee which refer to ‘covert 
action’, including one document in which Kissinger comments, “I am not so much against a 
coup as such, shocking as it may sound to some of my colleagues.”737 However, these 
documents are heavily redacted, the remaining sections are concerned with the programme of 
support to Soares and Antunes. Kissinger rejected many 40 Committee proposals (although 
their details are not specified) arguing, “Well frankly I regard a $1.3 million program as an 
amateurish operation. It just amounts to permitting everybody to cover his ass and being able 
to say he did something.”738 He commented in exasperation, “why not come up with an 
effective program and we will get the money we need. I still regard this Forty Committee 
paper as an amateurish, high school kind of program.”739 It appears that Kissinger was willing 
to support a more substantial covert operation but he did not receive adequate proposals for 
such a programme. This suggests the administration was operating under political constraints 
in Washington which made planning for covert operations difficult. There is nothing in the 
British archival record to suggest that the Labour Government was aware of discussions on 
covert operations by the Ford administration during this period. 
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The Ford Administration sought to coordinate closely with its western allies on 
relations with Portugal.
740
 State Department official asked Sir John Killick, during a meeting 
between Callaghan and Kissinger, “if the Americans could have advance notice of statements 
by HMG of political significance on Portugal.”741 The US approach to Portugal had become 
broadly similar to that of the Labour Government: to provide financial assistance to the PSP 
and to encourage political moderates within the AFM. Callaghan had received Major Antunes 
in London on the 27
th
 June and expressed support for his political position. However, the 
Labour Government remained sceptical as to whether intervention in Portugal would be 
effective. There was even concern that direct intervention by the US might prove 
counterproductive. During a Cabinet meeting Callaghan raised “a possibility that the 
Communist Party, with the backing of some of the members of the AFM, might stage a left-
wing coup ostensibly to forestall intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.”742 
However, the close institutional ties between Britain and America enabled public differences 
on policy to be avoided, with particularly close cooperation between their Ambassadors in 
Lisbon.
743
    
There were, however, differences between Britain and the United States on Portugal’s 
membership of NATO, which were exacerbated by attempts to achieve a common 
negotiating position at the Helsinki Summit.
744
 In particular the issue of whether to allow any 
discussion of a new generation of tactical nuclear weapons threatened to end the carefully 
constructed consensus reached in late 1974 whereby Lisbon was excluded from any 
discussion of nuclear issues.
745
 The West European members continued to argue that whilst 
Portugal’s membership might compromise NATO’s security, the geopolitical implications of 
its withdrawal from the alliance was the greater threat to western interests.
746
 The State 
Department remained sympathetic to the West European position. Indeed tacit support was 
given by certain officials to their counterparts in the FCO, encouraging them to maintain their 
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opposition to the Ford Administration.
747
 Kissinger became increasingly insistent that the 
issue be resolved because of the dominant position of the radical left in Lisbon and as a result 
the decision was made to restrict NATO allies’ access to nuclear secrets.748 This outcome, an 
FCO official noted, although affecting Britain less “because of our special arrangements with 
the Americans”, meant that “it tends to reduce the effectiveness of allied cooperation.”749 
During the Hot Summer the Labour Government’s policy towards Portugal was 
fiercely opposed by left-wing MPs within the Labour Party.
750
 The most sustained and 
informed criticism was made by maverick MPs of the International Department of the NEC, 
who were committed to a radical, internationalist British foreign policy. The Labour 
Government was criticised for primarily being concerned with ensuring that Portugal 
remained a NATO member. There was also scepticism as to whether the PSP remained a 
socialist party, and should therefore receive support rather than the more left-wing parties in 
Lisbon. The Secretary of the International Committee, Jenny Little, argued against further 
contact with the PSP, believing “that we should stay aloof for a time until matters had 
cleared.”751 The Ford Administration’s role in Portugal was viewed through the prism of 
previous covert operations to thwart democratic socialist revolutions, particularly Chile in 
1973. That the Conservative Party MP Winston Churchill was an enthusiastic exponent of the 
Socialist International’s role in Portugal increased suspicion of its activities.752 
Judith Hart and Jenny Little made separate visits to Lisbon on behalf of the 
International Committee during August 1975. On their return they wrote reports critical of 
western policy which were widely disseminated across the Labour Party.
753
 The reporting of 
events in Portugal by western media was criticised for a bias against socialism, including the 
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BBC World Service, where “press comment follows orthodox conservative patterns.”754 The 
notes and personal correspondence made by Judith Hart during her visit reveal the full extent 
to which she privately opposed government policy. As an ardent advocate of democratic 
socialism, she expressed admiration for the radical left: “We are impressed by the strength 
and unity of the movement for democracy and socialism in Portugal, and by the experiments 
here in direct democracy”755 She was dismissive of the PSP, arguing that “Portugal is in a 
revolutionary situation, but the PS is doing nothing which is revolutionary,” and that there 
was “No middle way of social democracy in Portugal.”756 The United States’ policy was 
viewed with suspicion; “Ford must support capital,” she argued, which meant that “There is 
no question of a threat to political freedom, except from the Right.” Developments in 
Portugal were seen from a wider radical perspective where “If Portugal stays left; if Spain 
crumbles; if Italy goes; and then, even, France – what is Europe then? And what happens in 
Britain?”757 These views were not included within her published report; prior to the meeting 
of the International Committee on the 9
th
 September there was a request that she “would 
prefer to report verbally to the Committee on certain aspects. The subject is too delicate to 
risk leaks.”758  
The impact of events in Portugal was raised during Cabinet discussion of the 
forthcoming Helsinki Summit.
759
 Before the meeting Soares appealed to the Labour 
Government that “NATO should put it to the Soviet Union that the future of détente was 
threatened by the course the Portuguese Communists were adopting” and that Moscow 
should be asked “to restrain the Portuguese Communist Party, which was something they 
certainly had the power to do.”760 The Conservative opposition raised the subject of Portugal 
during a House of Commons debate on the forthcoming Helsinki Summit, its Foreign Affairs 
spokesman, MP Winston Churchill, noting that “the conference will also be taking place 
against the background of the substantial and recent victories of the Soviet Union and her 
allies in South East Asia, and what I believe to be clear interference by the Soviet Union in 
the internal affairs of our NATO ally, Portugal.”761 The Labour Government was also lobbied 
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by the Labour MP Ian Mikardo, following a meeting of the Socialist International. He briefed 
the Prime Minister that “it had been agreed that they should approach their respective party 
leaders to suggest that they should use Soviet anxiety about the CSCE Summit as a lever to 
induce the Russians to use their influence in turn on the Portuguese leadership to behave in a 
more responsible fashion.”762 As a result the outcome of events in Portugal was now 
considered a litmus test of wider Soviet attitudes toward détente, and during the final weeks 
before the Helsinki conference the Labour Government sought to coordinate policy towards 
the Soviet Union and the PCP with other western states. 
Developments in Portugal were discussed by political leaders at the European Council 
meeting held on the 16
th
 and 17
th
 July. Initially, these centred on calls to provide EEC funds to the 
provisional government, and this was strongly supported by the Labour Government as a solution 
to its economic difficulties in supplying bilateral aid. However, the French Government refused to 
allow economic aid to Portugal while communist ministers were in government. Its position 
differed because it had no partisan ties to the PSP, unlike other leading member states, and there 
was concern that this might further legitimise the increasingly popular French Communist Party. 
But there was serious concern at the geopolitical threat to France were a communist-influenced 
government to be established on the Iberian Peninsula, an outcome which “would be intolerable 
and would require a diplomatic and possibly other reactions.”763 This meant that the French 
delegation in Brussels accepted that events in Portugal should be raised with the Soviet Union 
during the Helsinki Summit. It was agreed that the British and French should make a joint 
approach to the Soviet delegation. This decision originated from its failure to reach a consensus 
on material assistance to the provisional government and also concern that this would lead to a 
loss of influence in Portugal at a critical moment. 
 
The Helsinki Summit 
The conference held in Helsinki between the 29
th
 July and 1
st
 August 1975 was the 
final stage of the CSCE process. A gathering of thirty-five heads of state signed a declaration 
of principle which covered a myriad range of issues (organised into ‘Baskets’), including an 
agreement to accept Europe’s post-war borders, non-interference in sovereign affairs and 
wider transnational issues such as political rights and human contacts. Both contemporary 
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observers and historians refer to the summit as the ‘high-point’ of détente, whilst recent 
interpretations of the Cold War stress the effect of its human rights provisions on the eventual 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.
764
 Despite Harold Wilson’s commanding opening 
speech to the Helsinki Summit (the choice of the Prime Minister was arbitrary), the Labour 
Government’s involvement was limited compared with that of other western allies, reflecting 
its more sceptical attitude towards east-west détente.
765
  
The previous section has shown that Portugal became an essential element in Britain’s 
final planning for the Helsinki Summit. A discussion ensued within the Labour Government 
on how to raise Portugal with Soviet leaders during the CSCE conference. They sought to 
coordinate their approach with the French Government, whilst informing the Ford 
Administration of their actions. A request was sent to the British Embassy in Paris to “Please 
tell the Quai d’Orsay that we will be grateful to know the lines along which they are speaking 
to Brezhnev. Did they envisage both the Prime Minister and Giscard having a joint meeting 
with Mr Brezhnev (as distinct from their respective bilateral)?”766 The Labour Government’s 
position hardened after receiving further alarming reports from the British Embassy in Lisbon 
including Soares’ direct appeals for western intervention.767 Although they had always sought 
to coordinate their approach with other western allies, having received no response from the 
French Government they were now prepared to raise Portugal with the Soviet Union 
unilaterally. 
The importance attached to events in Portugal by the British delegation in Helsinki 
was also affected by last minute changes to its personnel. FCO officials who had participated 
in the CSCE process from its inception were initially prominent. The international 
significance of the conference, however, alongside the limited number of places offered to 
each delegation by the host nation, led to their being replaced by FCO permanent under-
secretaries. This brought complaints that “There are a large number of people on this 
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delegation whose connection with the CSCE is minimal or, in the case of some of the 
secretaries, whose involvement has been brief and inglorious.”768 These officials were more 
likely to demonstrate the attitude of those described by a recent historian as ‘Cold Warriors’, 
who were sceptical of Soviet intentions and played a prominent role after the events of the 
11th March in the formulation of policy towards Portugal.
769
 The personnel change to the 
British delegation undoubtedly contributed to developments in Lisbon being seen within a 
wider east-west context.  
The discussion within the Labour Government on how to raise events in Portugal was 
also “complicated by the uncertainty about who on the Portuguese side will be at 
Helsinki.”770 If political moderates were present any intervention would need to be judicious 
or their position would be compromised. A debate ensued as to whether to raise events in 
Portugal during open sessions or bilateral meetings at Helsinki. The decision was made that 
during the opening of the summit “The Prime Minister will probably not mention Portugal by 
name in his public speech given inter alia the possibility of a riposte from the Portuguese.”771 
It was also agreed that “A decision will need to wait until nearer Stage III, when we have a 
clear idea of the situation on the ground in Portugal.”772 In the event, the makeup of the 
Portuguese delegation was not confirmed until the 29
th
 July (the day of their scheduled 
bilateral meeting), although even then it remained unclear who the foreign minister would 
be.
773
  
The uncertainty within the Labour Government meant that the British delegation 
arrived in Helsinki without having reached agreement on how events in Portugal would be 
raised with the Soviet Union. Despite a series of meetings with other western allies at the 
beginning of the conference, the British delegation made no attempt to coordinate its 
approach on Portugal. During a bilateral meeting with the US delegation on the 30
th
 July 
events in Lisbon were not raised, whilst at the European political committee meeting on the 
same day, although Portugal was considered (alongside the Arab-Israeli conflict), the focus 
was on the forthcoming meeting in Stockholm.
774
 The British delegation awaited 
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communication from their French counterparts on Portugal, but none was forthcoming. The 
Labour Government’s decision to raise events was therefore made without consultation with 
western allies.
775
 Callaghan eventually resolved that during the bilateral meeting with the 
Soviet Union, “we should probably make a direct reference”, believing that “the cardinal 
point is that the kind of situation which exists in Portugal has got to be cleared up if détente is 
to prosper or have any real meaning.”776 His dilemma, however, was also to ensure that 
“Whatever is said to the Russians will be couched in such a way as to make our point as 
effectively as possible without in any way jeopardising the Conference.”777  
At the Helsinki Summit events in Lisbon were raised during bilateral meetings with 
the Portuguese and Soviet delegations. During a meeting with the Portuguese President, 
Wilson and Callaghan, whilst tactfully acknowledging the difficulties facing the government, 
raised with surprising frankness their concern at the treatment of moderate parties in Portugal 
and the prospects for parliamentary democracy. The meeting was dominated by a sharp 
exchange on the nature and relationship between democracy and socialism, Wilson bluntly 
retorting that “The question was which hand would ultimately be round the people’s 
throats.”778 Callaghan concluded, “But we felt that the right of choice was not at present 
being demonstrated.”779 The British delegation only raised the problems facing British 
business in Portugal indirectly and at the end of the meeting, and Wilson promised to put 
these concerns into a letter to the Portuguese President.
780
  
The bilateral meeting with the Soviet Union was held immediately before the final 
signing ceremony on the 31
st
 July. The memoirs of both Wilson and Callaghan recall the 
meeting at length, while the FCO archives confirm and elucidate their accounts.
781
 Aside 
from mutual congratulations on the success of the Helsinki meeting and improved Anglo-
Soviet relations (which both parties agreed were an example of détente in action), Portugal 
                                                             
775 A Portuguese historian has argued that “Washington, Bona, Paris e Londres diferiam no grau de emenho 
posto na CSCE, o que se justifica pelo facto de os objectivos em jogo para cada um deles serem claramente 
distintos.” (Washington, Bonn, Paris and London differed as to the degree of commitment invested in the CSCE, 
which is justified by the fact that the objectives at stake for each of them are markedly different.) Moreira de S , 
Os Americanos na Revolu  o Portuguesa, p.33. 
776 Callaghan to FCO, ‘Portugal’, 25 July 1975, FCO 30/2990.  
777 Killick to Wright, ‘Political Directors’ Meeting Helsinki’, 28 July 1975, FCO 30/2990.  
778 Hunt to FCO, ‘Record of Meeting between the Prime Minister and the President of Portugal’, 1 August 1975, 
FCO 9/2285. 
779 Ibid.  
780 Ibid. 
781 Wilson, Final Term, pp.165-75. 
176 
 
was the only other issue discussed.
782
 Wilson declared that he wished to mention an issue 
about which “he felt anxiety” and stated that “One test of détente was the position of 
Portugal”, meaning that “he hoped that Mr Brezhnev would use all his influence to ensure 
that the situation was resolved in a way which accorded with the wishes of the Portuguese 
people.”783 Despite the importance of the exchange, however, the meeting was foreshortened, 
and lasted only twenty minutes, whereas it was “Originally intended to last for one hour.”784 
An FCO official bemoaned that this was the result of a “Soviet request to hold it immediately 
before the signing ceremony rather than after it as planned.”785 The timetabling of the 
meeting also meant that “the last part... had been slightly distracted by anxious secretariat 
officials trying to get Mr Brezhnev and Mr Wilson to the platform of Finlandia Hall.”786 That 
Portugal was raised at all, however, demonstrates its significance to the British delegation. 
 
The limited time available also meant, an FCO official recorded, that “it was not 
possible to cover some issues, including Portugal, as fully as we would have wished.”787 In 
particular incendiary rumours that the Soviet Union was supplying military equipment to the 
PCP were only briefly discussed. It is illustrative that Brezhnev’s reply (“The Soviet Union 
was in no way involved in the situation. They were not sending arms to Portugal”) remains 
the only record of this exchange by FCO officials.
788
 This suggests that these allegations 
raised a heated but rushed exchange. Its ineffectual conclusion led to a request by Callaghan 
that “since time for discussion was so short, he would like to send Mr Brezhnev a 
memorandum about the question.”789 His biographer, Kenneth Morgan, makes reference to 
such a document in his personal papers, but the Callaghan archive is not catalogued, and this 
was not found during research at the Bodleian library.
790
  
 
The effect of the British delegation’s exchange with their Soviet counterparts is 
difficult to gauge. Brezhnev concluded the meeting by observing that “many countries had 
approached him during the conference at Helsinki; he and his colleagues would think the 
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matter over when they returned to Moscow to see what could be done.”791 It appears that the 
British delegation was the most assertive. An article in Pravda entitled “The Soviet Détente 
League Table” (which graded each bilateral meeting) recorded, perfunctorily, “UK 
businesslike and constructive”, in contrast to “French full mutual understanding.”792 The 
British delegation was front page news in Izyestiya and Pravda, which an FCO official 
observed “seems to have placed it in a slightly more important category than for example Mr 
Brezhnev’s first meeting with President Ford.”793 A Portuguese historian recently observed 
that “It is very interesting to note the coincidence of timing regarding the conversations 
between Wilson, Callaghan and Brezhnev and Costa Gomes and the changing attitude of the 
PCP in relation to the military left.”794 
 
The Labour Government’s intervention in Helsinki was an ad hoc response to the 
deteriorating situation in Lisbon, rather than an attempt to influence Soviet attitudes towards 
détente. It is indicative that the documents attached to the FCO’s planning for the bilateral 
meeting were an assortment of telegrams relating to Portugal from various FCO departments 
rather than a measured policy response.
795
 Its willingness to raise Portugal during such a 
critical international summit demonstrates not only the importance attached to developments 
in Lisbon, but also that the Labour Government remained sceptical of Soviet motives 
throughout détente. Its decision to unilaterally raise events with the Soviet delegation 
following the failure of its attempts to coordinate a common western response demonstrates 
the seriousness of its concerns. 
 
Western European intervention 
The Labour Government accepted an invitation to attend a meeting of Socialist 
leaders and Heads of Government in Stockholm immediately following the Helsinki Summit, 
to discuss ways in which democracy in Portugal could be supported. The tone of the meeting 
was somewhat alarmist. Olof Palme during his opening statement explained that the 
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gathering “gave us an opportunity to consider our social democratic response to what may be 
a setting up of the ideological conflict on the part of the USSR,” and later warned that “We 
should also make clear to those western governments who anticipated a counter coup that a 
right-wing dictatorship was no solution for social democracy.”796 During his opening 
statement Soares hectored that “The Communist Party plot was part of a wider international 
communist strategy,” which had “unlimited financial resources and was receiving training 
from Cuba for a paramilitary militia.”797 Because Wilson and Callaghan attended the meeting 
as representatives of the Labour Party rather than of the Labour Government, they were able 
to meet Soares in person (for the first time since the April election) without accusations of 
interference in Portugal’s internal affairs. However, Wilson and Callaghan were sceptical of 
the value of the Stockholm meeting; as a socialist party gathering it was not a forum where 
concerns about the protection of British business interests could be raised, or the importance 
of maintaining constructive relations with the AFM.
798
 There was concern that the meeting 
could be portrayed as a first breach of Principle VI on “intervention direct or indirect, 
individual or collective, in the internal affairs of another participating state,” from the final 
act of the Helsinki Accords.
799
 Wilson and Callaghan also attended the Stockholm meeting in 
part to reaffirm the Labour Government’s commitment to an organisation to which they had 
previously appeared indifferent. McNally briefed that “There is some discontent amongst its 
partners at what they have occasionally seen as boorish and destructive tactics” at Socialist 
International meetings.”800 
During the meeting in Stockholm, whilst other delegates publicly outlined proposals 
for assistance and intervention in Portugal, Wilson and Callaghan appealed for these to be 
addressed in private, arguing that “Time for words was still with us, but it was also time for 
action, which should be discussed in a smaller group.”801 This unwillingness to discuss 
support for the PSP at an open forum probably reflected the parlous financial position of the 
Labour Party. It had recently struggled to raise its membership fee for the Socialist 
International, a consequence of a wider funding crisis resulting from an economic recession 
and the cost of General Election and referendum campaigns. The NEC’s International 
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Department meeting prior to Stockholm, besides discussing events in Portugal, considered a 
“statement on the financial difficulties of the Party” from the General Secretary and its 
implication for their budget.
802
 This led McNally to inform the secretariat of the Socialist 
International that “The Labour Party is at present in a very precarious position,” and must 
reduce its contributions that year.
803
  
The Stockholm meeting led to the formation of the ‘Committee of Friendship and 
Solidarity with Democracy in Portugal’, which aimed to “work actively to prevent an 
isolation of Portugal from the rest of Europe.”804 There was also agreement to meet on further 
occasions to discuss Portugal.
805
 Although a useful forum, enabling the Labour Government 
to demonstrate a commitment to the moderate parties in Lisbon without facing accusations of 
direct intervention in Portugal’s internal affairs, the meeting held in London on the 5th 
September challenged this premise.
806
 The ambiguity of a government in Number 10 hosting 
a partisan gathering of fellow socialist movements from elsewhere made protocol at the 
meeting problematic. A record of the meeting could not be widely distributed across 
Whitehall, nor could a copy be sent to Kissinger in Washington. The Portuguese Embassy 
could not be approached to support Soares and his delegation during their visit.
807
 The FCO 
was sceptical of the value of the London meeting; an official preparing the briefing noted, “I 
believe that the range of options for party activity is narrower than that open to Government,” 
and that “It is very difficult to suggest concrete ways in which Western European Socialist 
parties can influence events in Portugal apart from supplying money to Dr Soares and giving 
him advice and encouragement.”808 The evolution of events in Portugal from concern at the 
relationship between the military and the moderate parties, to the relationship between 
factions within the AFM, and the possibility of civil war, reduced further the scope for 
participants at the meeting to influence events. Although the Labour Government did 
participate in gatherings of the Socialist International, they did not demonstrate either the 
ability or the willingness to support a common policy towards Portugal with its European 
socialist partners. 
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The Labour Government also sought to promote its interests in Portugal by 
encouraging the provision of EEC economic aid.
809
 Britain’s economic weakness meant that 
it was unable to match the bilateral assistance given by West Germany and the US; it also 
meant that it faced losing its traditional position as Portugal’s closest ally. A multilateral 
approach, through the EEC, became a crucial means for maintaining influence in Lisbon and 
demonstrating a commitment to democracy. Callaghan argued that “Because of the multiplier 
effect of making our contribution through the Community scheme, the political benefits to the 
West as a whole seem likely to be quite substantial by comparison with the small sums 
involved.”810 However, despite broad agreement between the Nine on the necessity of 
providing immediate economic assistance, achieving a consensus proved difficult. The 
Belgium and West German governments continued to prefer a coordinated bilateral response 
whilst the French demanded that no aid be given until democracy was clearly established.
811
 
The EEC Heads of Mission in Lisbon reported to Brussels on “the difficulties experienced by 
the managers of foreign companies in Portugal,” which made it hard to justify the provision 
of economic assistance.
812
 There was also wide concern that economic aid would strengthen 
those opposed to democracy, which meant that “All the Nine had been unanimous in linking 
closer economic and financial cooperation between the EEC and Portugal with the 
development of a pluralistic democracy in Portugal.” 813  
The debate within the Labour Government on the proposed different methods of 
providing EEC aid reflected wider concerns. The British Ambassador in Lisbon remained 
sceptical as to whether economic assistance would be effective, given the political and 
economic chaos in Portugal, concluding that “In view of the desperate economic situation, 
any financial aid that we gave now was likely to go down the drain.”814 The FCO pressed for 
the provision of immediate aid, believing that this was the best means to influence the current 
government in Lisbon, but Britain’s economic weakness and Treasury opposition made this 
difficult. A proposal to offer an EEC loan, financed by member states, was considered, but it 
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was decided that “This is probably well beyond our present capacity.”815 The provision of 
EEC aid was equally problematic because, as an official explained, “we might well have 
great difficulty in meeting our share.”816 The FCO was unable to provide direct aid, because 
“It is more than likely that the FCO will suffer expenditure cuts on our budget across the 
board.”817 Such was Britain’s economic weakness that concern was expressed at the likely 
consequences of a democratic outcome in Portugal. An FCO official noted that “Portugal 
could conceivably throw up a regime so democratic as to deserve our unstinted support.”818 
Any such proposal for aid by Brussels meant that “An exceptional contribution from the 
community budget would necessarily involve an increase in UK public expenditure to which 
ministers are opposed in the present economic situation.”819 Therefore the Labour 
Government decided to press for assistance to Portugal through loans from the European 
Investment Bank, which would initially be backed by guarantees from the EEC, rather than 
by traditional guarantees by member states. Such a scheme would make the greatest possible 
impact on the political process in Lisbon, maximising the assistance given to Portugal whilst 
requiring only a minimal outlay from the national budget of each member state. 
  An ad-hoc committee on Portugal was established by the European Foreign Affairs 
Council to consider possible options for providing economic assistance.
820
 The appearance of 
action, followed by a protracted decision-making process, suited the Nine who were thus able 
to demonstrate a commitment to democracy in Portugal without giving any immediate 
financial assistance; this enabled them to wait until the direction of events in Lisbon became 
clearer. A West German Foreign Ministry official, during a meeting with Kissinger in Bonn, 
explained that “One of the things we have decided in order to try to help the moderates is to 
announce financial aid but not give the aid unless the moderates’ position is strengthened.” 821 
However, the political crisis following Soares’ resignation led to intense lobbying by the 
moderate parties in Lisbon and the State Department in Washington for immediate assistance 
from the EEC.
822
 There was recognition that the provision of economic assistance to Portugal 
could play a crucial role in the outcome of events. The British Ambassador argued that “the 
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socialist demand would prevail once the military had come to understand that the socialists 
alone had the right contacts in Western Europe and North America to attract foreign 
investment on the massive scale required to forestall economic disaster in Portugal.”823 The 
Irish Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald, speaking for the Irish Presidency of the Council, 
informed member states that “Even the leftward elements of the Armed Forces Movement 
had come to recognise that they could not get assistance elsewhere and must look to the 
European Community.”824  
After Soares’ resignation the European Council called for an immediate provision of 
exceptional aid. There was also a marked change in tone within Whitehall circles, with wide 
acceptance that Portugal was moving inexorably towards a decisive political crisis. The 
institutional delay caused by opposition to aid provision now ceased. An FCO official 
concluded that “we should prepare for an emergency rescue operation in the late autumn, 
rather than a long-term programme which started earlier.”825 The EEC decided to make an 
immediate symbolic gesture, intended to have a political impact, by promising 180m units of 
account, although the precise details of the arrangement were made deliberately ambiguous 
so that the provision of aid would occur only after the prospect of pluralistic democracy in 
Lisbon was guaranteed.
826
 Although important for shaping Portuguese public opinion, the 
imprecise nature of the economic programme meant that the Nine were unable to directly 
affect the political process in Lisbon through conditionality.
827
  
 
The ‘Document of Nine’  
The political anarchy in Lisbon brought social and economic chaos throughout 
Portugal, leading to a backlash against the provisional government. In an attempt to remove 
Prime Minister Gonçalves from office, the political moderates within the AFM released the 
‘Document of the Nine.’ This condemned the government for attempting to introduce a 
people’s democracy modelled on those of Eastern European countries, and called instead for 
democratic socialism as mandated by the Portuguese electorate. The radical left within the 
AFM responded with the ‘COPCON’ document which dismissed their opponents as a “well 
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orchestrated domestic and international reactionary campaign,” and called for Gon alves’ 
resignation in order that a more radical government could be established and the socialist 
revolution completed. This was the most critical point of the Portuguese revolution. Mass 
demonstrations were held in Lisbon by the supporters of each side, whilst the allegiance of 
the armed forces was divided between different factions within the AFM. By the end of 
August, with Portugal sliding towards civil war and following diplomatic pressure from 
western allies, the Portuguese President decided to disband the provisional government on 8
th
 
September.
828
  
Despite the precarious political situation, until the final week of August the Labour 
Government remained optimistic that political moderates would succeed. An FCO official 
observed that “There is a good chance that the Communists will lose a lot of their current 
power and their position at the centre of things in the near future.”829 However, the Ford 
Administration became increasingly pessimistic at developments in Lisbon and sought to 
influence the outcome by asserting control over the diplomatic response of the western allies. 
At the height of the crisis, Washington received a request from moderates within the AFM for 
western governments to send a diplomatic démarche to Lisbon. The British, Netherlands and 
West German governments were contacted by their US Embassies who warned that “the 
moderates’ momentum was being lost”, and urged that “western countries should take 
immediately, any action that they could to strengthen the resolve of Costa Gomes to move 
things in a moderate direction.”830 They were informed that the Ford Administration was 
considering the question “is Portugal really deserving of our support?”831  
The Labour Government’s response to the request for a démarche was hindered by 
Callaghan’s absence on a holiday in Ireland. Unlike each previous crisis since the April 
Revolution, there could be no direct communication between Kissinger and Callaghan. 
Aware of divisions on Portugal within the Ford Administration, FCO officials in London 
were even concerned “whether the American approach has Kissinger’s personal authority.”832 
There was scepticism within the FCO whether sending a démarche would have any positive 
effect, and concern that doing so would “strengthen the communists (sic) hands by an 
appearance of western threats”, whilst the Portuguese President should not be made to act “if 
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he believes it will lead to an avoidable civil war.”833 The British Ambassador also advised 
against sending a démarche, arguing that “In our own case I believe that a forceful line, 
similar to that of the Americans, would be a mistake, given the limited extent of any 
contribution to economic aid for Portugal that we are likely to be able to make.”834 The 
circumstances behind Washington’s request were only known to certain British officials 
because American “contacts with the Melo Antunes Group were strictly confidential and 
must be protected”, which meant there could not be a wider distribution of information across 
Whitehall.
835
 Therefore, as a result of Callaghan’s absence from London and a consensus 
within the FCO, the British Ambassador did not join his counterparts in sending a démarche 
on the 22
nd
 August.
836
  
By the end of August, the political situation in Portugal had deteriorated to such an 
extent that Washington once again pressured London to send a démarche. The US shared 
information that moderates within the AFM “might be prepared to grasp military control of 
Lisbon on behalf of the Antunes group,” and that “If this does not work out, the Antunes 
Group would consider they had no alternative but to move their headquarters to the north and 
rally the support of military commanders there,” which meant “effectively precipitating a 
division of the country.”837 FCO officials still maintained “the possibility that demarches by 
us and our allies will be counterproductive in their overall effect.”838 Such was the pressure 
from Washington that Sir John Killick concluded, “I believe that the Secretary of State will 
be anxious to keep in step with the Americans if at all possible, and inaction, even if it may 
be correct, is not comfortable.”839 Finally the decision was reached to send a démarche, 
although this would be shaped by British priorities rather than by the guidelines sent by the 
State Department, an FCO official explaining that “I recommend that we instruct Mr Trench 
to do what the Americans tell us Melo Antunes has asked for, but in the way that Mr Trench 
has suggested.”840 The British Ambassador requested an audience with the Portuguese 
President on the 27
th
 August, and during a frank exchange called for Gonçalves’ removal as 
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Prime Minister. However, he made only the general appeal, “We accept that democracy can 
take many forms. But we do not regard rule by any repressive minority against the freely 
expressed wishes of a large majority of the people as compatible with democracy.”841 The US 
Ambassador in contrast explicitly threatened Portugal with withdrawal from NATO and 
warned that “the United States will not be able to justify to its own people continued – much 
less expanded - support for Portugal of any kind.”842  
Immediately after the British démarche was sent, during the first week of September, 
the political situation in Lisbon reached such a critical point that Portugal appeared to be 
descending into civil war. The British Ambassador reported that “the whole situation here is 
in turmoil and no-one is rash enough to predict what the outcome will be.”843 The seriousness 
of events led the British Embassy to abandon its previous caution and advise that “Our 
unanimous conclusion, on a personal basis, was that the time had come when the PS must 
make a stand, whatever the consequences. Over the past sixteen months numerous attempts at 
compromise had merely resulted in a steady drift towards the extreme left.”844 For the first 
time since the April Revolution, the Labour Government gave serious consideration to the 
possibility of a civil war in Portugal, concluding that “Although the latest developments are 
slightly more hopeful, it is not impossible that the Antunes group may feel obliged to move to 
the north and attempt to rally from there all opponents of Gonçalves and the PCP.”845 Rapidly 
scrawled handwritten notes by Callaghan on a memorandum for a forthcoming meeting of the 
NEC’s International Department reveal greater concern at potential developments than other 
documents, listing economic catastrophe and civil war as possible scenarios facing 
Portugal.
846
 
Some historians argue that the Labour Government was involved in organising armed 
resistance against the radical left.
847
 Kenneth Morgan argues that “The full story of the 
support that the British Labour government offered the Portuguese Social Democrats, 
including covert military assistance in dropping supplies, has to be told.”848 The AFM 
certainly blamed outsiders for intervening in Portuguese affairs, and much of the western 
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media reported on the western alliance’s diplomacy as a prelude to a possible coup d’état.849 
There was contingency planning within the FCO on whether to follow Soares and other 
moderate politicians to the north of the country in the event of a civil war, and how contact 
could be maintained with British residents living in the southern regions of Portugal.
850
 It was 
decided to install immediately a secure radio-telephone within the British consulate in Porto, 
and an agreement was reached that allowed American facilities to be used in the event of an 
emergency.”851 Recent historical studies in Portugal assert that Callaghan was involved in 
planning a military intervention (alongside its western allies) and a number of British 
historians and biographers refer to the existence of such a programme, but these are not 
verified by published sources.
852
 US archival records reveal that during a meeting with 
Ambassador Carlucci in Washington, Kissinger commented, “We would be prepared to help 
with military equipment if necessary. So would Callaghan”, but the Ambassador’s reply that 
“Small arms are available in Portugal”, suggests that such a programme was unnecessary.853 
There is no British archival evidence that covert operations were planned by the US and 
Britain, but given the seriousness of the situation in Lisbon, and its potential implications for 
the NATO alliance, it does appear likely that consideration would have been given to the 
possibility.  
The crisis in early September coincided with pressure once again to address 
Portugal’s status within NATO. The summer break allowed a delay in passing information 
which avoided Portugal’s removal from decision-making councils, but officials were aware 
that “The arrangements made for the month of August whereby the distribution of material to 
all members of the Alliance was held up could not long continue now that the Alliance was 
resuming its normal activities.”854 The escalating political crisis in Lisbon meant that “From 
the security point of view there was now a strong case for withholding all NATO secret 
material from the Portuguese.”855 The British delegation maintained that “The two principal 
dangers which they have had to take into account are that the Portuguese might leave NATO 
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in a fit of pique, and that drastic NATO action (news of which could well become public) 
might be used by the Portuguese Communists as propaganda to improve their position in the 
power struggle.”856 The absence of Callaghan from London meant that the issue was 
addressed by Hattersley, as Minister of State at the Foreign Office; he had always been the 
minister most concerned with the impact of events in Portugal on NATO and on the US 
reaction. On the 8
th
 September, Hattersley reached the decision to accept a US proposal that 
all NATO secret material should be withheld from the Portuguese.
857
 
The unexpected dismissal of Prime Minister Gonçalves meant that the Labour 
Government was suddenly relieved of making a decision on Portugal’s membership of 
NATO and of responding to the possible outbreak of civil war. The establishment of a 
government on the 9
th
 August, dominated by political moderates for the first time since the 
April Revolution, transformed the Labour Government’s policy towards Portugal. It now 
sought to assist Prime Minister Pineiro de Azevedo’s government, whilst preventing the 
radical left from mobilising support within the armed forces for a coup d’état. The Labour 
Government had acted somewhat against its better judgement in sending a démarche, but the 
outcome of events meant that Britain was now in a stronger position to play a diplomatic role 
in Lisbon.   
 
Britain and the ‘Hot Summer’  
  The power struggle between the radical left and political moderates after the 
constituent assembly elections had led the Labour Government to conclude that “The crunch 
point has come.”858 However, during the critical period that followed, Britain’s influence in 
Lisbon actually declined. The course of events created an insuperable dilemma for British 
policy whereby, the British Ambassador in Lisbon explained, “we had to encourage her in the 
building up of a democratic system without appearing to take sides against the military or 
withdrawing support from the democrats.”859 This conundrum came to dominate relations 
with Portugal through the summer of 1975, until the establishment of a moderate government 
allowed unequivocal support to be given.  
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The Labour Government was confident after the April Revolution that once elections 
were held there would be a successful transition to democracy in Portugal. However, the 
radical left’s consolidation of power after the failed right-wing coup led to a major 
reassessment of British policy. The threat to the integrity of the NATO Alliance meant that 
the international implications of events now became the Labour Government’s principal 
concern. The ‘Hot Summer’ coincided with a series of international gatherings, culminating 
in the Helsinki Summit of August 1975. Bilateral meetings held with the Portuguese 
delegation at these gatherings became the principal means by which Wilson and Callaghan 
pursued the strategy of maintaining constructive relations with the provisional government. 
The international dimensions of events in Portugal were also addressed at these meetings and 
will be discussed in the final chapter. Therefore summit diplomacy rather than British activity 
in Lisbon became the principal means by which the Labour Government conducted relations 
with Portugal during this period. 
The radical left’s consolidation of power after the failed coup on the 11th March led 
the US to describe Portugal as a “Trojan Horse” within NATO.860 Its outcome meant that the 
strategy that Kissinger had pursued since the April Revolution had clearly failed. He privately 
admitted to the British that “One reason for this was that the United States had not started 
soon enough – i.e. last year – in cultivating a meaningful relationship with the new 
Portugal.”861 After the constituency elections the US reluctantly allowed the Labour 
Government to take the lead on policy towards Portugal and accepted its argument that 
Soares and the PSP was the best hope. However, after developments in Lisbon during the 
‘Hot Summer’ became serious for US interests, Washington sought once again to actively 
intervene in Portugal and to lead the western response. Despite the Ford Administration’s 
adopting a similar approach to the Labour Government, it had less influence in Washington 
than in any other period after the April Revolution. The Labour Government’s more nuanced 
policy of pursuing constructive relations with the Portuguese government antagonised the 
Ford Administration.  
The Socialist International enabled the Labour Government to support the PSP 
without antagonising the provisional government in Lisbon. Having a multilateral 
organisation represent internationalist social democratic values was also more likely to be 
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effective than the efforts of individual parties, which could be seen to serve their own 
national interests. However, although Washington supported the role of the Socialist 
International in Portugal, the Labour Government did not serve as its point of contact. 
Instead, the USA did so principally through Olof Palme from neutral Sweden, and former 
Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany (whose Ostpolitik policy had antagonised the 
Nixon Administration).
862
 As a leading member, the Labour Government could have 
demonstrated its value to the Anglo-American relationship. This suggests the Labour 
Government saw the Anglo-American relationship in terms of the British national interest, 
rather than as an element of party political values. 
During the ‘Hot Summer’ West Germany became increasingly significant, organising 
a comprehensive programme of support for democracy in Portugal. The tenets of its approach 
– cooperation with the US, support for the PSP and independent trade unions, the provision 
of economic aid to and diplomatic pressure on the Portuguese government - were similar to 
those of the Labour Government, but there was surprisingly little close coordination between 
the European allies. Ana Mónica Fonseca argues convincingly that for West Germany 
relations with Portugal were a significant element in its ‘Westpolitik’ strategy, whereby 
encouraging political change in the authoritarian regimes of southern Europe would set a 
precedent for Eastern Europe.
863
 Hence the premises of the British and West German 
approach differed, with the latter motivated by a wider strategic foreign policy goal. 
Therefore, despite shared interests, their cooperation was within multilateral institutions 
rather than state to state relations. It is illustrative that in an effort to deepen relations Schmidt 
visited Britain in November 1975, culminating with a speech to the Labour Party conference, 
but there had been no attempt prior to the visit to coordinate policy on Portugal. The 
increased influence of Bonn on the PSP was also a reflection of the disparity of economic 
resources between West Germany and Britain. As a result the relationship between the 
Labour Party and the PSP did atrophy during the ‘Hot Summer’, allowing West Germany to 
become its principal sponsor.  
Prior to the Brussels Summit the Labour Government realised that its influence in 
Lisbon would depend largely on an ability to offer financial assistance. There was a 
consensus throughout Whitehall that this was a political imperative, but Britain’s economic 
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weakness meant that a number of ministries raised bureaucratic obstacles to the provision of 
bilateral aid. A multilateral EEC response became crucial to British interests, although this 
meant giving the EIB a new role providing economic assistance outside of the Community. 
Ironically, given Britain’s concern with EEC membership such as the loss of sovereignty, 
trade preferences, budget rebate issues and a divisive referendum on continued membership, 
on this issue the FCO became the vanguard for encouraging institutional change, against the 
opposition of its European partners. 
The course of events in Portugal was closely tied to that of the overseas territories 
during the ‘Hot Summer’. The dominance of the radical left in Lisbon led to the appointment 
of colonial administrators sympathetic to the national liberation movements with which they 
had once fought. In Angola assistance was given to the MPLA, enabling them to seize control 
of state institutions and thereby shifting power in their favour. In East Timor Portuguese 
Marxist groups seeking independence rather than assimilation into Indonesia were favoured. 
This dimension of the Portuguese Revolution has been stressed by historians such as Kenneth 
Maxwell.
864
 To the Ford Administration events in the overseas territories were an emerging 
sphere of proxy Cold War conflict intrinsically tied to events in Lisbon. Hence Kissinger 
instructed Ambassador Carlucci, “I want the Portuguese to understand that we object to the 
role that they are playing there and particularly their help to the MPLA.”865 The Labour 
Government after the April Revolution carefully connected events in Lisbon with those in the 
overseas territories because they were seeking a resolution of the Rhodesian question; once 
the principle of independence was granted this ceased. Therefore the Labour Government’s 
concern in sub-Saharan Africa was the solution of post-colonial issues rather than 
participation in the emerging Cold War rivalry, reflecting its changed world role. 
 The period following the constituent assembly elections saw significant changes in 
how British policy towards Portugal was made.  There was increased concern with the 
international implications of events, particularly the prospect of a Portuguese withdrawal 
from NATO. This meant that the initiative for British policy came from Wilson and 
Callaghan, including Cabinet discussions on Portugal taking place for first time since the 
April Revolution. The attempt to maintain constructive relations with the provisional 
government made bilateral talks between Wilson, Callaghan and their Portuguese 
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counterparts the best means to conduct British policy in Portugal. This meant that close 
personal and partisan ties between the Labour Government and Soares became less 
important. Indeed, there were emerging doubts as to whether he had the qualities for 
leadership; an FCO official observed that “Dr Soares knows his problems and the situation in 
Portugal better than we can hope to. But his judgement does not always match his 
charisma.”866 This led to a cooling of relations, with an official explaining that “We hope that 
our measured low-key response to these requests will have helped Dr Soares to realise the 
limitations within which we operate, and will help to steady him down.”867 The bilateral 
approach also reduced the British Embassy’s significance as a conduit between the Labour 
Government and political moderates in Portugal.   
However, whilst Wilson and Callaghan dominated the British response, they could 
not give Portugal regular or sustained attention because they were distracted by other 
pressing international and domestic issues. This meant, unlike the period immediately after 
the Carnation Revolution, that policy making became less coordinated within the Labour 
Government. During the ‘Hot Summer’, whilst the British Embassy was increasingly focused 
on protecting British business interests, those departments within the FCO concerned with 
Portugal were concentrating on other aspects. There were even divisions within the Labour 
Government as its approach to Portugal antagonised left-wing members sympathetic to the 
radical left in Lisbon. The importance of Soares to western strategy led members of the 
Labour Party who were sympathetic to the radical left in Lisbon to maintain that he was only 
committed to achieving power, rather than promoting democratic socialism. 
During the ‘Hot Summer’ the Labour Government struggled to understand the fluid 
and chaotic political environment. This was partly because there were fewer opportunities to 
discuss events in Lisbon with Soares than in the period immediately after the April 
Revolution. There was a better understanding in London of the political role of the 
Portuguese military, a moderate figure within the AFM for example explaining the Byzantine 
reasoning whereby “some elements within the AFM were only able to disconnect from the 
Communist Party by becoming more left-wing.”868 However, many opportunities existed for 
Britain to influence events by supporting civil society, such as the independent media and 
trade unions. The BBC’s significance within Portugal meant that the Labour Government did 
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have a powerful means to shape the political process, but this was neither understood nor 
appreciated, with concern raised instead at the detrimental impact of its coverage on relations 
with the provisional government. Therefore the contemporary international relations concept 
of ‘soft power’ cannot easily be applied to an historical analysis of British policy towards 
Portugal.  
 The dismissal of General Gonçalves was a critical point of the Portuguese Revolution; 
the government of Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo was the first since November 1974 to be 
controlled by political moderates, whilst the radical left responded by organising a coup 
d’état. The Labour Government, whilst being relieved at the outcome of the ‘Hot Summer’, 
now faced the dilemma of how to meet the pledge Callaghan made in August: “I think we 
must prepare for real and very quick help to Portugal if the moderates win.”869 
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Chapter VI – The Consolidation of Democracy  
(September 8
th
, 1975 – July 23rd, 1976) 
 
The appointment of the sixth provisional government transformed Lisbon’s power struggle. 
The new Prime Minister, Admiral Azevedo, chose a cabinet which closely matched the 
outcome of the Constituent Assembly Elections, which meant that (alongside the control of 
the Armed Forces Movement by the Antunes Group) political moderates were dominant in 
Lisbon for the first time since Spinola’s resignation in September 1974. The radical left 
responded by strengthening its influence within the Portuguese military and in organising 
land seizures and public demonstrations. These efforts to destabilise the provisional 
government culminated in an attempted coup d’état on the 25th November, the failure of 
which ended the revolutionary phase of the Carnation Revolution. The establishment of a 
moderate government in Lisbon meant that the principal aim of the Labour Government in 
Portugal (since the overseas territories had been granted their independence) was achieved, 
and that relations could now be conducted through state diplomacy rather than partisan ties 
with the Portuguese Socialist Party. However, mounting economic and social problems 
facing Portugal made international support essential to ensure a democratic outcome. This 
chapter will consider the British response to these events, from the appointment of the sixth 
provisional government on the 8
th
 September 1974 until the Presidential elections on July 23
rd
 
1975, the outcome of which marked Portugal’s successful transition to democracy. 
These events coincided with a series of significant international developments which 
shaped their outcome. The aftermath of decolonisation led to the evacuation of Portuguese 
nationals from Angola. The rapid decline of Franco’s health, which meant that “the sense of a 
regime crumbling was all-pervading”, made events in Portugal appear the precursor for a 
similar transition in Spain.
870
 The series of international summits that began during the 
summer of 1975 continued; their number, and the range and significance of issues discussed, 
led a biographer of Wilson to describe this as a period when “Summitry was becoming 
infectious.” 871 The optimism engendered by the Helsinki Summit soon evaporated over 
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issues such as trade and emigration, whilst Angola’s civil war (which began before 
independence), alongside Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, fatally undermined superpower 
détente. The global energy crisis and economic recession led western states to coordinate 
their response, leading to an informal gathering at Rambouillet in France - which became the 
G7, that crucial forum for international diplomacy. Although events in Portugal were not the 
subject of formal discussion, they were raised privately between participants during these 
meetings.  
The main argument of this chapter concerns the impact that Britain’s economic 
difficulties had on relations with Portugal. Despite urgent pleas from the FCO, the Treasury 
would not provide aid on a scale which would have given influence in Lisbon, eroding any 
claim to a special relationship resulting from the ‘oldest alliance’. The Labour Government’s 
decision to cut defence rather than welfare spending damaged transatlantic relations, reducing 
cooperation with the United States on foreign policy issues such as Portugal.
872
 The domestic 
difficulties facing the Labour Government also undermined the coherence and effectiveness 
of British diplomacy. The cancellation of a ministerial visit to Lisbon, alongside criticism of 
the provisional government by left-wing members of the Labour Party, seriously damaged 
future relations with Portugal. As a result, when parliamentary and presidential elections were 
held in 1976, the Labour Government had little direct influence in Lisbon. There is some 
evidence (albeit largely from uncorroborated sources) that covert intervention alongside the 
United States was planned were there to be a coup d’état or civil war in Portugal. This 
suggests that, despite their differences on other issues, close institutional cooperation 
continued between British and American intelligence and security services.  
During this period there were significant changes in how British policy towards 
Portugal was made. The removal of a radical left-wing government in Lisbon, antithetical to 
western interests, meant that Wilson and Callaghan played a less prominent role. They were 
also increasingly overwhelmed by pressing economic and political problems, leading Wilson 
to recall that “it was the most hectic I have ever known either as Prime Minister or as a 
member of Clement Attlee’s post-war Cabinet.”873 This meant that even Callaghan became 
largely focused on domestic issues, particularly following Wilson’s resignation in March 
1976, and the subsequent Labour leadership election. Therefore, although the provisional 
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government in Lisbon faced continuing threats, and the opportunity existed to promote 
British interests, there was little direct contact during this period. Despite the presence in 
government of the PSP, relations with the Labour Party atrophied, whilst contact with the 
Antunes Group ceased entirely following the attempted coup d’état. The emergence of a 
moderate government in Lisbon allowed the British Embassy (which had often failed to 
understand developments in Portugal) to work closely with the new government. This made it 
far more effectual in defending British interests and predicting the course of events in Lisbon. 
The absence of clear policy guidance from the Labour Government meant that the initiative 
passed to the FCO. There was a recommendation that relations be established with a wider 
range of moderate parties in Lisbon beside the PSP. The Labour Government was also 
influenced by lobbying from business groups in Portugal who argued that British interests 
would be more effectively protected by applying pressure on the provisional government, 
rather than by providing support and encouragement. 
There was also increasing divergence between the Labour Government’s approach to 
Portugal and that of its western allies. The United States was now concerned with how events 
in Lisbon affected Angola, whose civil war had suddenly become a Cold War crisis with 
implications throughout the southern African region.
874
 The conduct of policy towards 
Portugal changed following the ‘Halloween massacre’, which saw the reshaping of President 
Ford’s foreign policy team in preparation for the forthcoming presidential elections.875 These 
changes reduced Kissinger’s influence on foreign policy-making relative to the State 
Department. The Ford Administration was also constrained by the House of Representatives’ 
attempt to reassert control over foreign policy making in the aftermath of Watergate.
876
 In 
contrast to the Labour Government, leading western European states continued to play a 
significant role supporting Portuguese democracy through the Socialist International, 
particularly during the parliamentary and presidential elections when advice and substantial 
financial assistance were given.
877
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The appointment of the sixth provisional government meant that Portugal became a less 
significant issue within British foreign policy. This is clearly seen in FCO planning for 
international meetings. After the 11
th
 March coup d’état attempt, Portugal was always a 
leading item on the agenda; it was the only issue raised with the Soviet delegation in Helsinki 
and the Socialist International in Stockholm. The political stability in Lisbon now made the 
wider implications of the Portuguese Revolution more important. During the bilateral 
meeting in Paris between Callaghan and Kissinger in November 1975, Angola was third on 
the agenda and Portugal seventh, whereas at the bilateral meeting between Crosland and 
Kissinger in April 1976, there was no mention of Portugal, and events in Angola topped the 
agenda.
878
 Moreover, after Franco’s demise, Portugal was included only as an adjunct to 
events in Spain at international gatherings.
879
 Its declining importance was also the result of 
the Labour Government’s focusing on addressing its own domestic crises. The increasing 
significance of a range of foreign policy issues extraneous to the Cold War, such as the 
energy crisis and improving relations with developing countries, also meant that Portugal was 
less important; it was entirely absent from FCO planning for the Rambouillet summit 
(forerunner of the G7 meetings).  
During the months that followed its appointment, the sixth provisional government 
reversed measures such as controls on the media and independent trade unions, previously 
introduced by the radical left to entrench their position in Lisbon. The radical left responded 
by accelerating land seizures and building their support within the Portuguese military, 
leading to rumours of a coup d’état, or even civil war. The political turmoil, alongside the 
effects of rapid decolonisation, exacerbated Portugal’s economic crisis. During the following 
weeks political tensions escalated further, as each side, fearing the other’s intention, 
manoeuvred to thwart supposed conspiracies. These events culminated in the 
 
November 
coup d’état attempt, when supporters of the provisional government within the armed forces 
either responded to, or acted to prevent, an attempt by their opponents to seize power (exactly 
whom remains a point of contention amongst historians), decisively tilting the political 
balance in Portugal towards the political moderates.
880
 The provisional government, despite 
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mounting economic and political problems, held parliamentary and presidential elections, the 
outcome of which ensured Portugal’s successful transition to parliamentary democracy.  
 
Support for the Sixth Provisional Government   
The power struggle in Portugal during the summer of 1975 culminated in Prime 
Minister Goncalves’ resignation on the 8th September. His replacement, Admiral Pinheiro de 
Azevedo, although a member of the radical left, had become convinced during the Hot 
Summer that only a government representative of the Portuguese electorate could restore 
political authority. As a result he immediately offered leading moderate politicians ministerial 
posts within his government.
881  
However, Azevedo faced the dilemma of whether to also 
appoint representatives from the radical left, fearing that to do so would undermine his 
government from within, but to exclude them entirely would mean that without the 
responsibility of office, Portugal’s economic crisis would enable them to increase their 
popular support. The sixth provisional government, formed on the 13
th
 September, was 
largely composed of political moderates, particularly from the PSP. They made an immediate 
commitment to hold parliamentary and presidential elections the following year, and to 
restore discipline within the armed forces. The radical left now sought to challenge the new 
government by encouraging land seizures in the south and bolstering their support within the 
Portuguese armed forces. The continued political instability, alongside the return of 
impoverished refugees from Angola, worsened Portugal’s mounting economic problems, 
leading to further civil unrest, and by the final week of October rumours first circulated 
around Lisbon of an imminent coup d’état.  
 
The British Government welcomed the appointment of Prime Minister Azevedo, 
believing that this made a transition to democracy possible. There was disagreement, 
however, as to whether this could be achieved with the PCP outside government, as some 
feared that this “may simply turn out to be an opportunity for the Communist Party further to 
undermine any prospect of pluralist democracy.”882 During the week Azevedo formed his 
government, the British Embassy reported the renewed threat from the radical left, 
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particularly the seizure of an arms cache in Lisbon, which raised the spectre of civil war.
883
 
The Ford Administration, more sceptical of the significance of Azevedo’s appointment, 
argued against the PCP receiving ministerial posts. During a meeting between Kissinger and 
Callaghan in New York on the 6
th
 September, the latter argued that “the Communists must 
share responsibility for dealing with the economic situation.”884 Kissinger continued his 
opposition, only sardonically conceding “unless it is something minimal e.g. a Communist 
Sports Minister.” 885 By the following week Kissinger’s position had hardened, and he sent a 
message to Callaghan expressing his fear that “the manner in which the Communists have 
acted to translate their minority status into positions of power in key areas of influence gives 
one no reason to think they will behave any differently in the future.”886 He requested that 
these concerns be shared with Soares during a scheduled meeting with Callaghan, including 
the message: “we do not intend to assist any Portuguese Government in which the 
Communists have positions of any significance.”887 In the event Soares’ schedule prevented a 
meeting being held. 
 
 The appointment of the sixth provisional government meant that for the first time 
since the April Revolution the Labour Government could give unambiguous support to 
Portugal. The British Ambassador called for the new government to be welcomed because 
“their objective of having the civilian cabinet posts distributed in proportions corresponding 
to the performance of the major parties in the April elections” would mean moderate 
democratic politicians were ascendant in Lisbon.
888
 The principal concern of the Labour 
Government that summer - the presence of communist ministers within a NATO member-
state – was now allayed. There was optimism that British economic interests in Portugal 
would be better protected. In the weeks following the government’s appointment, however, 
there was mounting concern with the activity of the radical left. The deterioration in Franco’s 
health also meant serious consideration was given to how events in Portugal might impact on 
Spain; an FCO report concluded that “Portugal should serve as a lesson to us when 
considering the far greater prize in Spain.”889 The FCO’s Southern European Department, 
previously sanguine about the threat from the radical left in Lisbon, argued that events on the 
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Iberian Peninsula were entwined, particularly following an attack on the Spanish Embassy by 
Portuguese militants protesting at the execution of political prisoners.
890
 
 
The appointment of a government in Lisbon committed to democracy but facing 
political and economic difficulties led to a consensus amongst western states that immediate 
economic support was necessary. The EEC aid committed to Portugal that summer had been 
deliberately structured to ensure delay until a propitious political outcome was assured. 
Following Azevedo’s appointment there was agreement that “he should be given a response 
with all speed and that this response should not have to wait for the next council in 
October.”891 A series of meetings was held intended to influence the formation of the sixth 
provisional government.
892
 This led to the immediate provision of previously agreed aid by 
the EEC, although this was still conditional and given in stages (unlike American and West 
German bilateral aid), which reduced its political effectiveness. The aid programme 
committed the Labour Government to providing a £4.5 million subsidy, through the EEC 
Budget, on the loan of 150 million units of account which the Portuguese received from the 
European Investment Bank.
893
  
The Labour Government agreed that Portugal needed additional economic aid. 
However, Britain’s worsening economic problems (a special Cabinet meeting had recently 
discussed further public spending cuts) made encouraging more assistance by the EEC the 
most attractive option.
894
 An FCO official argued that “We are too poor to rescue Portugal 
alone, and if we are more willing to help them than some of our partners we would do well to 
use much of whatever we can afford, multilaterally, with a view to squeezing contributions 
out of them.”895 A continuing role for the EEC was also considered significant because 
“Portugal attaches importance to a community reaction.”896 However, there appeared to be 
insuperable obstacles to achieving consensus on further EEC aid, with leading member-states 
such as West Germany continuing to favour bilateral assistance. Lobbying in Brussels was 
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unlikely to be successful given the Labour Government’s political isolation.897 The option 
most attractive to Lisbon was an expansion of trade with the Nine, alongside the promise of 
future accession talks. The difficulty with such a course was that EEC tariffs discriminated 
against many Portuguese products and reversing these would be difficult.
898
 Callaghan 
commented that during the global recession, “Western Governments face domestic problems 
in taking more exports of Portuguese textiles, wire, cork and agricultural products.”899 The 
Labour Government was particularly concerned that proposals “to waive the ceilings on 
imports on Portuguese textiles” would harm constituencies in northern England.900 
The obstacles to further EEC assistance led to calls within the Labour Government for 
bilateral aid. This was first raised by Callaghan during the formation of Azevedo’s 
government. He argued forcefully that bilateral aid would bring political influence in Lisbon, 
providing that they “who have worked hard with encouragement and advice to assist Dr 
Soares to achieve this end, should make a clear and public gesture towards such a 
government soon after it takes office.”901 Following the provisional government’s 
appointment, a public display of support by giving bilateral aid was considered essential, 
given that previously the Labour Government had sought to avoid any impression of directly 
intervening in Portuguese affairs through multilateral aid. The FCO also made the calculation 
that “The EEC have now made a multilateral offer, so that we no longer fear that a bilateral 
offer by us will harm the prospects of that.”902 
Having explored the possibility of EEC aid, Callaghan now approached the Treasury to 
explain that “as a result of our discussions in the Community I am satisfied that bilateral aid 
to Portugal really is a necessity.”903 The criticism that small-scale aid would have negligible 
impact on the Portuguese economy was countered by the argument, “But my judgment is that 
it will have a significant political impact at a moment when there is still all to play for.”  904 
Callaghan also noted that the provision of aid by the United States and West Germany was 
likely to increase, which threatened further Britain’s traditional position as Portugal’s closest 
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ally.
905
 In a series of correspondence with the Treasury, the FCO argued strongly that 
bilateral aid was in the British national interest, a position outlined by an official who noted 
that “it will build up direct links between us and Portugal, with visits by experts in both 
directions. It will make for us grateful clients in Portugal, and provide practical 
demonstrations of our friendship.”906 Despite such lobbying, the Treasury remained 
implacably opposed to providing bilateral aid. This stance hardened once the political 
situation in Lisbon began to deteriorate in the weeks following the provisional government’s 
appointment. A Treasury official noted that “HM Ambassador has reported to you threats of 
extremist left-wing coups, indiscipline in the Armed Forces and an admission by Admiral 
Azevedo that the Government were not able to control Lisbon completely, let alone the rest 
of the country.”907  
The Treasury’s continued opposition to bilateral aid led Callaghan to approach 
Wilson for support. He sought agreement to the principle of giving such assistance, an FCO 
official recording that “If the Prime Minister’s reaction is favourable perhaps the Private 
Secretary would add a further paragraph to the draft to this effect.”908 Callaghan argued that 
continued British influence in Lisbon depended on the provision of bilateral aid; a 
forthcoming ministerial visit to Lisbon by Hattersley caused him to say, “I do not think we 
can afford to send him empty handed.”909 Callaghan also expressed concern that the 
credibility of British foreign policy was being damaged by the perception that policy aims 
could not be supported by military and economic means. An FCO official recorded that, to 
challenge this perception “Mr Callaghan would however wish to be able to inform certain of 
his Foreign Minister colleagues in New York next week that a decision in principle had been 
taken.” There was particular concern at the potential damage to Anglo-American relations.910 
It was pointedly noted, “He is breakfasting with Dr Kissinger on 23 September when this 
subject may well arise.”911 Although Wilson eventually agreed to bilateral aid, he insisted this 
should come from the overseas aid budget rather than directly from the Treasury.
912
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After returning from New York, Callaghan promised only to “rest in stirrups” until an 
agreement on bilateral aid to Portugal was achieved.
913
 He appealed to the ODM “by means 
of a letter from the Private Secretary” that they consider urgently the issue of aid to 
Portugal.
914
 Despite anticipated opposition, this proposal elicited an unexpected response - a 
letter from the Private Secretary committing the department to aid, with a handwritten 
admission, “This is strictly a political gesture.”915 The ODM requested in return a 
sympathetic future spending-round that acknowledged this commitment.
916
 Therefore, 
although sympathy for Portugal existed throughout the Labour Government, the political 
implications of public spending cuts were the determining factor in accepting a commitment 
of aid. Despite the ODM’s agreement, the Treasury continued to delay any immediate 
decision on aid to Portugal and a heated exchange of letters with the FCO followed. 
Callaghan argued for a commitment, asserting that “we should make it, as an exception to the 
general trend of our aid policy, and that history will judge us harshly if we do not.”917 In 
reply, Reg Prentice at the Treasury expressed scepticism whether recent events in Lisbon 
suggested aid would prove effective.
918
 They finally agreed to resolve their differences by 
meeting during the forthcoming Labour Party Conference. 
The continued opposition by the Treasury to providing development aid from the 
ODM’s budget led to calls that humanitarian aid be given instead. Such an approach would 
resolve the dilemma of how to provide economic assistance whilst the political environment 
in Lisbon remained fluid, and was justified by social conditions which were worsening with 
the return of Portuguese nationals from Angola. The British Ambassador sent warnings that 
“The refugees are likely to form an increasingly unstable and discontented group.”919 The 
appointment of a new government in Lisbon also meant that previous pledges of 
humanitarian aid, which were significantly smaller than those of other western states, now 
appeared wholly inadequate.
920
 The decision to charge the cost of fuel of the RAF transport 
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plane sent to assist the evacuation of Angolan refugees received particular criticism. An FCO 
official noted that this compared unfavourably “with the actions of other countries, in 
particular of the USA, France and West Germany, who have made available more or larger 
aircraft at less, or no cost to the Portuguese.” 921 The FCO also argued that an increase of 
humanitarian aid was an excellent means to promote the British national interest in Portugal. 
The British Ambassador advised that “the situation could be improved and HMG could 
simultaneously gain credit within Portugal if it gave aid to the refugees in some visible 
way.”922 There was a pressing need for aid to arrive before the winter; the fact that “We 
appear to have been the first mission approached in this way so far” was evidence of Britain’s 
importance to the provisional government, but the Ambassador warned this would only 
continue if such expectations were met.
923 
These arguments led the ODM to agree to an 
increase in humanitarian aid, although they remained sceptical of its likely effectiveness 
given the political tensions in Lisbon.  
 The momentum in Whitehall towards giving economic aid, however, slowed 
following threats to British farmers in the Alentejo region. The British Embassy reported that 
“most of our farmers in the area are either being taken over, under active threat, or seriously 
worried about their prospects.”924 As a result once again the Embassy spent a 
disproportionate amount of time attempting to “keep up the pressure on the Government in 
Lisbon, keep in touch with Military Commander about physical protection if and when this is 
necessary, and keep in touch with the farmers themselves so that they do not feel isolated and 
neglected.”925 However, they counselled caution, believing these threats were not the result of 
“Revolutionary dynamism”, as the Portuguese Agricultural Minister claimed, but were a 
deliberate strategy by the radical left.
926
 The Embassy argued that “The Communists were no 
doubt pursuing two objectives. They wanted to win the support of the landless peasants by 
promising to make them free and rich through taking over the land of the ‘foreign exploiters’. 
But they also wanted to get the Portuguese Government disaffected from Britain and 
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Germany, the two countries most involved.”927 This raised the dilemma of how to protect 
British business interests whilst giving support to the provisional government. 
The US Embassy shared their British counterparts’ concerns over developments in the 
Alentejo region. A ‘study in depth’ by visiting State Department officials seen by the British 
Embassy concluded that “the farm take-overs were part of a carefully orchestrated communist 
plan, and not the result of a wild-cat action.”928 However, the difference was, a British 
official argued, that “The Americans were of course interested in these developments as 
evidence of the political, social and economic developments in the area; our own interest also 
extends to the protection of specific British interests.”929 This meant that the British Embassy 
became increasingly focused on how to defend its interests in Portugal rather than on wider 
concerns. The Labour Government’s distraction with domestic issues meant, an FCO official 
noted that, “The tactics on this whole question have been left to the British Embassy in 
Lisbon.” 930 The British Ambassador approached the Portuguese Prime Minister on the 3rd 
November with a list of British farmers whose land had been occupied or forcibly 
expropriated, and called for their compensation. However, without the support of other 
western states, this attempt was unsuccessful and even possibly counterproductive.
931
 An 
FCO official recorded that “Possibly as a result of ministerial action following our 
representations here, the Agrarian reform process in the Alentejo appears to be moving into a 
phase of open confrontation.”932 Therefore the British Embassy’s efforts to protect British 
farmers undermined efforts by the Labour Government to support and encourage the new 
government in Lisbon. 
The British farmers from the Alentejo region also sought to influence policy toward 
Portugal by lobbying in Westminster. Dozens of letters were sent to MPs critical of the 
British response, leading to their concerns being raised in both parliamentary debates and 
during private meetings with government ministers.
933
 This complicated Britain’s relations 
with Portugal; Foreign Office minister Roy Hattersley voiced the dilemma that although 
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“HMG would represent the interests of Mr Fairbairn’s constituents as forcefully as we could, 
of course we realised we might inevitably have to antagonise some people in the Portuguese 
Government machine. But we did not want to damage the long-term chances for 
democracy.”934 As a direct result of lobbying, Hattersley met the Portuguese Ambassador in 
London on the 21st October to raise concerns about the safety of British farmers. Although he 
had some successes, Hattersley’s planned visit to Lisbon, intended as a means to demonstrate 
support for the Azevedo government, became principally seen as a means of protecting 
British business interests in Portugal. An FCO official recorded that “Mr Hattersley said that 
he himself was going to Portugal next month, and would make representations about all this 
and stand on a few toes.”935 
There was also criticism of the Labour Government’s approach to Portugal from left-
wing members of the Labour Party. Their opposition reflected wider ideological divisions 
within the Labour movement during Wilson’s final term, rather than concern with 
developments in Portugal. In particular, relations between ministers and backbench MPs 
inside the National Executive Committee had fractured, with their differences being personal 
as much as political. This was illustrated by Callaghan’s comment, on his failure to attend a 
meeting, “It’s not because I’m too busy; it’s that I’ve no desire to attend a Committee which 
has people on it like Frank Allaun and Joan Maynard and Alex Kitson.”936 It also affected the 
NEC International Committee’s effectiveness. The minutes of one meeting recorded that “Mr 
T. McNally had previously been invited to the meetings of the committee as a channel of 
communication with the Foreign Office, but as other political advisers were not allowed to 
attend meetings of committees of the National Executive Committee, it was agreed that this 
invitation should be withdrawn.”937 This meant that government ministers were not present to 
oppose the drafting of a composite motion for the forthcoming party conference critical of 
policy toward Portugal. The TUC was also criticised by left-wing members for supporting 
Labour Government policy toward Portugal, the minutes of a meeting for affiliated trade 
unions expressing the intention “to give full consideration to support through international 
solidarity and further and if necessary to call on the Government to completely oppose any 
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intervention by N.A.T.O. forces.”938 There was also protest by other British far-left groups, 
such as the rally organised by the Portuguese Workers Co-ordination Committee held on 
Speakers’ Corner on the 20th September.939 
The Labour Party Conference, which began on the 29
th
 September, was an 
opportunity to express support for the new government in Lisbon. Soares attended the event 
as an observer and guest speaker, and was given a public statement of support from 
Callaghan.
940
 However, this notoriously bad tempered conference saw the dispute between 
two different versions of socialism in Lisbon shape debate within the Labour Party, meaning 
divisions on Portugal were publicly revealed. Left-wing MPs proposed a composite motion 
challenging policy towards Portugal, and disparate groups on the conference fringe, such as 
the Labour Party Young Socialists and the Bertrand Russell Foundation, protested at 
government policy and Soares’ presence.941 This was the first direct meeting between the 
Labour Party leadership and the Portuguese Socialist leader since he had rejoined the 
provisional government; intended to strengthen relations, the conference caused acute 
embarrassment to the Labour leadership.
942
 Soares’ hostile reception left a lasting impression 
which damaged future relations. During planning for a later meeting between Callaghan and 
Soares, the British Ambassador warned that “one of the points which Soares will probably 
bring up is the attitude of the Labour party representative at the meeting of the Socialist 
International two or three days ago.”943 Soares also recalled that “the representative (Jane or 
Jenny Little (sic), if I understand correctly) opposed aid to the PS, because the latter was too 
far to the right.”944 At a meeting on the 2nd January “both the Prime Minister and Ron 
Hayward went out of their way to assure him of continuing Labour Party support, the Prime 
Minister going so far as to tell him “to rely on the men and forget the women.”945 The 
embarrassment caused by the conference contributed to the breakdown in trust between 
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Labour ministers and the International Department within the NEC concerning policy toward 
Portugal. 
The chaotic organisation of the Labour Party conference also meant that Callaghan 
“was not, in the event, able to discuss with Mr Prentice in Blackpool the doubts Mr Prentice 
has exposed about the advisability of bilateral aid to Portugal.”946 During the following 
month dialogue between FCO and Treasury officials continued, but with Callaghan now 
focused on other issues, no agreement was immediately reached. The provisional government 
in Lisbon faced mounting opposition from the radical left which meant that they were 
distracted from lobbying western governments for economic aid. The British Embassy first 
reported rumours of a coup d’état on October 31st, the Ambassador ominously noting that 
“Although Lisbon is outwardly calm the political situation remains brittle. The Government’s 
efforts to impose their authority have not been an unqualified success.”947 The attempt by 
western governments to bolster the Lisbon government had failed. During the following 
month rumours of plots became a daily occurrence, until finally on November 25
th
 the army 
mutinied.  
 The Labour Government had grasped immediately after the appointment of the sixth 
provisional government that a democratic transition was now possible, but that the continued 
threat from the radical left, alongside Portugal’s mounting economic difficulties, made urgent 
financial support essential. However, its own economic problems prevented consensus in 
Whitehall on how this should be achieved and the failure to resolve this issue prevented the 
Labour Government from having significant influence in Lisbon. The threat to British 
farmers also meant that the Lisbon Embassy began to put pressure on the Portuguese 
government rather than give support. The cohesion of British policy towards Portugal was 
also undermined by the Labour Government’s domestic political difficulties. Developments 
in Portugal were not discussed at cabinet level throughout this period, whilst the FCO 
planning for Hattersley’s visit to Portugal changed from giving diplomatic and economic 
support to the provisional government, to sending a démarche calling for the protection of 
British farmers. There was little coordination of western policy towards Portugal once events 
there had ceased to be a Cold War crisis. There was also only irregular contact between the 
Labour Government and the Ford Administration because of their policy differences on other 
issues. The attempted coup d’état in November would mean that Britain, alongside the United 
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States, would once again play a significant role in Portugal. However, the Labour 
Government’s inability to respond effectively following the appointment of the sixth 
provisional government had long-term implications for Britain’s diplomatic influence in 
Portugal.  
 
The 25
th
 November coup d’état attempt  
The final act of Portugal’s political drama was a sudden, confused attempt by the 
radical left to seize power. They set out to destabilise the sixth provisional government after 
its appointment through a series of planned and spontaneous actions. This culminated in 
construction workers (calling for a 45% wage increase) surrounding Parliament on the 13
th
 
November in a siege that would last for several days, leading to counter-demonstrations by 
supporters of the government. By the final week of November, indiscipline in the Armed 
Forces led the Prime Minister to admit that the government no longer had full control over 
Lisbon and on the 24
th
 November, in a defining event, farmers supporting the government 
blocked routes into the capital. In response, a paratrooper regiment with allegiance to the 
radical left seized control of an airbase outside Lisbon on the following day. This led the 
provisional government to declare a state of emergency and, after a day of confusion in 
Lisbon, the mutiny was suppressed. In the months that followed the remnants of radical left 
influence in Lisbon were removed.
948
  
The Labour Government received accurate and reliable information concerning 
Portugal throughout the November crisis; the British Embassy first reported rumours of a 
coup d’état on the 31st October, and sent almost daily despatches thereafter.949 These included 
briefings from Sa Machado, under-secretary in the Prime Minister’s office and a close 
associate of Soares, who gave warning that the provisional government had placed the 
Portuguese security forces on alert in readiness for a breakdown of public order.
 950
 This 
enabled the Southern European Department to conclude as early as the first week of 
November that “The crisis of authority is moving into an increasingly violent phase of 
confrontation.”951 Therefore, unlike during similar crises in September 1974 and March 1975, 
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the regular and accurate reporting of the British Embassy enabled the Labour Government to 
predict the course of events. Wilson and Callaghan themselves were included within the 
Whitehall distribution of these despatches, whereas previously they had received only 
irregular summaries from the Southern European Department. Following the sixth 
provisional government’s appointment, the Labour Government also began receiving regular 
briefings from the Portuguese Ambassador in London.
 952
  
Despite being aware of the threats facing the provisional government, the Labour 
Government did not respond by changing its policy toward Portugal. There was little attempt 
to influence events, as had been the case during previous crises, such as sending public 
messages of support, or establishing contacts within the Portuguese military. Throughout the 
crisis the Labour Government was convinced that any coup d’état attempt would fail, and that 
instead, as an FCO official argued, “A compromise - not to say muddled – solution still 
seems more probable than violent confrontation.”953 The despatches sent by the British 
Embassy appear to have engendered a confidence that a transition to democracy remained the 
most likely outcome, unlike previous occasions when the Labour Government’s 
understanding had been principally shaped by contact with Kissinger (who viewed events 
through the prism of the Cold War) or Soares (who exaggerated their significance to his 
advantage). Because the Labour Government was better informed, rumours such as that “a 
sizeable proportion of the government had also gone north in case of a left-wing coup in 
Lisbon” or that “if the communists took over Lisbon, the Azores might separate from 
Portugal” were dismissed without influencing decision-making.954 By contrast, the Ford 
Administration was more susceptible to such rumours, particularly those concerning the 
activity of right-wing groups operating from the north of Portugal and Spain.
955
   
The Labour Government’s muted response also resulted from an urgent need to address 
domestic difficulties. Barbara Castle recalls that an informal Cabinet meeting held at 
Chequers on the 17
th
 November revealed “problems of almost insurmountable gloom.”956 
There were also problems in Northern Ireland, strikes in industry, continued divisions on 
Europe, factionalism within the Labour Party and an ongoing energy crisis. Moreover, the 
Labour Government faced the challenge, as a minority government, of ensuring that 
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legislation was passed following the opening of parliament on the 19
th
 November. These 
domestic difficulties led to the Labour Government’s decision to cancel a planned ministerial 
visit to Portugal. The proposed three day tour to be led by Hattersley and scheduled for the 
26
th 
November was cancelled on the 19
th
 November after attendance at a House of Commons 
vote became necessary to ensure a government majority. This decision was not a response to 
the political crisis in Lisbon; rumours of a coup d’état had existed whilst the visit was 
planned, and its purpose had been to demonstrate public support for the provisional 
government. However, the need to cancel the visit proved convenient because “a visit which 
went off at half-cock because of Portuguese preoccupation with a domestic political crisis 
would be worse than none at all.”957 This coincidence also meant there was little reaction in 
Lisbon, and therefore Britain’s relationship with Portugal was not harmed.    
The absence of a clear policy response may have been because a coup d’état was so 
antithetical to British interests that a covert operation was being planned instead. The British 
archival records do not support such an argument, although there are a greater number of 
missing files and closed documents for this period than for any other. However, the absence 
of an explicit response to events may be explained by a ‘state within a state’ of military and 
intelligence operatives planning an operation to thwart or reverse a left-wing coup d’état 
within a NATO member-state.
958
 This view is posited by a number of recent historians, with 
a number of secondary accounts by Portuguese historians, such as Gomes and Moreira de 
Sa.
959
 These accounts cannot be definitively disproved because their argument is based 
almost exclusively on unrecorded oral testimony and unsubstantiated sources.
960
 Had 
intervention been planned by the intelligence services with Wilson and Callaghan complicit, 
neither the FCO, the Lisbon Embassy, nor the Labour Cabinet had any awareness that such a 
programme existed. It also seems improbable that any sizeable covert operation could have 
been planned given the financial constraints the Labour Government faced during this period 
which, as we have seen, prevented bilateral assistance to the sixth provisional government. In 
his authorized history of the M15, Christopher Andrew also notes the antagonistic 
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relationship between the Wilson Government and the British secret services during this 
period.
961
 
There is a wide agreement amongst Portuguese historians that the United States 
planned a covert operation in Lisbon in the event of a successful coup d’état.962 There are US 
archival records which support this argument, but these are currently heavily redacted and 
reveal neither their scale nor intention.
963
 A “special channel of communication” was 
established with Antunes, and an offer of unspecified assistance was given, “in the event of a 
tragedy.”964 During a meeting with Carlucci in December, Antunes shared that his colleagues 
had “in the back of their minds ‘Kissinger’s offer of assistance’”, which he had believed 
might be “military assistance during the heat of the fray.” 965 However, there was not 
necessarily a US covert military programme in Lisbon; the US rejected Antunes’ request for 
money to buy small arms prior to the attempted coup d’état.966 The Ford Administration, like 
the Labour Government, was also distracted by a range of serious international and domestic 
issues during this period. The MPLA’s declaration of Angolan independence on the 10th 
November triggered South African intervention and the Cuban response which significantly 
increased Cold War tensions in the region.
967
 The ‘Halloween Massacre’ in Washington, also 
reduced Kissinger’s role within the Ford Administration.968 The attempt by Congress to 
restrict the activities of the CIA through the Church Commission also reduced any likelihood 
of a large-scale covert operation in Lisbon.
969
  
  
The absence of regular discussions between Kissinger and Callaghan during 
November 1975 demonstrates that Portugal was no longer considered a Cold War crisis. The 
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Anglo-American relationship had become strained by the Labour Government’s decision to 
cut defence spending in response to Britain’s economic difficulties.970 Kissinger warned 
Callaghan that “America’s long-term relations with the UK will inevitably have to take into 
account Britain’s standing as a partner in our common security enterprise.”971 However, a 
successful coup d’état in Lisbon would have caused such damage to the NATO alliance that 
the existence of contingency planning for a covert operation is probable, and, given the close 
institutional ties between the US and UK intelligence services, cooperation was likely, 
irrespective of the foreign policy of each government.
972
 There is some circumstantial 
evidence that Wilson and Callaghan were aware of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation 
on Portugal, but this was not shared with the Cabinet (some of whom opposed their support 
for the sixth provisional government) or relevant Whitehall departments.
973
 There is certainly 
no evidence of the Labour Government acting to prevent US planning of a covert operation, 
as had been the case following the 11
th
 March coup d’état attempt.974 Overall, a definitive 
account of intelligence operations in Lisbon can only be established once documents 
currently subject to the Official Secrets Act are accessible.
975
   
 
There is circumstantial evidence that events in Portugal were discussed during the 
Rambouillet conference. This gathering in France held between the 15
th
 and 17
th
 November 
was intended as a forum to coordinate the policy of western states in response to the energy 
crisis and the global recession. FCO planning for the conference, unlike for the Helsinki 
Summit in August 1975, did not include the subject of Portugal. Wilson records that the 
second day of the conference “began with an informal discussion between the Heads of 
Government on international affairs.”976 Because the aim was to encourage an open forum, 
there was no fixed agenda or officials present, which meant that there was no record of the 
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meeting; Wilson wrote that “It was agreed that what was said there should not be revealed 
outside.” 977 However, Wilson’s memoirs reveal that “After this long interval there is no harm 
in recalling that a good part of the talk related to Spain and the prospects of democracy 
there.”978 The host nation, as a neighbouring state, was increasingly concerned about events 
in Spain (with Franco’s health now deteriorating) and therefore became more prominent in 
the west’s response. Wilson recalls that “Giscard was at the time in closer touch with the 
Spanish session than the rest of us.”979 The likelihood that events in Portugal were raised 
during discussion of Spain suggests that these did not include possible covert intervention 
there, because Wilson would not have alluded to such an incendiary course within his 
memoirs.   
 
During November 1975, the Labour Government believed that diplomatic support 
alone would be sufficient to ensure the provisional government’s survival. This approach was 
poorly executed, with little attempt being made, unlike in previous crises, to coordinate 
policy with other western allies. This was partly because the Labour Government was 
distracted by domestic difficulties, but they were also much better informed of developments 
in Lisbon which meant they were confident throughout the crisis that any coup d’état attempt 
would fail. Britain’s economic weakness (the ODM eventually agreed to provide £10 million 
of development aid) also meant that, although the Labour Government remained a significant 
diplomatic actor in Lisbon, its influence was less than immediately after the April 
Revolution
980, an FCO official arguing that “the relatively modest amount of aid that the UK 
have been able to provide, while constituting some demonstration of UK support for the 
Portuguese, gives us no particular leverage with them.”981 
The actual course of events during the November coup d’état attempt remains a cause 
of controversy amongst historians of the Carnation Revolution.
982
 It is still unclear whether 
the radical left was intending to seize power, or whether the provisional government 
deliberately triggered a response, to allow its suppression. There was no direct British 
intervention in Lisbon during the coup d’état attempt. The Embassy was principally 
                                                             
977Ibid. 
978 Ibid. 
979 Ibid. 
980 Manning to FCO, Aid to Portugal’, 22 September 1975, PREM 16/1054. 
981Goodison to FCO, ‘The Mutiny of the 25th November’, 23 February 1976, FCO 9/2412.   
982 Manuel, The Uncertain Outcome, pp. 124-127. Gomes and Moreira, Carlucci vs Kissinger, pp. 335-357. 
Maxwell, The Making of Portuguese Democracy, pp.155-157. Robert Harvey, Portugal: Birth of a Democracy, 
pp.86-92. 
214 
 
concerned with the safety of British subjects, the Ambassador reporting that “We are 
instructing wardens in the Lisbon area to keep in touch with their flocks, reassure them, and 
remind them of the normal precautions to be taken in a disturbed situation.”983 The British 
Embassy was in contact with the provisional government throughout the final crisis, which 
meant it was fully aware of its political strength.
984
 The British Embassy was able to send a 
number of despatches to London during the crisis. The outcome of events in Lisbon brought 
renewed optimism that parliamentary democracy could be established in Portugal. The 
Embassy report that “There is an atmosphere of immense relief in Lisbon itself”, led the FCO 
to conclude that whilst “The events of 28 September 1974 and of 11 March 1975 were both 
serious setbacks”, this crisis “appears to have been a decisive victory to the forces of 
moderation, law and order, and resistance to Communism.”985  
The 25th November coup d’état attempt was the decisive turning point of the 
Portuguese Revolution.
986
 The provisional government was able to consolidate its authority 
and hold elections the following year, whilst the radical left’s influence declined, never again 
to achieve office. This outcome was welcomed by the Labour Government. A principal 
foreign policy aim of Wilson’s final term – the establishment of parliamentary democracy in 
Portugal – was achieved, whilst the threat to British interests, particularly the expropriation of 
land, could be resolved. However, the Labour Government’s decision not to intervene in 
Lisbon during the November crisis, along with its previous failure to provide substantial 
economic aid, meant that British influence in Portugal declined. Ironically, this also meant 
that they were unable to accrue any benefit from previous support for political moderates, and 
during the final stage of Portugal’s transition to democracy, the Labour Government, 
increasingly distracted by domestic political and economic difficulties, did not play an 
important role in supporting moderate politicians in Lisbon. 
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“An 11 March in reverse”987 
 The outcome of the coup d’état attempt removed any further danger of the radical left 
seizing power in Lisbon. During the following months, the sixth provisional government 
consolidated its hold on the institutions of power, enabling Parliamentary and Presidential 
elections to be held on the 25
th
 April and 27
th
 June. These revealed that an overwhelming 
majority of the Portuguese electorate supported moderate democratic parties. Melo Antunes 
(whose role within the AFM had been crucial during the Hot Summer) now became isolated; 
his commitment to “preserve some communist influence, so that this could act as a 
counterweight to any movement towards the right”, alongside his fellow military 
commanders’ withdrawal from politics, meant that he lacked any political power base.  988 
This political stability, however, now revealed Portugal’s economic problems, particularly of 
rampant inflation and rising unemployment, meaning that “it would still be necessary to 
stabilise the economy if the Portuguese were to achieve political stabilisation as well.”989  
The British Embassy viewed events in Lisbon as a decisive step towards establishing 
parliamentary democracy. The British Ambassador reported “a lengthy conversation 
yesterday with Dr Mario Soares, who was in a buoyant mood, declaring that all danger of a 
communist seizure of power had now been removed.”990 The British Embassy argued that 
evidence of renewed military discipline was highly significant, observing that “the image 
which the army is trying to project since these recent events is of a taut, disciplined and tough 
force rather than the over-confident hoi polloi they had become.”991 The British Ambassador 
noted the significance of the radical left losing “the power to interfere in the Constitution”, 
which he saw as “a practical recognition of the changing balance of power.”992 However, 
there was concern at the excessive optimism then prevalent in Lisbon, leading the British 
Ambassador to observe that “The economy is run down; foreign exchange has run out; 
unemployment figures have run up at the economic situation.”993 An FCO official concluded, 
“But I fear that when the current wave of elation has worn off some disillusionment will set 
in. The fact is that all the problems that were there before the mutiny still exist today.”994 The 
British Ambassador warned that “it will not be easy to convince everyone that Portugal needs 
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a government of moderates unable to deliver what revolutionaries have promised.”995 These 
concerns led the British Embassy to stress that despite changed political circumstances, 
protecting British interests in Portugal was a necessity. The British Ambassador concluded 
that the significance of recent political events would depend on the sixth provisional 
government’s response to these concerns, arguing that “This will be the test of the 
pudding.”996  
There was debate within the Labour Government, following the attempted coup 
d’état, as to the exact course of events during November 1975. In particular, confusion arose 
as to the role of the PCP, an FCO official noting that “A number of signs point to at least 
some degree of PCP involvement. But on the other hand the party as such failed to come out 
into the open to follow up on the paratroopers’ action.”997 The Labour Government, however, 
immediately grasped the significance of events: the opportunity to remove radical left 
influence from Lisbon, leading an FCO official to conclude that events were “an 11 March in 
reverse.”998 This statement demonstrated that events in Portugal were now understood 
through an analysis of previous crises since the April Revolution, rather than through 
historical parallels such as the 1948 communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia (which 
had previously been the case). The isolation of the radical left in Lisbon also meant that 
developments were no longer narrowly viewed through the prism of the Cold War. The 
British Ambassador, wary of Soviet involvement in Portugal, argued that the PCP was now 
being encouraged to remain in government, because “objective conditions did not exist for a 
seizure of power by the Communist Party.”999 He observed that since “Senhor Cunhal has in 
fact led his Party as though it was marching towards an October Revolution,” following the 
25
th
 November “the PCP seems to have been at sixes and sevens.”1000 This changed analysis 
meant that the Labour Government was now principally concerned with narrowly pursuing 
the British national interest in Portugal. There was a greater determination to ensure the 
protection of British farmers in the Alentejo, with any further assistance to the provisional 
government dependent on a resolution of the issue. 
The renewed optimism in a democratic outcome also meant that the Labour 
Government once again began supporting moderate parties and democratic institutions in 
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Portugal. There was a re-evaluation of those ties with Melo Antunes established during the 
Hot Summer, an FCO official noting that although his “personal stature has been increased 
by recent events”, the AFM’s role “has become harder to define if ‘pure politics’ are no 
longer to be the proper function of military men.”1001 Franco’s death on the 20th November 
made events in Spain the more urgent crisis on the Iberian peninsula. However, this gave 
greater urgency to efforts to establish democracy in Portugal, with a wide consensus within 
the Labour Government that “Portugal could exert considerable influence on Spain.”1002 In 
particular, following experience after the Portuguese Revolution, there was a belief that 
“Spain should be included on the agenda” at the Socialist International, particularly because 
her significance “made it even more important to try to develop a united Social Democratic 
approach to Spain.”1003  
The opportunity to promote democracy in Portugal coincided with the Labour 
Government facing a worsening domestic economic and political crisis. Wilson recalls that 
“December 1975 was by far the most hectic and harrowing month I experienced in nearly 
eight years as Prime Minister, indeed in the eleven years and over of my Cabinet 
experience.”1004 The need for further public spending cuts caused bitter divisions within the 
Labour Cabinet, whilst British borrowing at the IMF had “used up all that was available to 
her on easy terms”, meaning that a loan with conditionality was likely during 1976.1005 The 
Labour Government also faced domestic political difficulties, particularly in Northern 
Ireland, and the constant challenge of managing a minority government. This meant that 
despite political change in Lisbon there was no progress on bilateral aid. There was also 
noticeably less interest in Portugal amongst the members of the Labour Cabinet.  
The difficulty of pursuing a coherent foreign policy towards Portugal whilst 
addressing Britain’s domestic problems became evident during Soares’ visit to London on 
22
nd
 December. This was a final stop during a tour of west European capitals, and was the 
first opportunity to repair any damage to relations caused by the critical reception Soares 
received at the Labour Party Conference.
 1006
 During a meeting with Wilson and Callaghan, 
Soares sought to elicit further support from the Labour Government, stressing that “If Europe 
was going to help, it was now or never,” and strengthening his case by arguing that “likely 
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changes in Spain made it even more important that Portugal should achieve democratic 
stability, since there was a close connection between Portuguese and Spanish problems.”1007 
His principal request was for further economic assistance, an FCO official recording that they 
had already asked for “our help in obtaining loans from the IMF.”1008 Soares once again 
raised the subject of British imports of Portuguese textiles (EEC tariffs affected many 
Portuguese products)
1009
; an FCO official recorded that Wilson explained his inability to 
make concessions by arguing, “If there were not a world economic slump we could perhaps 
have weathered this, but the decision to restrict imports in this field had been taken by 
Cabinet and the Prime Minister saw no opportunity of reopening the question.”1010  
Soares also requested renewed support from the Labour Party to the PSP before 
campaigning for the forthcoming elections began. He expressed dissatisfaction “with the state 
of Labour Party/PSP relations at medium and lower levels”, comparing these unfavourably 
with those of other west European states.
1011
 Soares also expressed concern that whilst “the 
Socialists were now wrestling control of the trade unions from the Communists”, relations 
“were not as good as they might be with the TUC”, and again requested “closer contact at 
both local and regional level.”1012 Throughout this meeting, Soares was more assertive than 
on previous occasions, negatively comparing the support being offered by Wilson and 
Callaghan against that of other west European states.  
Despite the fact that “Dr Soares expressed satisfaction with his visit”, expectations of 
support were raised which the Labour Government was unable to meet, and relations with the 
future Portuguese Prime Minister began to deteriorate.
1013
 Harold Wilson’s final involvement 
in Portugal before his resignation was at the Socialist Conference held in Elsinore, Denmark, 
in January 1976. The gathering was intended to garner support for the PSP before 
forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, enabling the PSP “to appear to be 
intent on putting distance between themselves and the parties to the left and the right.”1014 
Wilson’s main contribution was a response to Mitterrand’s call for partnership with the 
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Eurocommunist movement, reciting the limerick “There was a young lady from Riga/Who 
went for a ride with a tiger”, which incensed both the French delegation and left-wing 
members of the National Executive Committee.
1015
 Wilson’s speech on Portugal supports the 
recent argument that a “Chilean shadow of neo-authoritarian reaction” existed within west 
European politicians’ understanding of Portugal.1016 Wilson told delegates that the critical 
issue was whether “the economy be stabilised in such a way as to establish social 
democracy”, warning that “there was a danger of right-wing reaction, which must be 
prevented.”1017 Despite attending the Socialist International meeting, increasing domestic 
problems meant that the Labour Government was unable to play any significant role, 
alongside other west European states, in supporting moderate political parties and democratic 
institutions in Portugal. During early 1976, operational policy towards Portugal was 
conducted by middle ranking officials within the FCO’s Southern European Department. 
Their approach was essentially the one they had pursued immediately after the April 
Revolution, until the Hot Summer made Portugal a Cold War crisis and therefore Wilson and 
Callaghan’s preserve.  
The first strategy was to develop institutional relationships between the British 
military and their Portuguese counterparts. They were largely unconcerned with the 
continued role played by the military in Lisbon, arguing that since the 25
th
 November “The 
AFM for all practical purposes no longer exists.”1018 The FCO noted that the continued role 
of the military was not surprising, given that “it was the military who brought about the 
downfall of the previous regime”, and also considering “the long tradition of military 
presidents in Portugal.”1019 The removal of the radical left from positions of command after 
the attempted coup d’état, and the return of those who had served in the overseas territories, 
allowed the restructuring of the Portuguese military as first proposed after the Carnation 
Revolution. This gave the opportunity for Portugal’s NATO allies to provide aid and 
expertise, an FCO official noting that “various parts of NATO are stirring with ideas about 
how to employ, and eventually reduce, armed forces which were developed to hold down a 
large Colonial empire, at the cost over recent years of the largest share of GDP in the entire 
                                                             
1015Austen Morgan, Harold Wilson, pg. 525.  
1016 Del Pero,‘'Which Chile, Allende?' Henry Kissinger and the Portuguese revolution’, p. 25. 
1017 ‘Extract from meeting of European Social Democratic leaders in Copenhagen’, 18 January 1976, PREM 
16/1054.    
1018 Ure to FCO, ‘ iolent Demonstrations’, FCO 9/2412.  
1019Trench to FCO, ‘Constitutional Pact’, 1 March 1976, FCO 9/2412. 
220 
 
Alliance.”1020 However, Britain’s economic weakness meant that any support would be on a 
limited scale, whereas the US was able to begin a programme of military training in which 
“they wish to encourage closer contacts between the Portuguese armed forces and those of 
other Allied nations as a means of instilling greater professionalism in the Portuguese 
military.”1021 The subsequent development of closer relations with other NATO members, 
alongside the departure of Marxist military officers, meant that the Portuguese military could 
be encouraged against further intervention in domestic politics. These contacts meant that 
during increased tension in Lisbon during early 1976, the British Embassy was able to report 
that “Both we and other Western Embassies have been approached in recent weeks by a 
variety of officers from all three of the Armed Forces seeking help or advice in unearthing 
and countering the plots of their opponents.”1022 
 The Labour Government also returned to providing the Portuguese security services 
with training and riot control equipment. This proved controversial, particularly after the 
Labour MP, Tom Litterick, witnessed their use in Lisbon during a visit sponsored by the 
pacifist Russell Tribunal Group. This incident received considerable international press 
coverage, alongside fatal shootings during a Porto demonstration.
1023
 The British military 
attaché in Lisbon was summoned “to discuss measures for the control of the civil order” , 
leading to a Whitehall policy review as to whether further support should be given.
1024 
An 
FCO official outlined the dilemma accordingly, writing that “As a result of stringent 
measures, especially rising prices, demonstrations would be arranged principally in Lisbon 
and Porto to provoke confrontations with the aim of discrediting the Government and the 
forces of Law and Order, demonstrations with which those same forces have only 
rudimentary ideas of dealing.”1025 The British military attaché in Lisbon forcefully argued 
that “if we are able to help Portugal weather this storm, immediate internal security assistance 
becomes almost as important as slower-to-arrive economic aid.”1026 The Whitehall review 
eventually concluded that, although “Deplorable as these incidents are”, the Portuguese 
security services “would be less likely to resort to shooting if they had alternative, non-lethal 
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equipment.”1027 Therefore a request was made to Scotland Yard “for appropriate films to be 
sent” which would assist with “the planning and execution of crowd control operations.” 1028  
Despite political change in Lisbon following the coup d’état attempt, protecting 
British agricultural interests remained a clear priority of the Labour Government. There were 
continued threats to British farmers in the Alentejo region, although not on the previous scale. 
The British Embassy expressed concern after the PCP retained a junior ministerial post on 
agrarian affairs.
1029
 Its understanding of the Alentejo region was also badly affected by the 
sudden death of Tom Spence, an attaché whose brief included Portuguese agriculture.
1030
 The 
Embassy’s analysis reached the pessimistic conclusion that the provisional government was 
“more concerned to protect itself against possible accusations that it is about to betray the 
Revolution by putting a stop to agrarian reform.”1031 Despite the general improvement in their 
circumstances, lobbying in Westminster by British farmers became more effective as other 
concerns with the political situation in Lisbon decreased. There was a series of written 
Parliamentary questions calling for intervention to support British farmers.
1032
 These 
culminated in calls by the Conservative opposition minister, William Whitelaw, to withhold 
further British aid to Portugal. An FCO official noted that “there are Parliamentary pressures 
on Ministers here which mean that they cannot be appearing to be neglecting these 
problems.”1033 Therefore, despite the need to continue support for the provisional 
government, the Labour Government maintained that “HMG have a responsibility towards 
British farmers and businessmen who have patiently held on through recent months of 
uncertainty.”1034 This led to an unsuccessful attempt by the British Ambassador “to obtain the 
agreement of the Portuguese Government to a general statement on their part (promising 
reinstatement, or compensation), which British Ministers could use in Parliament.”1035 
There was concern within the Labour Government that scheduled elections might be 
postponed after renewed political tension in Lisbon during January 1976. The British 
Embassy had been reporting that “the Government has so far proved rather disappointing in 
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the slowness with which it is managing to cope with fundamental economic and social 
problems besetting the country.”1036 The resulting political disturbances included a series of 
bomb incidents across Portugal, particularly in the northern regions and major cities.
1037
 
There was also apprehension that constitutional arrangements for the elections, agreed when 
the electoral commission had to “carry out their appointed task in the face of pressure from 
the Communists and extreme Left”, meant that there was “a Marxist flavour to many of the 
Constitution’s provisions.”1038 Likewise doubts were expressed as to whether Portugal could 
hold free-and-fair elections, with particular unease regarding the Portuguese media’s 
independence (after measures to reduce the radical left’s influence proved ineffectual) and 
concern at the ability of the Portuguese security services to maintain political order.
1039
 
Despite such concerns the British Ambassador basically remained optimistic, reporting that “I 
know I have painted a gloomy picture. By doing so I do not want to give you the impression 
that we are losing heart about the Portuguese Revolution.”1040 Nevertheless, the 
announcement on the 26
th
 February by President Costa Gomes that scheduled Parliamentary 
and Presidential elections would be held as planned was greeted with relief by the Labour 
Government.
1041
  
Despite the importance of the Portuguese elections to the Labour Government’s 
foreign policy, they coincided with a further deterioration in Britain’s economic 
circumstances, alongside the political drama of Wilson’s sudden resignation and the 
subsequent leadership election.
1042
 As a result little sustained attention was given to events in 
Lisbon, with no specific British policy response during election campaigning in Portugal. The 
Labour Government cancelled another proposed visit by Hattersley to Lisbon on the 1
st
 April 
as it coincided once again with a crucial Commons vote.
1043
 During 1976 (apart from 
attending the Socialist International meeting in Elsnore) Wilson played no role in British 
policy-making towards Portugal.
1044
 Although it was a closely guarded secret, Callaghan was 
informed on the 15
th
 March, several days before the Labour Cabinet, of Wilson’s decision to 
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resign.
1045
 Thereafter Callaghan focused on his leadership campaign, until his eventual 
success on the 5
th
 April, following a second ballot.
1046
 The new Prime Minister immediately 
faced “an exchange crisis and a growing domestic political crisis.”1047 Therefore Callaghan 
played no direct role in policy-making toward Portugal during this period.  
The electoral strategy of the PSP was to present itself as the party best able to manage 
a sound economy because its close relationship with other West European states meant 
further economic assistance was assured. This made public demonstrations of support from 
west European leaders a crucial element of electoral campaigning. The climax of this strategy 
was the Socialist International conference held in Porto on the 13
th 
and 14
th
 March.
1048
 This 
brought together leading politicians from across Western Europe, “making this an 
extraordinary occasion for the diffusion of a favourable image of Portugal and the PS, both 
internally and internationally.”1049 However, although fully aware of its significance, 
domestic political difficulties meant that neither Wilson nor Callaghan, nor indeed any 
leading member of the Labour Party, was able to attend. This gives clear support to the 
argument of revisionist historians of the 1970s Labour Government that its political weakness 
affected the coherence and effectiveness of its foreign policy.
1050
 The British Ambassador 
sent Callaghan’s message of support to Soares, containing an apology and an appeal that “I 
hope he will understand that we have a lot on at this particular moment.”1051 Such an 
impersonal and perfunctory message, given the significance of the conference to the PSP and 
Callaghan’s previous commitment to Portuguese democracy, demonstrates the scale of the 
Labour Government’s domestic political difficulties. This would have reinforced Soares’ 
perception that the Labour Government had reneged on its promise of support given 
immediately after the April Revolution. The Labour Government’s absence from the 
conference would also have been noted by its Western European allies, shaping their 
perception of Britain’s importance in the region. 
The inability of the Labour Government to provide significant support to the PSP 
during election campaigning was in contrast to that given by other western states. The Ford 
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Administration, although less involved in Lisbon than during the Hot Summer, was able to 
provide material aid after amending the 1976 budget to allow "extraordinary assistance to 
Portugal.”1052 The Dutch and German Social Democratic parties increased support to the PSP 
immediately after the Socialist International conference.
1053
 The West German government, 
believing economic stability to be the most important element for achieving a transition to 
democracy in Portugal, organised a visit to Lisbon by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher which was supported by economic diplomacy.
1054
 As a result, whereas the 
influence of the Labour Government declined, support provided by other west European 
states during this period was widely appreciated in Lisbon.
1055
 
During election campaigning in Portugal the most significant role played by Britain 
came from actors outside the Labour Government. Thus the greatest commitment to the CDS 
was made by the British Embassy in Lisbon, the British Conservative Party and The 
Economist, rather than the Labour Government. The British Ambassador welcomed the 
official Conservative Party delegation to the CDS Conference held on 1st April, which 
included leading MPs such as “Baroness Elles, Douglas Hurd MP and Rob Shephard of 
Central Office research department.”1056 British media reporting of events in Lisbon 
continued to have a high profile and shaped public discourse across Portugal during election 
campaigning. During March 1976, the British Ambassador noted that the ““prognostications 
that the PPD would take the lead over the Socialists in the election” (within Financial Times 
and Daily Express editorials) led to similar speculation within “weekly newspapers here 
today.”1057 The Lisbon Embassy particularly expressed concern that British press coverage 
was focused on the “poster-wars”, which meant journalists, such as Christopher Reed, an 
influential correspondent of The Guardian and Daily Express, were reporting that “politics 
have become more violent now than they were a year ago”, even though “we think his 
judgement may be coloured by his desire to give more spice to his coverage of the election 
                                                             
1052 Mario Del Pero quotes from Bernard D. Nossiter, ‘Socialists Plan Portugal Aid, 06.09.1975’, Cold War 
History, p. 53.   
1053 The FRG was channelling support through the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. See, Fonseca, 'The Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Portuguese Transition to Democracy’, p. 41. 
1054 Ibid. 
1055 Ibid.  
1056 Brooks to Fell, ‘The CDS National Conference’, 1 April 1976, FCO 9/2411. Hurd’s aptitude for foreign 
languages was noted by the FCO, who noted that “Although all speeches by foreign delegates were 
simultaneously translated, Hurd was the only one to include a few phrases in Portuguese which won him a 
standing ovation.” Ibid. 
1057 Ralph to Fell, ‘Elections’, 5 March 1976, FCO 9/2412.   
225 
 
campaign.”1058 British press coverage of events in Lisbon was less controversial now than 
during the Hot Summer, because the absence of a clear Labour Government policy toward 
Portugal meant that reporting was not seen as an element within a wider strategy of British 
intervention. 
During the final weeks of election campaigning there was a sudden predicament for 
the Labour Government after former President Spinola, on the 9
th
 April, requested an entry 
visa to the United Kingdom. Spinola had recently been linked with an arms deal supposedly 
intended to allow his supporters to seize power in Lisbon.
1059
 The British Ambassador 
warned that “Spinola’s recent behaviour suggests that he is under considerable illusions about 
the extent of his support here and that he continues (despite undertakings to host 
governments) to lend himself to plots against the regime.”1060 He therefore advised that “A 
brief visit to the UK, while seeking a more permanent refuge elsewhere, might not give rise 
to serious criticism here, but a prolonged stay would probably cause adverse comment, 
particularly during the present electoral campaign.”1061 This led Foreign Office minister, 
Hattersley, to conclude that “despite the UK’s tradition of political asylum for deposed Heads 
of State, the FCO should on this occasion advise the Home Office that General Spinola 
should not be admitted”, a view endorsed by Prime Minister Callaghan, who added that “we 
should keep out of this.”1062 The incident demonstrated particular sensitivity toward the 
provisional government and Portuguese public opinion, given that the former South 
Vietnamese President Thieu had recently been granted a temporary visa.
1063
 
The British Ambassador on the eve of the parliamentary elections, scheduled for the 
25
th
 April, reported that “the general state of Portugal remains calm and the level of political 
excitement, as compared with last year at this time, is distinctly lower.”1064 He reported that 
“It is widely expected that there will be some decline in the percentage turn out for the polls 
compared with last year. The novelty of free elections has to some extent worn off and many 
are disillusioned with the results of exercising a free vote.”1065 The likely reduction in PSP 
support led the Southern European Department to attempt, alongside Britain’s western allies, 
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to manoeuvre the PSP into a coalition with other moderate parties before the elections.
1066
 
The British Embassy was aware that the East German government (who they considered to be 
“acting as a cat’s paw for the Soviet Embassy”) had also approached the PSP, encouraging 
them to form a pact with the PCP.
1067
 Although the Labour Government did not fear 
communist representation in government, they believed that a majority socialist government 
would be best able to tackle the land reform question.
1068
 However, there was no direct 
attempt by the Labour Government to encourage Soares to consider forming a coalition, and 
the issue was not raised with him when he dined with the British Ambassador soon after the 
election on the 6
th
 May. Therefore, unlike previous occasions during the Portuguese 
Revolution, no confidential political advice was given to Soares by the Labour 
Government.
1069
  
 
The outcome of the Parliamentary election was broadly similar to the Constituent 
Assembly election the year before. The PSP remained the largest party with 34.97% of the 
vote, although there was some decline in their support. There was a slight increase in the 
PCP’s vote to 14.56%, whilst the greatest successes were those of the centre-right moderate 
parties who had suffered discrimination during the previous election.
1070
 The British Embassy 
expressed satisfaction at the result, which allowed the PSP to form a government without 
support from the radical left. It considered that given Portugal’s economic crisis, the PCP 
would be most disappointed with the outcome. There had been no contact with Soares during 
the election campaign, and although the Labour Government’s preference was for a coalition 
of political moderates, there was no attempt to influence the Portuguese leader in his 
decision. This reflected both Prime Minister Callaghan’s distraction by domestic issues and 
the fact that the new Secretary of State, Anthony Crosland, did not consider Portugal a 
priority. There is no evidence of any congratulatory note being sent to the new government in 
Lisbon which, if the case, illustrates how domestic difficulties affected basic diplomatic 
courtesies during this period. It also demonstrates Soares’ increasing self-confidence as a 
leader, which meant that he no longer consulted his western supporters before reaching 
important decisions. Following the parliamentary result there was discussion of potential 
candidates for the forthcoming presidential elections. His recent success led to calls for 
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Soares to stand as candidate. The FCO judged that this would serve the British national 
interest, given that “despite recent ups and downs, there is no doubt that in the case of Soares, 
his links with the British Labour Party would be very substantial dividend as long as that 
Party is the governing one in the UK.”1071 In the event General Eanes, a moderate military 
leader, stood in the Presidential election on the 27 June and won with 61% of the vote.
1072
 
The Labour Government expressed satisfaction that two years after the April Revolution, 
Portugal had made a successful transition to parliamentary democracy. 
During the months after the 1976 elections the new government in Lisbon struggled to 
address Portugal’s mounting economic problems. The Labour Government similarly wrestled 
with its own economic difficulties which culminated in the 1976 IMF crisis. As a result, 
despite the close relationship between Callaghan and Soares, there was little meaningful 
contact during this period, as indicated by the marked decrease in the number of FCO 
documents concerning Portugal in the British National Archives. Portugal was not a close 
concern of Anthony Crosland, Callaghan’s successor as Foreign Secretary, with the first 
official meeting not taking place until November 1976, in marked contrast to the regular 
contact which had followed the April Revolution. Therefore, despite Portugal having made a 
successful transition to parliamentary democracy, the Labour Government had no clear vision 
of its future relationship with Lisbon. By contrast, Washington played a prominent role in 
establishing a multinational ‘Jumbo Loan’ and supported the reorganisation of Portugal’s 
armed forces through the provision of military equipment.
1073
 There was concern within the 
FCO that Lisbon might approach the Labour Government for diplomatic support (as the 
‘oldest alliance’) during an application to join the EEC, because Portuguese membership 
would directly harm Britain’s economic interests. Hence the decision was made to publicly 
dissemble on the issue of Portuguese membership.
1074
 The Labour Government also gave no 
direct support to Portugal’s approach to the International Monetary Fund, fearing that this 
might undermine Treasury planning for a possible British emergency application.  
The successful transition to democracy in Portugal meant that only the Southern 
European Department now followed developments in Lisbon. The emphasis of policy was to 
develop cultural contacts in Portugal, particularly with educational and cultural exchanges, 
designed to counter the initiatives pursued by Eastern bloc countries after the April 
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Revolution (characterised as “Cossack dancers and the like”).1075 Thus the British Council 
provided the Portuguese government with information on the British Open University 
system.
1076
 This was an area in which the British Government, compared with other states, 
could assert great influence in Lisbon, but such initiatives were undermined by appeals for 
FCO funding being rejected.
1077
 Therefore whilst the Anglo-Portuguese relationship had been 
transformed since early 1974, Britain’s continuing political and economic difficulties meant it 
was unable to take full advantage of the opportunities that now existed to advance the 
national interest in Lisbon, as had appeared likely immediately after the April Revolution.  
 
Britain and Portugal’s transition to democracy  
The appointment of the sixth provisional government was the turning point of the 
Carnation Revolution; after the radical left’s attempt to seize power on the 25th November, 
Portugal ceased to be a Cold War crisis and, following elections in 1976, a parliamentary 
democracy was established. The emergence of a moderate government in Lisbon had been 
the Labour Government’s principal aim throughout the Hot Summer, but maintaining 
influence thereafter would prove to be its greatest challenge since April 1974. During 
previous crises Wilson, Callaghan and the FCO had played an important role in supporting 
moderate politicians in Lisbon and coordinating the western response. The new government 
urgently needed western assistance to address Portugal’s economic crisis and prevent the 
radical left from seizing power, but this proved impossible given the Labour Government’s 
own economic difficulties. This was particularly damaging because, as the British 
Ambassador observed, “the Portuguese expect us to give the Anglo-Portuguese relationship 
greater practical content than we have been in the habit of doing in recent years.”1078 It also 
made protecting British interests more difficult, even as the political situation in Lisbon 
improved. By 1976 proposed IMF and EEC assistance to Portugal even threatened to 
undermine the Labour Government’s plans to address Britain’s economic crisis.1079  
The Labour Government’s policy towards Portugal was also affected by its domestic 
political difficulties. Wilson and Callaghan gave less attention to Portugal than had been the 
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case during the Hot Summer, and as a result their close personal relationship with Soares had 
reduced significance; Anthony Crosland, Callaghan’s replacement as Foreign Secretary, 
demonstrated no interest in Portugal. This meant that the Labour Government’s approach to 
Portugal lacked coherence. The cancellation, twice, of proposed visits to Lisbon by 
Hattersley (because of being a minority government) damaged relations with Portugal. 
Britain’s economic crisis gave the Treasury greater influence over foreign policy, and as a 
result economic aid to Portugal was opposed. Ideological factionalism within the Labour 
movement prevented unambiguous support being given to the PSP. The far-left’s control of 
the NEC’s International Committee led exasperated government ministers, such as Tom 
McNally, to absent themselves from meetings on Portugal (a confrontation which 
foreshadowed those within the Labour Party during the following decade). These difficulties 
demonstrate that to be effective, British foreign policy required strong leadership from the 
Prime Minister; otherwise Parliamentary Sovereignty would undermine its cohesion. 
There was less cooperation between the Labour Government and the Ford 
Administration on Portugal during this period, principally because events in Lisbon were no 
longer considered a Cold War crisis. With the exception of the political crisis in November 
1975, British and American defence and intelligence officials did not collaborate as closely 
on Portugal as they had during the Hot Summer. The United States was increasingly 
concerned with the activities of the Soviet Union elsewhere, particularly in Angola, which 
did rapidly become a Cold War crisis. However, the Labour Government’s principal aim in 
southern Africa remained bringing to an end white minority rule, rather than preventing the 
spread of communism. This difference in approach from that of Washington (which was in 
contrast to their close cooperation on Portugal during the Hot Summer) supports the view that 
the Labour Government had a conception of the Cold War which was principally concerned 
with the balance of military forces in Europe.  
The Labour Government and the Ford Administration, although both committed to 
establishing parliamentary democracy in Lisbon, no longer closely coordinated their 
approaches to Portugal during this period. The Labour Government’s inability to provide 
substantial economic assistance to Portugal contributed to a wider deterioration in relations 
with the United States. By contrast, West Germany became more significant in the United 
States’ foreign policy towards Portugal. This supports a recent study of the Anglo-American 
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relationship which contends that deterioration began even prior to the 1976 IMF crisis.
1080
 
The reestablishment of close Anglo-American relations had been a principal aim of 
Callaghan after his appointment as Foreign Secretary (the previous government had allowed 
its decline). By 1975 events in Portugal were no longer seen by the Labour Government as a 
means to repair ties with Washington. A close personal rapport still existed between 
Callaghan and Kissinger, but this was no longer the primary aim of British foreign policy. 
Their differences on Portugal immediately after the provisional government’s appointment 
demonstrate that, although a divergence of opinion existed between the US and Britain, 
because this was within the spectrum of opinion held by their officials, in this case there was 
no damage to Anglo-American relations. Their cooperation on Portugal during the 25
th
 
November crisis also shows the value of their relationship during periods of acute political 
crisis. 
The emergence of a moderate government in Lisbon gave West European states a 
crucial role in supporting democracy in Portugal. This was made clear in the final declaration 
of the PSP conference which concluded that “Portugal belongs to Europe – Europe must 
recognise its responsibilities towards Portugal.”1081 Del Pero even suggests that there was a 
distinctly west European approach to Portugal which differed from that of the United 
States.
1082
 Thus the European Council expressed hopes that “What the Community had to 
show the Portuguese was that steps towards pluralistic democracy would lead to the 
maximum possible assistance from the Community.”1083 The Labour Government would 
have been expected, as a West European state and governing socialist party, to give 
significant support to the new government in Lisbon. It clearly understood the importance of 
developments; in a speech to other West European leaders Soares noted that “the country had 
said yes to socialism and no to dictatorship.” 1084 However, Britain’s economic weakness 
prevented the Labour Government from playing a significant role within the West European 
response; its proposal for EEC funding was a means of advancing British interests in Lisbon, 
rather than grasping the potential of a European foreign policy. The expressions of support 
for the radical left by members of the Labour Party prevented the Labour Government from 
articulating a clear vision of social democracy in Portugal. Therefore a distinctly European 
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approach on Portugal, rather than being an opportunity, proved a challenge for the Labour 
Government. In contrast, West Germany was able to confidently lead other states in their 
support of democracy in Lisbon. Hence, although West European assistance proved crucial to 
the democratic outcome in Portugal, this did not include a substantial amount from the 
Labour Government. 
The Labour Government’s failure to play a significant role in events in Lisbon also 
challenges accounts of the Portuguese Revolution which stress the role of outside powers in 
ensuring a democratic outcome.
1085
 The Labour Government’s support for political moderates 
was certainly less significant in this period than during the Hot Summer. The perception of 
British support, however, remained important in Lisbon. This allowed informal British actors, 
such as the media and trade unions, to have greater influence. The potential of such an 
approach (the contemporary concept of Soft Power) was not clearly understood, with the 
Labour Government giving no direct encouragement to the activity of such groups.
1086
 The 
experience of supporting democracy in Portugal did, however, influence the FCO’s approach 
to Spain, recognising that previously “The Labour Party response, quite frankly, was 
deplorable.”1087  Thus assistance was given to moderate parties in Spain immediately after 
Franco’s demise, and the Madrid Embassy sought “to acquaint ourselves with the widest 
possible range of elements in the opposition.”1088 Therefore, although the Labour 
Government’s support of democracy in Portugal was largely inadequate, its experience meant 
that there was an embryonic understanding of how democratic transitions occur which would 
influence its response elsewhere, such as Eastern Europe during the 1990s. 
 
 The period after the appointment of the sixth provisional government saw significant 
changes to how Britain’s foreign policy towards Portugal was made. The emergence of a 
government in Lisbon dominated by political moderates meant relations could be conducted 
through state-to-state diplomacy. This allowed the British Embassy, which had often 
struggled to understand developments in Lisbon, to work closely with the provisional 
government. It became far more effective, giving both accurate predictions and 
demonstrating greater initiative defending British interests. The FCO’s analysis of events also 
became more cogent, being informed by an understanding of events in Portugal since the 
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April Revolution rather than by making historical comparisons. However, the continued 
threat to British farmers in the Alentejo region meant that the Labour Government was 
concerned with the radical left’s activities even after its influence in Lisbon declined 
following the 25
th
 November coup d’état attempt. Thus paradoxically, despite the 
improvement in the political situation in Lisbon, lobbying by British farmers in Westminster 
became more urgent. The role of the British intelligence services during this period remains 
unclear; although they appear to have been active in Portugal, this seems to have been 
separate from, rather than integral to, the Labour Government’s approach.  
 During the period after April 1974, the Labour Government was an important 
diplomatic actor in Lisbon; once democracy was established, however, although its foreign 
policy objectives in Portugal were largely achieved, British influence declined. By the end of 
1976, relations with Lisbon were similar to those in the period during the 1960s, when 
Britain’s traditional relationship with Portugal was undermined by wider policy differences. 
This reflected a crisis in British foreign policy which resulted from its economic weakness. It 
was only in ‘soft power’ that the opportunity existed to restore British influence in Portugal. 
This was recognised by the British Ambassador in Lisbon, who argued, concerning an ODM 
programme, that “I hope that as it gathers momentum we can put more resources into it, not 
only for the sake of the spread of British culture, but because in the long run it will pay 
commercial and political dividends.”1089 
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Chapter IX - Conclusion  
The Labour Government’s response to the Carnation Revolution was shaped not only 
by developments in Portugal but by wider domestic and international circumstances. The 
1970s were a period of transition in Britain’s world role, and its response to the Portuguese 
Revolution shows it adjusting to these new realities; in particular there was on occasions a 
clear gap between its goals and its capabilities. It was also a period of domestic instability 
(resulting from the minority government), unique given its recent history and the nature of its 
voting system. Immediately after the April Revolution participants in Britain, Portugal and 
elsewhere believed Britain would play an important role in the outcome of events, but its 
ability to intervene in Lisbon steadily dwindled. By late 1975, British foreign policy was 
conducted in circumstances where “ministers had to be yanked out of official visits to fly 
back for crucial divisions in the House of Commons” and in which “the lack of resources 
hung over any attempt to pursue foreign policies, which might require something more than 
words to back them up.”1090 Britain’s inability to respond effectively to events in Lisbon 
made its decline as a power obvious to other states. Thus although the eventual outcome of 
the Portuguese Revolution served her interests, Britain was no longer considered a leading 
player in Lisbon.  
 
This thesis has shown that the Labour Government’s response to events in Portugal 
had two distinct stages. The first was the period after the April Revolution when its main 
objective was to encourage immediate independence for Portugal’s overseas territories. The 
principal motivation for this policy was that if Mozambique were to achieve independence, 
sanctions against Rhodesia might be fully enforced, giving the prospect of a resolution to a 
foreign policy issue which had bedevilled successive British governments. Chapter I revealed 
that the persistence of the Portuguese Empire had been a recent campaigning issue for 
sections of the Labour movement and the British electorate, as recent studies have shown.
1091
 
Therefore encouraging Lusophone decolonisation was also a means of challenging the 
widespread criticism of the 1970s Wilson Government, as identified by historians of the 
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Labour Party, that it ceased to be idealistic once in office.
1092
 Chapter II shows that Britain’s 
commitment to political change in Lisbon should not be considered separately from its 
objective of encouraging Lusophone decolonisation. Its support for the PSP in Lisbon, rather 
than being merely partisan as suggested in a recent article by António Simões Do Paço, was 
intended to encourage immediate independence in the overseas territories.
1093
 This approach 
was detrimental to the Labour Government’s relations with President Spinola, whose 
resignation and replacement by the radical left damaged its interests in Portugal. Despite its 
commitment to restoring a close Anglo-American relationship, the Labour Government’s 
approach to Portugal after the April Revolution differed from that of the Nixon 
administration, which considered events as a solely Cold War concern (particularly its 
implication for the Azores military bases and the integrity of the NATO alliance), given the 
presence of communist ministers in the government in Lisbon.  
 
The first stage in its response to events in Portugal supports the argument of 
revisionist historians that the Labour Government did have an effective foreign policy during 
this period.
1094
 The immediate improvement of Anglo-Portuguese relations after the April 
Revolution showed the continued status of Britain in Portugal. Chapters II and III show that 
Britain was able to provide much of the policy expertise required by the new government in 
Lisbon, especially concerning the decolonisation process, but also with regard to electoral 
law, security issues and public administration.
1095
 The Labour Government also held a series 
of bilateral meetings with the provisional government and its western allies on events in 
Portugal, including Callaghan’s visit to Lisbon in February 1975.1096 The immediate response 
therefore gives support to the argument that Britain continued to have relevance as a global 
actor during this period. The election of a Labour Government in February 1974 was also 
significant. The Labour Party was unequivocally committed to political change in Lisbon, 
especially through its opposition to Caetano’s 1973 London visit (in contrast to the Heath 
Government which was compromised by its relationship with the regime). The Labour 
Government’s policy towards Portugal was strongly influenced by the group of radical left-
wing ministers, appointed by Harold Wilson, who had led protests against the Caetano 
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regime and its colonial policies. The Labour Party’s archival records and Callaghan’s private 
papers demonstrate that they were in regular contact with leading Portuguese politicians in 
Lisbon and with national liberation movements in Lusophone Africa, playing a critical role in 
facilitating the first negotiations on independence. The Labour Government’s immediate 
response to the Portuguese Revolution supports Anne Hall’s argument that the 1970s Labour 
Government demonstrated a unity of purpose on foreign affairs based on social democratic 
values.
1097
  
 
 The second stage of the Labour Government’s response was motivated by the Cold 
War implications of events in Portugal. The activity of the radical left in Lisbon after 
Spinola’s resignation alarmed the Labour Government, but the sudden attempted 11th March 
coup d’état and the direction thereafter brought an urgent reassessment of its approach to 
Portugal. The Labour Government remained optimistic that, if elections were to be held, 
Portugal would become a parliamentary democracy, but the possibility, however remote, of a 
Marxist government became the most important influence on Britain’s policy. Its primary 
concern was the threat to NATO were Portugal either to remain in the alliance with 
communist ministers in government, or to leave, and even invite the Soviet military into the 
Iberian Peninsula. There was also increasing concern with protecting British business 
interests in Portugal, especially following lobbying of MPs in Westminster. The perceived 
depth of the crisis is clearly shown in Callaghan’s hand-written jottings on an FCO 
document, which outline possible scenarios in Portugal including civil war and communist 
intervention.
1098
 This led the Labour Government to raise concerns about communist activity 
in Portugal with the Soviet Union at the Helsinki Summit. It also sought to give more support 
for political moderates in Lisbon and provide assistance to the Portuguese economy. 
However, this thesis has demonstrated that it became increasingly difficult (for domestic 
reasons) for the Labour Government to have an effective policy towards Portugal in contrast 
to that of its other western allies, especially the United States and West Germany.  
This second stage of Britain’s response provides support for the argument of 
historians that the Labour Government lacked effective instruments for an independent 
foreign policy during the 1970s. Despite the seriousness of developments in Lisbon, which 
directly threatened Britain’s interests, there was a marked decrease in its diplomatic activity 
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in Portugal during the Hot Summer. This is most clearly seen in Britain’s inability to respond 
to urgent requests from the provisional governments in Lisbon for economic assistance 
through the promise of bilateral aid, but was also the case on other occasions such as its 
refusal to remove tariffs on Portugal’s textile imports.1099 The impact on Britain’s military 
power of economic decline is seen in the RAF’s limited role in the evacuation of Portuguese 
nationals from Angola. The domestic political instability facing the Labour Government 
during the Hot Summer also undermined its approach to Portugal.
 
There were crucial points 
when the Labour Government was distracted by domestic crises, which led to the cancellation 
of ministerial visits to Lisbon. Its approach to Portugal also exacerbated divisions within the 
Labour movement, where democratic socialist members were sympathetic to the cause of the 
radical left in Lisbon.  
In assessing the Labour Government’s response it is important to consider that this 
was a period of significant difficulties for governments across the western world. Despite the 
limitations imposed on its foreign policy the Labour Government continued its support for 
parliamentary democracy throughout the period. There were also occasions when the Labour 
Government acted firmly and effectively, particularly when raising Soviet intervention in 
Portugal at the Helsinki Summit and its contact with the United States during late 1975. 
Britain’s economic weakness meant that it increasingly acted through multilateral and 
supranational organisations, especially the EEC and Socialist International, and thereby 
contributed to assistance which historians have argued was the critical factor in Portugal’s 
transition to democracy.
1100
 By encouraging British non-governmental actors such as trade 
unions and the opposition parties to play a role in Portugal, the Labour Government also 
showed an awareness of the possibilities of British soft power. There was also closer 
cooperation with the Ford administration on Portugal now that Kissinger’s Cold War 
concerns were shared.  
 The response of the Labour Government to events in Portugal shows that it remained 
a relevant diplomatic actor in Lisbon throughout most of the revolution, although this 
declined with its worsening domestic problems during 1975. Its response to the Portuguese 
Revolution gives support both to a traditional and a revisionist interpretation of the Labour 
Government. There was undoubtedly a decline in Britain’s global influence during the 1970s, 
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but this was not a collapse, as has been argued by some historians.
1101
 There was a 
determination to be a leading player, even if this was in cooperation with other states and not 
as an independent actor, and there was a greater realism in its foreign policy response. This 
supports the argument of those revisionist historians who argue that the 1970s Labour 
Government had a number of impressive achievements, particularly in foreign relations, 
which (given domestic political weakness and Britain’s economic and military decline) 
demonstrated the political capabilities of its front-bench ministers.  
 
Britain’s response to events in Portugal had three interesting components. The first 
was the continued relevance of the ‘oldest alliance’ to Anglo-Portuguese relations. Although 
regularly cited by British officials, this was never a primary motivation in shaping policy 
towards Portugal and its tenets were never clearly articulated or its contemporary relevance 
explained. Recent historical research has detailed the difficult relationship between Britain 
and the Caetano regime.
1102
 However, the ‘oldest alliance’ was significant and neither party 
dismissed its relevance. The ambiguity of the concept, which existed almost outside of state 
relations, allowed its continuation almost irrespective of events. Hence the ‘oldest alliance’ 
was an unquestioned substructure to the Anglo-Portuguese relationship which, although not 
clearly expressed, was nonetheless believed to shape contemporary relations. It was 
analogous to the Anglo-American alliance: an asymmetrical, sometimes difficult, but 
nonetheless constant friendship, with clear areas of common interests and shared cultural 
values. The Anglo-Portuguese relationship was based on geopolitics and history. Both were 
Atlantic-orientated, global trading states on the periphery of continental Europe. Their 
emergence concurrently as nation-states, habitually in cooperation, occasionally in 
competition, meant they had faced recent historical challenges together. This led to a close 
transnational relationship, largely unexplored in this study of state-to-state relations, with 
regular travel and trade, leading to deep ties (such as the fortified wine industry established in 
Porto during the eighteenth century). Hence whilst never a principal motivation of the Labour 
Government, the ‘oldest alliance’ meant Britain’s participation in events was never 
questioned.      
 The second component was the Labour Government’s commitment to establishing 
parliamentary democracy in Portugal. This appears an obvious stance given Britain’s political 
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values in the 1970s, but it was a distinct feature of its policy response. The opinion was 
widely held amongst western political scientists and commentators that parliamentary 
democracy was not compatible with Catholic, southern Mediterranean (and Latin American) 
societies, similar to the contemporary debate concerning the Islamic world.
1103
 This attitude 
was shared by a number of FCO officials but Labour ministers always expected Portugal to 
become a parliamentary democracy. There was never a calculation made as to whether a 
democratic government would best serve British interests, in marked contrast to the United 
States who contemplated supporting another right-wing authoritarian government after the 
April Revolution.
1104
 Therefore the Labour Government’s response to events in Portugal 
appears to support Peter Jones’s argument that there were “elements of a socialist foreign 
policy” which meant that “it should adopt a position in opposition to dictatorial and 
undemocratic regimes.”1105 It is interesting that the option of another authoritarian 
government was not considered by the Labour Government despite the seriousness for 
Western Europe were Portugal to have a Marxist- orientated government. 
 
The Labour Government’s support for democracy demonstrated awareness that 
Portugal was essentially a conservative country, particularly in the north, where attraction to 
Marxist left-wing ideas was an understandable reaction to fifty years of reactionary 
authoritarian rule. Its support for Portuguese democracy challenged British public cynicism 
with regard to the Labour Government and was a conduit for the political idealism of the 
Labour movement.
1106
 This thesis has demonstrated the strength of the Labour Party’s anti-
imperial tradition. There was a generation of internationalist Labour ministers whose political 
views were shaped by the events of the mid-twentieth century, particularly the anti-colonial 
struggle, for whom the relevance of democracy to all peoples was unquestioned. An 
interesting counter-factual consideration is Britain’s likely policy response had the 
Conservative Party won the February 1974 election; it had greater links with the previous 
regime and British interests in Portugal. It might have supported the PSP as the party with the 
best prospect of bringing democracy to Portugal, but it would not have had a close 
relationship based on shared values. The Labour Government, however, sought the 
establishment of a parliamentary democracy on the Westminster model and a process of 
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decolonisation in Lusophone Africa based on the British experience. Its approach to 
supporting democracy was based on Britain’s immediate post-war practice, with an emphasis 
on press freedom and independent trade unions. It was not influenced by the emerging ideas 
of human rights and civil society prominent in the 1970s, which hold interest for political 
scientists studying the Portuguese Revolution.  
 
The third interesting component of the Labour Government’s response was its 
conduct of a parallel foreign policy of formal state relations with the provisional governments 
in Lisbon and informal support for the PSP through close partisan ties. The Labour 
Government’s goal of achieving Lusophone decolonisation meant providing support to 
Soares, the PSP leader, who as Foreign Secretary led Portugal’s negotiations. Its overt 
support for the socialist party therefore reflected not only partisan ties but also the pursuit of 
Britain’s national self-interest. Chapter III shows that following the resignation of President 
Spinola its support for the PSP remained not only partisan but the best means of ensuring a 
democratic outcome in Portugal. However, following the PSP’s resignation from government 
during the República affair, the Labour Government faced the difficulty of continuing its 
support for the PSP when it was in open confrontation with the provisional government; this 
was a situation which was complicated by a need to defend British business interests in 
Portugal by lobbying the government in Lisbon (which would not be effective if it was seen 
to be actively supporting its opponents). It therefore served Britain’s national interest for 
support to be given to the PSP through the Labour Party (and Socialist International). The 
Labour Party archival records, alongside Callaghan’s private papers, reveal that the Labour 
Government conducted a parallel approach to relations with Portugal during the Hot Summer, 
which was separate from the formal institutions of policy making in Whitehall. Its approach, 
however, was undermined by the divisions within the Labour Party during this period, 
particularly within the International Department of the NEC, on wider domestic and 
international issues (which the power struggle in Portugal reflected). These divisions became 
public after visits by radical left Labour MPs to Portugal and protests at the Labour Party 
Conference and these damaged the Labour Government’s relationship with Soares and the 
PSP. 
This study also contributes to our understanding of the nature of British foreign policy 
during the mid-1970s. The Anglo-American relationship is a critical factor in explaining the 
Labour Government’s response to events in Portugal. It had atrophied following Britain’s 
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withdrawal from overseas military commitments and Edward Heath’s attempted reorientation of 
Britain’s foreign policy towards Europe. The principal foreign policy goal of the Wilson 
government after its election was to reinstate close relations with the United States; as one of the 
most significant international crises of the period, the Portuguese Revolution was an opportunity 
to pursue this foreign policy goal. This thesis therefore argues that the regular and close 
cooperation on Portugal between Callaghan and Kissinger in late 1974 and early 1975 was partly 
the result of a desire to improve Anglo-American relations. The Italian historian Del Pero has 
shown that there was a fundamental disagreement between the Western European states 
(including the Labour Government) and the United States in their response to the Carnation 
Revolution. But policy differences on Portugal were subsumed within the wider Anglo-American 
relationship. In particular, the Labour Government sought to facilitate US diplomacy within the 
NATO alliance even when it disagreed with its approach. This supports the view of historians 
who stress that the Anglo-American relationship was based on close institutional ties which were 
maintained irrespective of the national interest on a particular issue.
1107
 It also suggests that the 
importance of Britain’s relationship with the United States had increased as its global influence 
decreased and that Britain’s decline as a power increased the asymmetrical nature of their 
relationship. 
The Labour Government was largely successful in establishing a close relationship with 
the US Administration. This supports the argument made by Peter Jones and Kenneth Morgan 
that in the post-war era Labour Governments have often been most successful in establishing 
close ties.
1108
 Kissinger and Callaghan, as both their memoirs assert, had a close personal 
relationship despite differing political values (much like that between George W. Bush and Tony 
Blair). Their open and robust discussions on Portugal, evident in the archival record, support the 
view that shared cultural values underpin the Anglo-American relationship.
1109
 The exchange of 
information on Portugal also demonstrates the existence of a close institutional relationship 
between their diplomatic, intelligence and defence communities, cooperation which occurred 
irrespective of the stated policy goals of each government. Although there were fundamental 
differences between Britain and the United States on Portugal, this did not harm the Labour 
Government’s approach to relations with Washington and it continued to seek to work closely on 
Portugal. The Labour Government was also aware of differences (although not their extent) over 
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Portugal between Kissinger and the State Department. But it did not seek to use this knowledge to 
influence the policy process in Washington, only to facilitate diplomatic relations. 
However, while the April Revolution coincided with a period of improving Anglo-
American relations, Britain’s worsening economic crisis at the end of 1975 reduced its usefulness 
to Washington. Despite regular discussions on Portugal there was not a common Anglo-American 
response, even though the establishment of the sixth provisional government both enabled and 
necessitated western assistance. This supports the argument that the United States began to work 
closely with other leading Western European states. Jones argues that “successive American 
administrations effectively dealt with Europe as a whole unit and, in consequence, took note of 
the views of other European leaders, almost, if not equally, as much as those expressed by 
Britain.”1110 In particular, it is significant that the Ford Administration did not seek to work 
through the Labour Party in order to coordinate with the Socialist International. Instead the US 
archives show that it held discussions with the officials from the FRG and Sweden. This 
demonstrates that the Anglo-American relationship went through another period of transition 
during late 1975, supporting recent historical research which argues that improved Anglo-
American relations had begun to decline even before the 1976 IMF crisis (as previously argued by 
historians).
1111
  
The Cold War was also a primary factor in shaping the Labour Government’s foreign 
policy during this period. Britain was more sceptical of Soviet motives during east-west détente 
than any other leading participant and this is clearly shown in its response to events in Portugal. 
After the April Revolution the Labour Government believed that the leftward direction of events 
was the result of indigenous causes, principally the understandable reaction of the Portuguese 
public to several decades of reactionary authoritarian rule. By contrast, the Nixon Administration 
immediately viewed developments in Lisbon through the prism of the Cold War. The Labour 
Government remained sanguine about the influence of the PCP in Lisbon following the 
resignation of President Spinola, and during the visit to Moscow showed that it was more 
concerned with improving relations with the USSR than protesting its involvement in Portugal. 
However, following the 11
th
 March coup d’état attempt, the Labour leadership and highest 
ranking officials within the FCO expressed concern at the Cold War repercussions of events in 
Portugal. It led to the decision to raise these concerns with the Soviet Union in Helsinki, an 
intervention which features prominently in existing historiography of the western response to the 
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Portuguese Revolution.
1112
 This study has shown that this was the result of developments before 
the Helsinki Summit rather than concerns immediately after the April Revolution. The depth of its 
apprehension during the summer of 1975 is demonstrated by Britain’s willingness to discuss 
events in Lisbon bilaterally with the Soviet Union, which was in contrast to other western states.   
The principal Cold War concern after the 11
th
 March coup d’état was the potential military 
implications for the NATO alliance. This was of more concern to Britain than the presence of 
communist ministers in Lisbon immediately after the April coup d’état and the establishment of 
post-independence Marxist governments in Lusophone Africa, and shows the continuing critical 
importance of the NATO alliance to post-war British foreign and defence policy. The political 
implications of the Portuguese Revolution on the western alliance have not yet been fully 
explored by diplomatic historians, with research yet to be completed in the NATO archives, but 
this study demonstrates its significant impact on wider British foreign policy. It did not share the 
United States’ immediate concern that the appointment of Communist ministers to the provisional 
government endangered the security of the NATO alliance, fearing instead the consequences in 
Lisbon were the west to appear to intervene in Portugal’s internal affairs (after all, the Salazar 
regime had been welcomed into the western alliance). The Labour Government initially sought to 
dissemble on the issue of Portuguese representation within NATO’s planning councils. However, 
after the 11th March coup d’état attempt, the possibility (albeit remote) of Soviet military bases 
on the Iberian Peninsula was viewed as entirely unacceptable by the Labour Government and it 
changed its policy response to the Portuguese Revolution. This demonstrates that the military 
balance between east and west was its primary concern, rather than the political cohesion of the 
NATO alliance, and that in spite of détente the Soviet Union remained a military threat to 
Western Europe. This is shown by its willingness to raise events with the Soviet leadership during 
their bilateral meeting at the Helsinki Summit. It was clearly a touchstone issue for the highest 
echelons of the British Government, demonstrating the continuance of traditional Cold War 
attitudes on the European balance of power amongst the Labour leadership and FCO officials 
(left-wing members of the Labour Party invariably opposed continued membership of NATO). It 
is illustrative that there was not the same concern with developments in Angola during 1975, as 
shown by Geraint Hughes in a recent article.
1113
 
The Labour Government’s reaction to events in Portugal shows the importance of 
multilateral organisations in the conduct of Britain’s foreign policy during this period. Its 
                                                             
1112 MacQueen and Oliveira, ''Grocer meets Butcher', pp. 29–50. 
1113 Geraint Hughes, ‘Soldiers of Misfortune’, p. 499. 
243 
 
response was shaped by Britain’s recent membership of the supranational EEC. Despite its 
divisions on membership and scepticism towards further integration, the Labour Government 
encouraged its embryonic foreign policy institutions to play a role in Portugal. This included, 
in particular, supporting an evolution of the EIB’s mandate to allow the provision of 
economic assistance to non-member states. The Labour Government encouraged a role for 
the EPC foreign policy institutions in Lusophone Africa and Portugal, which supports the 
argument that James Callaghan came to see their value, despite wider scepticism at European 
integration.
1114
 Therefore the mid-1970s was a period when the EEC and other European 
institutions were an influence on British policymaking. However, this cannot be seen as 
evidence of an enthusiastic approach to the European project, and despite their differences on 
policy, the Labour Government was more willing to work with the US administration on 
Portugal than with its European partners. The appeal of the West European social model was 
critical to the democratic outcome of the Portuguese Revolution, particularly during the 1976 
election campaigns.
1115
 Britain’s increasing economic and political problems, by comparison 
with other West European states, meant it was less able to present a clear alternative vision 
for their future which would resonate with the Portuguese public.
1116
 However, the 
assumption within the Labour Government immediately after the April Revolution that a 
democratic outcome in Lisbon was assured provided elections were held, showed an 
optimism that Western Europe now shared a common set of political values, and that the 
Portuguese people would embrace the same political system as other states.  
The encouragement of Lusophone African independence immediately after the April 
Revolution demonstrates the continued importance of the British Commonwealth to the 
Labour Government. Despite initial expectations that it might retain global influence through 
the Commonwealth, Britain’s relationship with the organisation was damaged by its failure to 
act decisively against the white racialist regimes of southern Africa. On returning to office in 
1974 the Labour Government sought to re-establish these ties through regular consultations 
with Nigeria, Zambia and Tanzania, the leading African Commonwealth members. This 
supports the view of historians that Britain still had a role outside Europe during the 1970s, 
and that the Commonwealth continued to shape policy.
1117
 The Labour Government’s 
concern in southern Africa was the assistance that these states might bring to a resolution of 
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the Rhodesian question. Its response also showed that it was concerned with its reputational 
damage at the OAU and the UN General Assembly. This demonstrates that the Labour 
Government was aware of the increasing importance of the developing world in global 
politics, particularly within multilateral organisations, and the potential damage to its 
relations elsewhere if it did not take their interests into account. 
Britain’s response to events in Portugal demonstrates that multilateral organisations 
were increasingly influential in its approach to foreign policy. This thesis shows that the 
Labour Government’s response was a pragmatic reaction to Britain’s declining power, rather 
than a distinctively new internationalist approach to foreign policy as historians have 
suggested. The Labour Government did not grasp the full potential for the use of its soft 
power in Portugal, and still thought largely in terms of a traditional approach to foreign 
policy. The Labour Government’s initial response to events in Portugal was conducted 
bilaterally, reflecting its confidence and unity during 1974. It was only when developments in 
Lisbon became a political crisis during 1975 with wider implications for international politics 
that the Labour Government worked through western multilateral organisations. The most 
significant factors shaping Britain’s foreign policy remained the Cold War and the Anglo-
American relationship, but its means of achieving its foreign policy objectives involved 
working through multilateral organisations, particularly alongside West European states in 
the EEC and Socialist International. However, its reliance on multilateral diplomacy 
compromised its policy towards Portugal because of the need to reach agreement with other 
sovereign powers, many of whom had greater diplomatic influence, or were without the depth 
of political and economic crisis facing the British government. Hence its first instinct was to 
achieve its aims through bilateral action (whilst closely consulting the United States) before 
actively promoting a role for multilateral organisations during the Hot Summer as events 
became a greater threat to Britain’s national interest.  
However, the importance of multilateral organisations is demonstrated by its concern 
with maintaining Britain’s reputation amongst member states, especially its desire to be seen 
as a facilitator between western states. Its multilateral approach also means that discerning its 
exact role within the response is a challenge for diplomatic historians. This served to limit the 
damage to Britain’s relations with Portugal. It is illustrative that Portuguese historians argue 
that the assistance given by the EEC was critical to the eventual democratic outcome but do 
not explore the role of particular states. There is evidence that its economic weakness meant 
that Britain could not take a leading role within western organisations.  
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This thesis has also allowed a consideration of the foreign policy making process in 
Britain during the mid-1970s. It has looked at the influence of actors both inside and outside 
government and at how decisions were reached. The dominant individual in Britain’s response to 
events in Lisbon was James Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary until his resignation in April 1976. 
Although he informed the Prime Minister and Cabinet of his approach to Portugal and always 
considered advice from Whitehall and Labour ministers, the development of British policy and 
critical decisions were invariably his alone. His personal papers held at the Bodleian Library also 
show that he had a clear personal interest in the Portuguese Revolution and the success of the PSP 
which went beyond the immediate pursuit of the British national interest. There is no evidence 
that Callaghan had a similar interest in any other foreign policy issue during this period. By 
contrast, his successor, Anthony Crosland, showed little interest in events in Portugal (which 
confirms the view that he avoided stating a strong position on any issue until he had carefully 
considered the evidence).
1118
 Hence the personality, background and capability of individual 
Foreign Secretaries and their interpretations of the role, rather than just the formal constitutional 
processes of decision making, are crucial to foreign policy making.  
This study supports the view that the role of Foreign Secretary became an extremely 
challenging one during this period. There were a number of occasions when Callaghan was 
distracted from his Cabinet role, such as when campaigning for the General Election and the 
Labour Party leadership elections, or when events such as the Cyprus crisis or the EEC 
referendum claimed his attention, to the detriment of his concentration on events in Lisbon. 
Callaghan’s personal papers include the exact record of every telephone conversation he made 
whilst Foreign Secretary.
1119
 These are a fascinating insight into both the myriad issues he faced 
during this period and the difficulty of addressing them simultaneously. This contrasts with the 
impression given by reading the chronologically ordered official records organised by foreign 
policy area at the National Archives. The lack of a clear structure to daily business meant that 
policy making was influenced as much by other issues at the time as by the evolution of a 
particular foreign policy concern. This demonstrates the weakness of the British foreign policy 
making process where there is no clear deputy official, or parallel department like a National 
Security Council, empowered to lead on foreign policy.
1120
 Overall, it appears that Callaghan saw 
Portugal as an important issue which the Labour Government could influence, but it was one that 
was often overwhelmed by other events or political imperatives. 
                                                             
1118 Kevin Jeffreys, Anthony Crosland (London: Politicos, 2008), p.200. 
1119 Callaghan Papers, Box 136. 
1120 Dickie, Inside the Foreign Office, p.294.  
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The Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was only an intermittent participant in policy making 
towards Portugal. This supports the argument that his prime ministerial style during his third term 
was to allow ministers a large degree of policy independence. By this stage he clearly had a close 
personal relationship with Callaghan, with regular contact with his office. He also did not have 
the same level of interest in foreign policy that he had shown during his 1960s governments. 
However, Wilson’s personal encouragement of talks on Lusophone decolonisation indicates his 
particular interest in resolving the Rhodesian question which had caused him and the Labour 
Party such political difficulties during his previous term. His direct involvement in policy making 
was often when there were front-page reports on Portugal in the British press, such as 
immediately after the April Revolution and during the Hot Summer. During 1975 a series of 
international gatherings of Heads of State increased the role of the Prime Minister.
1121
 Harold 
Wilson often led discussion on Portugal at international conferences and during bilateral 
meetings, although he was briefed carefully prior to the meetings by Callaghan or the FCO rather 
than expressing his personal views. His forceful and impassioned performance on these occasions 
does not support the view that his physical and mental capacities were in decline prior to his 
resignation, as is often claimed.
1122
  
The Labour Cabinet did not play a direct role in Britain’s response. Developments in 
Portugal are only mentioned in Cabinet minutes on seven occasions during the revolution.
1123
 
These largely consisted of statements by the Foreign Secretary summarising both the situation in 
Portugal and Britain’s policy response. Its concerns were mainly the Cold War implications of 
events during 1975, alongside Britain’s contribution to the evacuation of Portuguese citizens from 
Angola. Despite the seriousness of the situation and its impact on British interests elsewhere, 
there was no extended discussion of the Labour Government’s policy approach. It is illustrative 
that Tony Benn only mentions events in Portugal twice in his diaries, and despite being a minister 
of the radical left who was often in confrontation with the Labour leadership during this period, 
he did not express an individual opinion on the Labour Government’s response.1124 This supports 
the argument of historians who downplay the significance of the Cabinet on foreign policy 
making during this period, although an interesting feature of the Labour Government’s response 
was the role of individual ministers, many of whom took a close interest in events in Portugal 
                                                             
1121 Young, Britain and the World. pp 166-167. 
1122 Pimlott, Harold Wilson, pp.681-685. 
1123 CAB 128 - 54/14, 54/25, 56/8, 56/6, 56/16, 57/7, 57/12.  
1124 Tony Benn, Against the Tide, pp. 315-315, p. 423.     
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even though these did not directly relate to their ministerial area.
1125
 The House of Commons and 
Lords held a series of foreign policy debates which mentioned the Portuguese Revolution, 
especially during those concerned with détente and the Helsinki Summit. A series of questions on 
Portugal were asked by MPs expressing concern at threats to British business interests. This 
alongside other forms of lobbying had a discernible impact on the Labour Government’s policy 
response, particularly its decision to approach the sixth provisional government to protect British 
interests in Portugal in late 1975 (giving some support for Theakstone’s argument that “the impact 
of Parliament on the conduct of foreign policy and the behaviour of FCO ministers should not be 
underestimated”).1126  
The Labour Party remained extremely influential in policy making towards Portugal 
throughout the Carnation Revolution. Callaghan’s private papers reveal that there was continuous 
correspondence on Portugal between party members and Labour Party ministers, such as Tom 
McNally and Ron Hayward, much of which was completely separate from the FCO. The London 
talks between the new government in Lisbon and the PAIGC in 1974 were organised by party 
officials independently of the Labour leadership. Support for the PSP was given through the 
Labour Party and the Socialist International rather than the British Government. This was not for 
partisan reasons only (although the Labour Party had strong links with their Portuguese 
counterparts before the April Revolution), rather that conducting policy through party institutions 
allowed democracy to be promoted without leading to accusations of intervention in Portugal’s 
sovereign affairs. It was also politic to support the PSP rather than other moderate parties because 
the Portuguese electorate were not likely to vote for parties further to the right after decades of 
authoritarian rule. Hence supporting the PSP was in the British national interest, and doing so 
through existing partisan ties made the Labour Government’s policy more effective. However, the 
resolute support for the PSP among certain ministers does suggest that events in Portugal had a 
strong emotional resonance within the Labour movement because of their implications for Spain, 
whose Civil War had been a powerful formative experience for that generation. This appears to 
have been the motive of the TUC’s involvement in Portugal; the personal archive of Jack Jones 
for the mid-1970s includes regular correspondence with Spanish civil war veterans.
1127
  
The increasing disunity in the Labour Government between the Labour leadership and 
more radical democratic socialist members, which would cause a schism within the Labour 
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1126 Ibid., p.36. 
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248 
 
movement during the early 1980s, are present in the response to the Portuguese Revolution. 
In particular the International Department of the National Executive Committee pursued a 
course at variance to that of the Labour leadership. The reports published after visits by 
committee members to Portugal during the Hot Summer argued that Labour Governments 
should support social revolution rather than the establishment of parliamentary 
democracy.
1128
 This made it more difficult for the Labour Government to pursue a coherent 
approach towards events in Lisbon. In particular, its relations with Soares during late-1975 
were damaged by ideological factionalism within the Labour Party. Overall, these differences 
on Portugal within the Labour Party foreshadowed disagreements on NATO membership and 
relations with the United States in the 1980s.   
 
The Conservative Party actively supported Portugal’s transition to democracy. This 
appears to demonstrate the British convention of bipartisan cooperation on foreign policy issues 
of national importance. However, there was no all-party collaboration on Portugal. The 
Conservative Party supported the centre-right CDS rather than the PSP. It was also on occasions 
critical of the Labour Government’s approach to Portugal during parliamentary debate. There 
were private discussions between the Labour Government and the Conservative Party on 
supporting the moderate political parties in Lisbon before the 1975 constituent assembly 
elections. The FCO also gave practical assistance to the Conservative Party’s efforts to support 
the CDS. However, its initiatives were pursued separately from the Labour Government and 
without regular consultation. There was no antagonism between British parties, partly because the 
political situation in Lisbon meant that no party to the right of the CDS had any chance of 
winning, or even the opportunity of contesting, an election in Lisbon. It meant the Conservative 
Party had to accept, like Kissinger in Washington, that the success of the PSP was critical for a 
democratic outcome in Portugal. 
The FCO was not always able to operate effectively during the Portuguese Revolution. 
The British Embassy and the Southern European Department had not been working to remove the 
previous regime and were compromised by their decision to support Caetano’s proposed visit to 
London in 1973 despite public protests. The British Embassy failed to predict the April 
Revolution and the likely course of events thereafter. This was exacerbated by the appointment of 
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a new ambassador in Lisbon immediately before the revolution. The British Embassy was largely 
reactive to developments in Portugal; although it became better informed, the Labour Government 
often relied on British press reports or its contact with Soares for information, which had a 
detrimental impact on its understanding of developments in Portugal. There are otherwise 
inexplicable gaps in the FCO files at important points during the Portuguese Revolution which 
suggest that there was not always a sustained interest in unfolding events. This meant that the 
Labour Government’s approach to Portugal was characterised by periods of indecisiveness 
punctuated by rapid decisions made in response to events. In particular this is seen where Soares 
was often able to intervene in the policy making process with a warning or request which would 
lead to a reaction by the Labour leadership, rather than through the reporting of the British 
Embassy. During 1975 the Embassy became increasingly concerned with protecting British 
business interests rather than with the wider implication of events on the national interest.  
 
The debate within Whitehall on how to respond to events in Portugal does not support the 
international relations Bureaucratic Politics model.
1129
 The outcome of the dispute on the 
provision of financial assistance to Portugal during 1975 was a compromise between different 
departments, despite Harold Wilson’s personal intervention, but this was a rare occurrence and 
demonstrates more the immense and perennial influence of the Treasury within Whitehall.
1130
 
There were no differences on the fundamental British national interest in Portugal, which 
remained the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, although a range of other influences 
did shape British policy at various stages of the revolution (such as the protection of its farmers in 
the Atlentejo region at the end of 1975). It is also difficult to apply the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model because leading Whitehall officials are not party appointees and are expected to accept the 
political direction of their ministers. There was a strong consensus on Portugal among Labour 
Ministers and therefore the national interest was decided after internal debate rather than being a 
compromise between government departments with differing approaches.   
The seriousness of the political situation in Lisbon shaped how policy towards 
Portugal was made within the Labour Government. During the most significant crises the 
Labour leadership decided its approach alongside the highest ranking FCO officials. They 
demonstrated greater concern with the wider international implications of the Portuguese 
Revolution than did the British Embassy and the Southern European Department, both of 
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which stressed the indigenous causes of events. The influence of Soares on the Labour 
Government was also crucial in determining whether developments in Lisbon were seen as a 
Cold War crisis. It appears that FCO officials concerned with the wider Cold War believed 
that the threat of Soviet intervention was a reality (based on their understanding of its 
intentions during détente), whereas those whose concern was narrowly with events in 
Portugal understood the actual significance of communist intervention (which although 
significant would not determine the outcome of events in Lisbon). This supports the argument 
that leading FCO officials should be considered the ‘last Cold Warriors’ of British foreign 
policy, and that the Labour leadership was concerned primarily with maintaining a close 
relationship with the United States.
1131
 The difference in their approach is most clearly seen 
during the attempted coup d’état of November 1975, when the British Embassy and the SED 
remained sanguine in facing the possibility of communist takeover whilst the Labour 
leadership appears to have held discussions with the Ford Administration on possible covert 
intervention.  
 
The Labour Government’s approach to the Portuguese Revolution was also shaped by 
actors outside government. The British media was not a significant influence on the Labour 
Government’s approach, but there were occasions when its coverage caused difficulties in its 
relations with politicians in Lisbon. There were varied British business interests in Portugal (and 
Lusophone Africa) resulting from its historic relationship. British businesses in the north of 
Portugal were not directly harmed by the revolution, reflecting both the political stability of the 
region and their local influence through long established ties. However, British farmers in the 
southern Alentejo region faced expropriation during the Hot Summer. This led to lobbying of the 
Labour Government (either directly or through Westminster MPs), which had some influence on 
its policy, especially on bilateral relations with Lisbon. The British Embassy also gave an 
increasing amount of time to the protection of British interests. However, despite the damage to 
its interests during the Portuguese Revolution, defending them was never a priority for the Labour 
Government. Indeed, Britain often appeared reluctant to defend its interests in Lisbon, fearing 
(considering its past close economic relationship with the Salazar regime) that this would 
antagonise the provisional government and the Portuguese public, and thereby undermine British 
diplomatic influence. It was also sanguine concerning the possibility that the Marxist national 
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liberation movements in Lusophone Africa might introduce nationalisation programmes that 
would harm British interests. 
The recent release of government records for the period has allowed a study of 
Britain’s policy towards the Portuguese Revolution, but a definitive account can only be 
written once documents currently subject to the Official Secrets Act are made accessible. In 
particular the role of MI6 remains unclear. It has not admitted to being involved, but given 
the seriousness of the situation in Portugal it is unlikely that there were no operatives in 
Lisbon. There are historical accounts which refer to its involvement, but these are not 
substantiated by public sources. The National Archives hold a number of documents on the 
Portuguese Revolution which remain closed, although this might be to avoid compromising 
politicians still active in Portugal, such as Mario Soares, rather than being evidence of the 
existence of covert operations. The US archives include reference to covert activity, but these 
documents are redacted, giving little detail of either their scale or significance. They give no 
evidence of close cooperation with the Labour Government. British government records for 
the period make no mention, or even allusion, to the role of the secret services. At present it 
is only possible to speculate on the role of MI6, and while its archives remain closed this will 
remain the case; but the recent publication of its official history suggests that future historians 
might be given access to documents from this period.  
The democratic outcome in Portugal is seen to be hugely significant by political 
scientists studying late-twentieth century democratic transitions. This study has considered 
the evolution of British policy towards developments in Lisbon. There would be value in 
further research into its response to similar democratic transitions in the following decades, 
from Spain in the late 1970s to Eastern Europe during the 1990s, to assess what influence its 
policy towards Portugal had on its approach to future developments. It would be interesting 
to investigate whether there was closer cooperation between the main Westminster parties in 
supporting emerging parties elsewhere, and whether there was an evolution in the role of the 
BBC from reporting events to encouraging political change. Britain’s response may have 
been shaped by the increasing importance of human rights and civic action groups. It would 
also be of interest to assess whether Britain sought to influence the military leadership in 
these states to ensure a democratic outcome. Finally, it would be interesting to explore 
whether the British government gave greater bilateral economic assistance during periods of 
stronger economic performance or whether it continued with a multilateral approach.  
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The Portuguese Revolution was considered to be an extremely significant foreign 
policy episode in Britain. This is also the case in contemporary media coverage. Ben Pimlott, 
a British freelance journalist in Lisbon (later the biographer of Harold Wilson), speculated: 
“It may be premature to place the 1974 Portuguese coup d’état alongside the Fall of the 
Bastille or the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, as a key turning point in history. 
Perhaps in ten years’ time the idea will not seem so fanciful.”1132 Instead, Portugal became a 
stable, prosperous democracy firmly in the western alliance, and as a result the Labour 
Government’s response to the Carnation Revolution has not received the scholarly attention 
that it deserves. 
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